Social Justice and Social Security Committee

Meeting date: Thursday, November 30, 2023

Official Report 623KB pdf

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Delivering Scottish Social Security

Welcome back. Our next item of business is an evidence session with Dr Sally Witcher, the former chair of the Scottish Commission on Social Security, commonly known as SCOSS. The purpose of this session is to gain further insight into what lessons for the Scottish social security system can be learned from what has happened up to now.

I warmly welcome Dr Witcher to the meeting. I thank her for accepting our invitation and I also put on record our thanks for all the work and effort that she has put into designing and supporting Scotland’s social security system up to now. Before we move to questions, I invite her to make an opening statement.

I start by thanking the committee clerks and convener for their action to mitigate the risk for me, as one of many people who remain at high risk from Covid, of being with you today in person, thereby enabling me to do so.

I am delighted to have the opportunity to share with you my reflections on my former role as chair of SCOSS in the context of a career spanning 30 years, in which social security has been a recurrent theme.

My learning concerns the strengths, weaknesses and suchlike arising through the innovative development of Scottish social security, as discussed in my article for the Journal of Social Security Law. Key to that are the constraints arising from the many interdependencies between reserved and devolved benefits.

I was truly sorry to resign from my role as SCOSS chair last year. My commitment to the goals for devolved social security and to the important role of SCOSS was undiminished but, while recognising that there has been much valuable innovation, my assessment of what the Scottish Government can realistically achieve has considerably reduced.

I will highlight the following points. The high-level architecture of the new system that was set out in the Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018 was remarkably coherent, anchored by a set of principles spanning all stages of the process, from policy development to delivery to continuous improvement. Those principles were translated into practice by an enforceable charter, and people with lived experience have been integrated throughout the development and implementation of the system in highly innovative and valuable ways. However, there are always going to be significant challenges to maintaining coherence and simplicity when translating policy into legislation, delivery and impact in a turbulent, short-termist political environment, with rapid churn of key players and changing end-user needs, often attributable to failures in other areas of policy, but also, of course, the Covid-19 pandemic. Much complexity is added by the multiple interdependencies that shackle the Scottish Government to a Westminster Government that is pulling in a very different and, in my view, cruel and destructive ideological direction.

Far from there being complete autonomy over devolved benefits—which was anticipated and is still, I fear, sometimes expected—devolved benefits serve as a passport for reserved benefits and vice versa. The Scottish Government is tied to Westminster in terms of budgets. Where Westminster accepts differently framed devolved benefits as passports for reserved benefits, there is the on-going need for the respective delivery systems to exchange information on eligibility.

Westminster could pull the rug from under the devolved system whenever it chooses, and it is showing clear signs that it might well do so. If Westminster tightens the eligibility for reserved benefits, that can have an impact on access to devolved benefits, and the Scottish Government cannot do anything to increase Westminster expenditure without meeting that cost itself.

That plays out into SCOSS’s scrutiny role in ensuring that new devolved regulations fit with the rest of the devolved system and UK benefits, too. It is a unique model as a body with potentially wider application—it is a way of inserting much-needed expertise and continuity. It means that knowledge is directly inserted into the legislative process in what is otherwise a very fluid environment. It will never be independently able to determine its own work plan, but it must remain independent from Government and Parliament via this committee, although closely connected to both. SCOSS is not just another stakeholder for the committee. A strong relationship is helpful to both.

I regret that, due to secretariat challenges, we were not able to give more time to the social security charter, which was co-designed with people with lived experience. It has been a very effective tool in setting Social Security Scotland’s standards and culture from the bottom up, but it has been underutilised and perhaps in some ways misunderstood.

It is clear that there have been a lot of developments since I left my role. Obviously, the Social Security (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill is one of them. It is great to see some sensible recommendations that address some of the governance issues that I have highlighted.

There have also been challenges in the roll-out of the adult disability payment, as I suspected there might be. The independent review of ADP is pending, and other devolved areas of responsibility obviously still have to be rolled out. Everything will be impacted by the sorts of challenges and constraints that I have outlined, but there remain significant ways in which the Scottish Government has made, and still can make, a positive difference to the lives of claimants, if not on the scale that some of us perhaps would have wished.

I welcome members’ questions with some trepidation, as I am no longer on top of the detail in the way that I was. I am not immersed in the area, and I am thoroughly out of practice in appearing before committees. With that caveat, I hand back to you, deputy convener.

Thank you, Dr Witcher. Those are very helpful opening remarks.

I hope that one of my colleagues will return later in the evidence session to the financial challenges and the relationship between devolved and reserved benefits. I will not take up those cudgels in my opening question—I will be a bit more geekish.

In our predecessor Social Security Committee, which I convened, we used to appreciate reports by SCOSS that made quite significant recommendations to the Government on how it could improve the roll-out and delivery of a whole variety of matters. By and large—I would say this—that seemed to work well. The recommendations were robust, there was clarity and the Government seemed to respond—not always, but by and large—positively and constructively. I am a Government back bencher, and it suits me to say those things, but have I captured things accurately? Is that one of the things that have worked well, or does more need to be done to support SCOSS in that role going forward?

SCOSS was always very concerned to ensure that the recommendations that it made were realistic. Sometimes, that led us to some unpalatable conclusions, but it was also important that we were careful about wading too far into the policy terrain of decisions that were—rightly, because they needed to be—matters for political judgment. Most of the recommendations were accepted, and it has most definitely shown its worth as a key cog in the social security environment.

In my time, there were significant challenges, as I itemise in my article, around support, the nature of resources and the very rapid churn of temporary staff in the secretariat, which hampered what we were able to do. That was unfortunate. The issues did not necessarily arise through a lack of effort on the part of officials. The Scottish Government’s civil service has incredibly cumbersome processes—much as the DWP did, from what I remember from when I worked there—and it is very hard to make them work fast when you need them to do so.

Because of the way in which we were set up, I found that I was in a difficult position in that I was chair of a board that had no direct line responsibility for the secretariat. I was not even allowed to be on the selection panel for the post of secretary. In effect, that is like the board of a body not being able to be involved in recruiting its chief executive. Officials did their best to make sure that I was involved where that was possible. For the first recruitment, I was involved, although, probably, I should not have been involved.

That was difficult because, as the board of a separately constituted body, we had responsibilities—for governance and delivery, for example—but no constitutional levers to drive that. That was all within the gift of the Scottish Government, and if, for whatever reason, the Scottish Government was unable to deliver, there was nothing that we could do about that. However, I, as chair, felt responsible. That was not always a comfortable place to be.

I was pleased, therefore, that, when I made—let us say—suggestions that some of those issues might usefully be addressed, those were heeded. A review has been carried out and has come up with largely very sensible recommendations. From what I have seen, the changes in the bill will go a considerable way towards addressing some of the governance issues. Meanwhile, the secretariat has been much expanded, with permanent staff. My feeling is, therefore, that SCOSS is now well equipped to carry its role forward. That is important.

We achieved what we did despite the lack of support and in the face of difficulties, rather than having support to drive us forward.

Dr Witcher, it is not often that a witness comes to the committee, identifies the problems, then, in the same response, gives the solution and says that everything has been delivered, so I thank you. I have one brief further question, although I may come back in later, depending on time.

According to the paper that we read ahead of today’s meeting, you are keen that the expertise that is captured in SCOSS is used proactively as well as reactively. Alongside scrutinising regulations and legislation and making recommendations for what should be tweaked, altered, made clearer and so on, I think that you were talking about SCOSS taking a much more proactive role. A pattern is emerging in the interaction between devolved and reserved social security matters, and there is a suggestion that a piece of research—a bit of proactive work in relation to that—would be helpful. Can SCOSS currently not do that because it is not able to do it or is not resourced to do it? You mentioned it in your paper. Could you say a wee bit about that, before colleagues come in with some other questions?

I am not entirely sure that I have understood the question, so please stop me if I have not got the right end of the stick. The problem is the way in which Governments are structured—in the way that they work, the way that the civil service works and the way that politics works. There is very little continuity. People gain expertise, then go. Convener, as the convener of this committee’s predecessor committee, you are a rare exception in coming back to the area, but, generally speaking, people gain expertise then go away, and somebody else comes in with different ideas and so on. What is really lacking in a complex area such as this is that kind of consolidation of expertise—that institutional memory, if you like—and strategic oversight that looks backwards, forwards and across at the same time. That is what I think that SCOSS brings to the table.

10:15  

There could be scope for SCOSS to do more proactively. The charter potentially opens the door for that with more resourcing—which it now, hopefully, has—because the body will be able to proactively initiate reports on matters contained therein. However, in my view, the commission is not quite as open in what it can do as is the equivalent Social Security Advisory Committee at Westminster, which under its powers can, quite independently of anything, decide that it wants to investigate something and then go off and do that.

The charter very explicitly focuses on the role of the Scottish Government and Social Security Scotland, but, as I have outlined in the paper and just now, what the commission can or cannot do is very much impacted by the DWP and other players. There are some challenges in that respect. For example, how, through the charter, can you look at that bigger picture of underlying factors when the commission has no direct relationships with, say, DWP officials? I also cannot imagine that DWP officials will be terribly keen to have that relationship with us, either.

I do not know whether that answers your question. Was that what you were seeking?

I think that it does answer it. The important thing is that you have laid out quite clearly not just the limitations but the opportunities going forward, and you have just left that comment about the relationship with DWP officials hanging. That absolutely needs to be developed.

However, I will not explore that further, because we have a ream of colleagues who want to ask questions, and I do not want to dominate the session. I call Jeremy Balfour.

Good morning, Dr Witcher. I am sorry that I am not with you in person, but thank you for the evidence that you have given so far.

You were around during the passage of the Social Security (Scotland) Bill. One of the questions that we asked at the time was whether the charter should have legal authority behind it. The committee and, indeed, the Government said no to that question. Should we revisit that? Does the charter need a legal basis so that people can challenge it in some way, or is it working as it is at the moment?

That is a really interesting question. One of the important things about the charter is that it has more teeth than most charters, which, frankly, are not worth the paper that they are written on—in my humble opinion.

The charter contains enforcement measures not just via the commission but via reporting to the Parliament, and that is one area where it has perhaps been underutilised. It potentially provides a vehicle through which, for example, this committee could be asking questions and holding Social Security Scotland and the Scottish Government to account. That is perhaps something to consider.

At the moment, I have no fixed views on whether legal backing would be essential or would add value. However, the charter needs to be made meaningful. The mechanisms that are in place have not been fully tested yet. If they do not deliver the level of enforcement that was promised—if they do not have the teeth—then yes, legal enforcement is definitely something worthy of consideration.

Thank you—that was helpful.

I just have a couple of quick questions. The first is about an issue that has already been addressed with the convener. The timescales on which you were asked to respond to consultation documents presented a challenge. Will you outline how the process worked? Did you have enough time to respond to the documents, particularly the ones on regulations, which were very detailed?

Yes, the timescales were very often a challenge. The legislative timetable was a challenge and the intervention of the pandemic did not help matters, because a lot became backlogged. In the year after lockdowns, a huge amount of business came our way.

I am trying to be realistic here. Yes, in an ideal world, SCOSS would certainly have more time, governments would probably have more time and committees would have more time. However, we are not living in that world, and we have to be realistic.

Although the 2018 act says that SCOSS should be given the time that it needed, the reality was that, if there was a legislative timetable imperative for some regulations to be done by a certain point, that would happen whether we reported or not. If we missed the boat, we could still report but doing so at that point did not have the impact that it would have done.

It is certainly the aim that SCOSS should be given as much time as it needs to report. That might be possible with better planning, but I do not know, because officials tried it and there were pressures that made that very hard. The problem was that there would not necessarily be one set of regulations to deal with in an inadequate amount of time; there would be a whole bundle coming together at once, and we had to deal with several, all with their own timelines. That was where it became extremely challenging.

That is helpful. You have mentioned the Social Security (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill. The committee is scrutinising the bill and we are carrying out a consultation. With your experience, if you could make one change to the bill, what would you add to it that is not in there at the moment?

You are assuming that I have actually read—

I apologise to you, Dr Witcher, as I suspect that you would like to see more than one change. I also apologise for cutting across you.

You are assuming, Mr Balfour, that I have read the bill in depth, scrutinised it and know to some extent what is in it in order to form a considered judgment. I regret to tell you that that is not the case. I have some thoughts on what I have seen, but I am not in a position to go into that level of detail. Also, I do not want to, because I have, I hope, a reputation for not giving off-the-cuff answers to things that I do not feel equipped to answer. SCOSS has the same reputation. I am happy to go away, look at it and come back with an answer to your question, having given it due consideration, but I would prefer not to attempt to answer it here and now, if that is all right with you.

That is absolutely fine.

The paper in which you reflect on your experiences is really helpful. You refer to Westminster’s

“less than glorious track record”

on social security benefits. It is fair to say that many of us have quite high expectations of what might be possible in Scotland. Indeed, in your paper, you talk about those

“high expectations bumping up against”

implicit and explicit constraints.

I am somebody who looks at outcomes. One of the surprises to me is, despite what the cabinet secretary said earlier, the frustration and experience of many claimants, who do not feel that the outcomes are much different from before. They still have to wait lengthy periods for benefits and, sometimes, those benefits are not granted.

There are two categories, I suppose. There is the creation of new benefits such as the Scottish child payment, and there is the migration of existing benefits. In relation to the latter, what are the lessons from our experiences so far about how we do that better—we do not want to just mirror what comes from down south—and how do we speed up the process to get to a better outcome? I know that a lot of that is about money, but perhaps we can put money to one side and focus on the aspects that are not about money.

There is a lot in that question and I want to make sure that I have understood it. Are you asking about the expectations for delivery and of what is delivered?

I am asking about what lessons you think have been learned over the past few years, so that we better migrate benefits in future to provide a quicker process to get to what might be a better outcome.

The constraints to which I refer in my paper have major roles to play in different respects. However, another constraint relates to the scale of the task of setting up a new delivery system from scratch while establishing a new group of benefits for that system to deliver. Although I do not look that old, I first entered the realm of social security in 1989. I remember the unmitigated shambles that ensued when the disability living allowance was introduced. The then chief executive of what was the Benefits Agency—the set-up was a bit like Social Security Scotland’s—was hauled in front of committees and “Newsnight” and had to account for that.

The reality is that setting up a new system takes time. It is important to take the time because safe and secure transition is the priority. In a way, it is impossible to have another priority because of the agency agreement—you have to do that first. If you also try to change what is being delivered while trying to transfer the benefits, you are attempting to run two processes at once. People may be transferring while also applying for other benefits or a changed benefit, which is immensely challenging to deliver. In a way, I suspect that a bit of that is what has happened with the roll-out of ADP, alongside the challenges with scale.

It is much more straightforward to deliver a high-quality, person-centred process at small scale. Larger systems do not do that so well because it takes more time and resource. You cannot always have your cake and eat it. Some of the very good things that Social Security Scotland is trying to do will take more time and, from a purely bottom-line basis, may cost a bit more. However, ultimately, the outcomes will be better.

Social Security Scotland has experienced some challenges. I understand the frustrations of politicians and benefit recipients, because I feel the same frustrations. However, if I apply my practical brain, I know that trying to go too fast will cause even more problems. That said, I am not into the nuts and bolts of Social Security Scotland’s systems, so I cannot say whether there are other ways to do it. I am aware that it has put in place some changes to its systems and that those are starting to deliver some results, but you will have to pick that up with the organisation. I do not know whether that answers your question. Does that help?

Yes. It has given a perspective, which is helpful.

You mentioned in your paper that you accepted that doing away with the 20m rule was not possible at that point. Can you share any further dilemmas around that issue? Just now, we are looking at employment injury assistance support, which has remained unchanged since 1948.

At the time, the main challenge was making a change to the benefit that was going to be delivered while transferring a load of benefits into the new system. That was going to cause a lot of challenges that could be impossible, or very hard work, to address. It is about the impact of those constraints.

10:30  

I listed different types of constraints in my paper. So many things are tied together. In a way, the role of the committee and of SCOSS is to tease out whether there is realistically room for manoeuvre. There often is, but we sometimes have to burrow quite deeply. There have been some positive changes to ADP, for example, but there are sometimes practical reasons for doing things.

What I passionately want—and, I suspect, what the committee passionately wants—can hit up against the practical realities of what can be done in the real world, and we have to come to terms with that, as was my experience. We quizzed officials and ministers thoroughly to try to find a way forward, and we had to conclude that our proposal could not be implemented at the time. It was a case of our saying, “Maybe in the future, but not now”.

Thank you. That is me.

That was short and sweet.

My question may be partly on the same theme. You wrote in your paper:

“It has been a story of high expectations bumping up against implicit, consequently rendered explicit, constraints”.

How many of the constraints are financial constraints? You have spoken quite a lot about bureaucracy, process and so on, but is one of the major constraints a lack of finance?

It is one of them, but another key one is the way in which reserved benefits give rise to eligibility for devolved ones, and vice versa. For example, I was recently looking into the UK Government’s response to the work capability assessment consultation. There is a paragraph in it that makes it very clear that the assessment is an interim measure but that, in due course, the Government’s aim is basically to use the personal independence payment assessment.

My question is: if PIP—for which ADP is the equivalent—is to become a route into, or aligned with eligibility for, a reserved benefit, as in universal credit-type benefits, what does that mean for ADP if it is made more generous, and would the DWP regard that as a passport to the reserved benefit? In effect, there would be an inequitable system. If PIP was less generous and ADP was more generous, and both granted access to the same things under universal credit, that becomes problematic and inequitable. People would have to go through a separate assessment and effectively do a PIP assessment on top of an ADP one. I am talking about examples such as that and whether the DWP accepts a benefit with more generous criteria serving as a passport for reserved benefit. What happens if it does not? That is a key issue.

Officials and SCOSS—certainly officials—always had to have an eye to whether what they were doing would be acceptable to the DWP. That was not at all what people understood when the system was set up. That was not my understanding, for sure—I was perhaps overoptimistic. Such constraints are very real.

There are other constraints, too. When the Scottish child payment was introduced, it relied on the DWP providing information so that the payment could be extended. If the DWP did not do that, the whole thing got held up. There are a lot of different ways in which such things interconnect, and finance is certainly part of it. If Westminster decides to cut eligibility and budgets, that will feed through to Scotland. As far as I am aware, the Scottish Government does not have a whole lot of money down the back of the sofa to play with, and we have to be realistic about that.

In quite a lot of what you have said, you have emphasised the relationship between Holyrood—including the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament and everything else—and Westminster. That is obviously not something that we can control. I note that you say:

“I warmly welcomed and reciprocated the keenness of the then Chair of Westminster’s SSAC to liaise regularly with SCoSS”.

That sounds positive, although I do not know whether that is continuing now that you are not there. Is there anything that we in Scotland can do to improve the relationship with the DWP, or is it just going to be one of those things that fluctuates over time?

Again, it is very hard to say. I think that you are right: it will fluctuate over time. It may even be contingent on personalities. Officials may work together well, but they are obviously answerable to ministers, who will have different agendas. I think that there is a cultural divergence between the direction of travel for DWP ministers and the UK Government and what the Scottish Government is trying to do with a system that is based on fairness, dignity and respect. That is perhaps just something to be mindful of.

In the early days, SCOSS had very good relations with the chair of SSAC. The new chair seemed less keen to engage with us. There may have been entirely good reasons for that, but I cannot comment on that. I have no idea what that relationship is now, but it is a very important one, in my view. If it works well, it can be immensely valuable to both SSAC’s and our scrutiny.

However, my sense is that the DWP ministers are, to be frank, not very interested in devolved social security. It is not uppermost in their minds—or even, possibly, at the back of their minds. I suspect that the ramifications of what they do for devolved social security are not something that they are frightfully bothered about. I would like to be wrong about that. I look forward to being proven wrong.

That is also helpful. Another comment that you make is:

“Despite such constraints on policy changes, Scottish Government has thankfully been able to diverge a long way from Westminster”.

Is that more about how we do things, rather than the actual content?

Generally speaking, we have a lot of leeway in how we do things. We should not underestimate the importance of that. The experience that people have in engaging with DWP processes is pretty horrendous, a lot of the time. That should certainly not be the case when they deal with Social Security Scotland, despite its recent difficulties. The charter is a way of trying to drive standards, and accountability is built into that, as we have discussed.

In relation to what is delivered, things are more compromised and constrained. Part of the skill in my role and SCOSS’s role was in ducking and diving, testing out little routes and possibilities, and asking a lot of questions. Could we do it like this? Why do we not do it like that? Why is it done like this? We have to be realistic, but we also have to challenge what realistic means to try to find scope for innovation.

The involvement of people with lived experience has been important in the way that the system has been set up because, as I ask in my article, if it does not work for the people who are at the sharp end, what is the point? What are we all doing? It is surely those people whom the whole thing is supposed to benefit, and they are the ones who know whether it benefits them. That is a very important perspective and a very important feature of the devolved system. It is not present in the Westminster one, and I think that it shows.

Hello, and thank you very much indeed for the information. I will be mopping up, because I have some questions that are based on your answers to other questions.

In response to my colleague Mr Mason, you said that some of the hope in the initial stages of the setting up of SCOSS, as regards how things would or could be in the early days, has not quite come to fruition. Given those challenges, do you think that the devolved benefits system is as good as it could be? You have highlighted that it has maybe not quite met the aspirations that you had at first.

I think that, in some ways—indeed, many ways—what has been done on devolved social security has probably made very good use of the unexpectedly limited room for manoeuvre that the Scottish Government really has. With SCOSS, I think that, yes, we could certainly have done more, but at that stage, the charter had not really kicked in; delivery was still small scale and, therefore, the need for challenge and oversight was perhaps not there at that time in the way that it will be—and probably is now, given the scaling up and the increased complexity of the different forms of provision that are being delivered and what is being transferred.

I think that the charter is up for review next year, and it will be incredibly important to hang on to its ethos and the fact that it is driven from the perspective of the people using the system. It will come into its own and become an even more useful tool.

In a sense, then, SCOSS did the essential work that it needed to do—and to a very high standard—and demonstrably added value. It could have done more, but the bits that it did not do are not irrevocable and were perhaps not the most important bits of the role at that time. They will become more important going forward.

That was helpful—thank you. A lot of the information that you have provided today, including the article that was sent to us, has been very helpful to me, as somebody who is reasonably new to the committee and does not have that systemic memory that you have mentioned.

Another question sprung to mind when you stated earlier in the session—in response to the deputy convener, I think—that SCOSS is now in a position where it could perhaps handle an increase in responsibility in what we are looking at. Earlier, the cabinet secretary was of the mind that that was maybe not the right way to go. Can you expand on why you think this is the right place for the commission to move forward and why it provides the right avenue for taking on that additional responsibility?

Are you talking specifically about industrial injuries?

I am, yes.

Part of the challenge is that I do not know what that benefit will be. Until we know what it is, we will not know what expertise we will need to scrutinise it and ensure that it is designed and delivered as effectively as possible. If it is to be along the lines of the IIAB, we will need a whole different set of perspectives, skills and knowledge. We will need clinical and epidemiological—or whatever the word is—knowledge, the views of employers and trades unions and, I would say, lived experience. SCOSS just does not have that. That is not what it is there to do, and it is not what it was designed for.

If you were to extend things in that way, you would, in effect, have to have everything that would be needed for a separate body, but it would be bundled in with what was already there. I am not even sure that that would be particularly helpful—well, it would not be helpful. It would merge things in such a way that you would still have quite distinct roles without their completely overlapping.

That said, I think that, given that SCOSS has that more strategic oversight, and given that this is one of a number of different kinds of provision, you could have a structure in which whatever new body was created, SCOSS—and perhaps the Scottish Fiscal Commission as, if you like, the third angle on this—could liaise to maintain the overarching oversight, which I think is pretty valuable. That is just a thought—it is not something that I have considered in depth—but I can see a need for that. However, I tell you now that, if something that was basically the Westminster equivalent were to be introduced in Scotland, SCOSS could not do the work. It is not the right body.

That was very informative—thank you. Thank you for your candour, too. I appreciate it.

10:45  

I have a couple of questions—I said at the start that I would come back in if there was time. My question is about the relationship between devolved and reserved benefits. The expectations on the Scottish social security system can sometimes be more complex than we realise. There is an expectation that the system will mitigate the worst aspects of the UK system, so 455,000 households in Scotland get a council tax reduction that they would not get elsewhere in the UK and £83 million has been spent to ensure that households do not suffer the bedroom tax and to mitigate, where possible, the benefits cap. We are spending directly on reserved matters.

We are also proactively progressive. I am thinking about the £450 million—or whatever the figure is—that is spent on the Scottish child payment. Dr Witcher, you said something interesting about policy overspill. I apologise if “generous” is the wrong word but, if we are more generous and have different rules—for example for Scottish disability assistance—and more people qualify for a passported benefit, there are cost implications that could effectively become a bill that is chargeable back to the Scottish Government under the terms of the fiscal framework.

As a committee, and as a nation, we do not always understand the financial underpinnings of that. My concern is that it is difficult to see, in one place, what the Scottish Government spends on mitigating Westminster policies, what it spends on other areas that are new to Scotland and the cost implications of policy overspill and passporting.

Do you have any reflections on that? I have used a jumble of words that might sound quite complicated. How can we boil that down to a user-friendly and easy-to-understand analysis of the numbers and do that consistently every year so that this committee, SCOSS and others can look at that and make an informed decision about what to do next with the Scottish social security system? We are very ambitious, but we must have the money to pay for that.

You are asking about a user-friendly way of doing that. Okay; let me think.

I very much like the way that you have segmented expenditure to soften the worst impacts and expenditure to do things differently or innovatively and add positive value, as opposed to just reducing those worst impacts. That might be an interesting kind of analysis for the Scottish Fiscal Commission to look at: it would not necessarily be a job for SCOSS.

I did not mention the Scottish child payment earlier, but that is an example of the Scottish Government going beyond just trying to make things less awful to doing something positive, different and useful, but it is very constrained, for a number of reasons. If I have understood it correctly—I may not have—the Social Security (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill includes a proposal to change the structure of the Scottish child payment so that it is no longer a top-up benefit but becomes a stand-alone one. That would be a very good idea, although it was done the way that it was done for good reasons.

There is a job of work to be done to communicate and have a grown-up conversation with people out there, and in the Parliament, about what is and is not feasible and why that is the case. It is important to be challenging, and the committee is here to ask awkward questions, as indeed is SCOSS. There will be creative ways forward that ministers and officials may not have thought of.

It will often be a matter of softening the worst impacts, which is not to be underestimated: it is very useful to do that. Every little helps. However, I suspect that that is not necessarily what people envisaged when the Scottish Government received the devolved powers. There were higher expectations. Making overly aspirational claims about what is possible does not serve stakeholders well. It is not useful or helpful, although I understand that there may be political drivers behind it.

That is helpful. Just to put it on the record, the cabinet secretary said in the previous evidence session that she would write to the committee to let us know what will be additionally spent on mitigating UK benefit changes. There is a gap between block grant adjustments and Barnett consequentials and overall social security spend, so I look forward to receiving that data. We need to ensure that we collect that data in an independent, consistent and user-friendly way every year to allow the committee to identify trends and, as you say, work out what is possible in relation to social security in the real world, but that is wandering on to Finance and Public Administration Committee territory.

As always with these lines of questions, Dr Witcher, there may be something that you wanted to say but have been unable to because we have taken you off on a tangent. I want to give you that opportunity. Unless colleagues have any further questions, I will give you the final word. Over to you, Dr Witcher.

I am not sure that I want to listen to the sound of my voice for much longer, even if you are content to do so. I have probably said what I needed to say. If I have further reflections following this, I would like to write to the committee, if I may. If there is anything specific that you would like me to advise on or give a view on, I am open to doing that, bearing in mind that I am not working on a paid basis. I am not earning any money being here; I am doing it out of the goodness of my heart—just so you know.

I talked about accumulated knowledge, and I may have some that could be helpful. I am very open to using that and putting it at the service of the committee and the Scottish Government if that would be helpful so, if you would like to draw on that, I am very willing to assist.

Dr Witcher, that is very kind of you. I should reassure you that we are not looking for unpaid consultancy or expert advisory work.

Good!

We have identified on a cross-party basis that you have absolute expertise combined with lived experience and a fiercely independent voice, and it is difficult to find individuals with all three attributes rolled into one. The committee would appreciate keeping some form of relationship with you going. Thank you very much for your time, and we will keep in contact.

That ends the formal part of the meeting, and we move into private session.

10:52 Meeting continued in private until 11:10.