Justice Committee

Meeting date: Tuesday, May 9, 2017

Official Report 529KB pdf

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Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1

Agenda item 4 is our opening evidence session on the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Bill, with the Scottish Government’s bill team. I welcome Phil Lamont, bill team leader; Kevin Philpott and Patrick Down, bill team members; and Catherine Scott from the directorate for legal services.

I refer members to paper 2, which is a note by the clerk, and paper 3, which is a Scottish Parliament information centre briefing. I remind members that the officials are here to explain policy, not to defend it.

I invite questions from members.

I want to raise a few issues today, the first of which concerns non-harassment orders. When we held our inquiry into the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, we heard direct evidence from victims of domestic abuse. We have also received written evidence on the matter following our call for evidence on the bill. People have requested that non-harassment orders should be not only considered but imposed in all such cases.

What is your response to the evidence that we have received and the request that non-harassment orders be imposed in all cases?

11:30  

It might be helpful if I confirm what we are doing in the bill. The bill will change the current general provision on non-harassment orders. At the moment, where any offence involves misconduct towards another person, the court has the ability to impose a non-harassment order to protect that person from the perpetrator. An application by the prosecutor is required; the court at its own hand cannot impose such an order, as it must have the application first.

The bill will change that general provision. If the bill is approved by Parliament, an application by the prosecutor will not be required for the new domestic abuse offence and the existing domestic abuse aggravation that was created last year in the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 and the court will have to consider whether to impose an order.

We are aware that some stakeholders consider that the bill should go further and say that the court should not only consider but impose an order in all situations. We understand where that desire comes from, but we think—given how we have approached the issue in the bill—that the correct approach is to leave discretion with the court, not least because there may be cases involving domestic abuse in which the circumstances are such that, for a variety of reasons, a non-harassment order may not be the right approach. We think that discretion should always lie with the court to understand the facts and circumstances of the case and make the decision. The bill says that the prosecutor no longer has to bring the matter to the court’s attention; the courts can make that decision, because it is a domestic abuse case.

The written evidence that was supplied to the committee was concerning because, of 502 cases, only 33 non-harassment orders were issued—Hamilton sheriff court is mentioned. We heard of the experience of victims who had to take the process to the civil courts, which is a much more expensive route. There is concern that very few orders have been issued so far. If the bill does not go any further and it is left to the discretion of the courts, we could still see relatively few non-harassment orders being issued.

There is a question about what proportion you would expect in domestic abuse cases; there are arguments about that, and you will probably hear evidence from stakeholders in due course. In the bill, we give what I suggest is a heavy hint to the courts about how to approach non-harassment orders in the context of domestic abuse cases. I accept that that does not go as far as some stakeholders might like on requiring the courts to impose orders, but it moves on from the current position in which the court cannot do anything until the prosecutor applies—that will no longer be the case.

In other evidence that we received, Children 1st talked about going a step further to extend non-harassment orders to include children. What is your view on that evidence?

I think that that is a reference to the way in which the bill is drafted. The provision that relates to non-harassment orders links back to the existing provision in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which refers to a non-harassment order being available where a victim is subject to misconduct. In a case a couple of years ago, a court ordered a non-harassment order for a partner who had been abused and also their children, but that was overturned on appeal because it was found that the court had gone too far in interpreting existing law.

The Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Bill still limits the order to the partner or ex-partner as the direct victim of the abuse. Children 1st and one or two other stakeholders have suggested that, because we have child aggravation in the bill, the policy could go further so that where a domestic abuse offence is proven and a child was involved in that abuse, a non-harassment order should be available for those children. We are happy to consider the views of members and stakeholders during stage 1 scrutiny on whether the provision in that area can go a bit further.

We will have to explore that as we go through.

Another point that has been raised is about the training of police forces. In England and Wales, eight out of 22 forces have not charged a single person with the offence, according to a freedom of information request. Nine forces, which are listed in our papers, have made two or fewer charges since the new law came into effect in England and Wales in December 2015. There is a concern that relatively few cases have been taken forward since the introduction of the offence.

What are the panel’s views on that? If the bill progresses and Scottish legislation is passed, how can we ensure that adequate training is in place for all police officers and that there is greater public awareness of the changes?

That is a fair point. I do not want to speak for Police Scotland, which I am sure will give evidence in due course and explain its approach to ensuring that officers on the ground are aware of what is contained in the new offence if the bill is approved by Parliament.

We have worked with Police Scotland, among others, in developing the offence, so it is certainly very well aware of the new offence that is contained in the bill. It also assisted us in the development of the financial memorandum that includes estimates for costings for training police officers. If Parliament approves the new offence, we will not rush its introduction.

The reference to England and Wales is to the coercive control offence; I would not want to comment on what has happened down there on that. As far as working with key stakeholders in Scotland is concerned, we would make sure that, as much as possible, Police Scotland is made entirely aware of the timeline such that it can prepare the training of its officers so that those who deal with domestic abuse on the ground are aware of how the new offence works and what new factors they need to look for in its investigation.

The Crown Office and the Lord Advocate will give guidance to Police Scotland about the investigation of such cases, and I am sure that the committee will want to explore that with the Crown Office when it gives evidence.

We are working closely with those partners so that they are aware of and are very clear about what is in the bill as it stands, and we will see how it goes through parliamentary scrutiny. The risk that Mairi Evans raises about what appears to have happened down south is one that we are very well aware of and which we want to avoid as much as possible.

A few written submissions mentioned that the law should comply with the Istanbul convention. If the legislation is passed, will it do so?

Part of the Istanbul convention contains a provision that requires extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to certain offences. The convention was agreed a few years ago, so this offence postdates it. If Parliament were to agree to the new offence, there would be a question on whether it should carry extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, if incidents of domestic abuse take place in this country, but the couple involved travel to another country—perhaps on holiday—could other incidents there also be included, so that a Scottish court could hear a prosecution of the totality of the abuse?

We will be happy to hear in due course the committee’s views on the suggestion that the bill could be extended in that way. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is an exception to the normal approach in criminal law matters, but it currently affects certain offences. The context of the Istanbul convention and the UK Government’s consideration of whether to ratify it are very relevant factors that I am sure the committee will want to consider in due course.

Thank you.

I want to pick up on part of Mairi Evans’s question about the effect of domestic abuse on children. The offence is restricted to abuse by partners and ex-partners. There have been concerns from a number of children’s charities that the effect on children has perhaps not been sufficiently recognised. The Government has sought to address that by providing that an offence will be considered to be aggravated where it involves a child. Is that strong enough? Does adding an aggravator sufficiently address the effect on children, given that we all know the damage that domestic abuse does to them?

The Scottish Government recognises that growing up in an environment in which domestic abuse takes place can harm children. The aggravation is intended to go some way towards ensuring that children who are either involved in the abuse, towards whom behaviour is directed in the course of it, who are present when the abuse takes place or who saw or heard it are formally recognised by the criminal law.

On how it might go further, it is of course worth remembering that there are criminal offences of child abuse and neglect that will continue to apply whether they occur in the context of someone abusing their partner and those children or someone abusing just the children. I am aware that some of the children’s stakeholders think that there is a need to update or reform the law to reflect what is almost domestic abuse of a child and to create an offence in that regard. On whether that could be included in the bill, our concern is that the definition of abuse that we have come up with is focused on behaviour that is abusive when directed by someone towards their partner or ex-partner. To extend that to the parent-child relationship or the relationship between the partner of a parent and a child without further consultation and without perhaps adjusting the definition to take account of the very different nature of that relationship would not be appropriate and would risk criminalising behaviour that should not be criminal.

It is perhaps worth saying that the first of the two previous consultations that the Scottish Government carried out on the issue was on the general principle of having an offence, and one of the questions that we asked was about what relationships should be covered. Although views were offered that we should go beyond the relationship that has ended up in the bill, there was strong support for an offence that relates to partners and ex-partners, because there is such a particular dynamic to that type of abuse. Clearly, that is what we have provided in the bill.

In addition to what Patrick Down said, it is worth drawing the committee’s attention to the statement that the Minister for Childcare and Early Years made at the start of March in Parliament on the child protection improvement programme. One element of that statement was to set out that we will look at the section 12 offence in the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, which children’s stakeholders and others consider needs to be updated to reflect, among other things, our understanding of the modern experience of abuse of a child. That commitment has been given. To pick up on Patrick Down’s point about the difficulties of adapting our bill, there is a process under way for the Scottish Government to look at that area.

Given that, would you consider clarifying the policy that you are taking in the bill? You could set out what you have told us here, just to allay some of the concerns of charities that the measure has been put in the bill as an afterthought.

I certainly would not suggest that it has been. The aggravation in section 4 is an important provision that specifically tries to acknowledge the harm that domestic abuse can cause to a child. To pick up on Patrick Down’s point, direct abuse of a child can already be prosecuted under different laws. However, the aggravation is a clear statement that, if a perpetrator commits the new offence of domestic abuse and if, in committing that offence, they use a child in some way—by directing behaviour at the child to get at their partner or by committing abuse in such a way that the child is present or is aware that it is taking place—that can be harmful. If the aggravation is proven, the court will be required to consider whether the sentence that would otherwise be imposed should be enhanced. We think that that is an appropriate way of acknowledging the harm that such abuse can do to a child.

I totally understand what you are saying. I just wonder whether we could strengthen the wording a wee bit.

We have a supplementary on that point from Mary Fee.

Mr Lamont briefly mentioned the issue that I was going to ask about, which was raised as a concern during our preliminary evidence sessions. It is about coercively using a child in a relationship to cause harm to a partner. Will the bill cover that and will it explicitly state that that is deemed as domestic abuse?

Patrick Down might want to pick up on that, but I will mention it briefly without getting into the technicalities of the bill. Section 2 gives a definition of abusive behaviour, which is one of the essential elements of the offence. Under section 2(2)(b), the definition of abusive behaviour includes “behaviour directed at B”—that is, the partner or ex-partner—or

“at a child of B or at another person”.

The inclusion of the words “at a child of B” is an attempt to be clear that we are aware that one of the most common ways that abuse can be perpetrated, if it is not directly at the partner or ex-partner, is through the child or children of that person. Those words appear because, strictly speaking, it could be argued that “another person” covers children. We specifically inserted that phrase to give a clear signal, under the law, of our understanding that one of the most common ways that abuse can be perpetrated is through a third party. We wanted that to be in the bill.

11:45  

I know that the Serious Crime Act 2015 applies more generally. I am also aware that the two consultations that have taken place on the domestic abuse legislation have come to a different view, but I am unclear why that is the case. Is it because, were there to be a broader definition of abuse in a domestic setting that could involve not only children but elder abuse—a coercive or controlling relationship with a parent or a grandparent in a household? Was it considered that, by including such scenarios, the impact of the bill or its ability to strike at instances of abuse of a partner or an ex-partner would somehow be diluted? What was the rationale?

As you say, the Serious Crime Act 2015 has a wider application and it applies not only to partners and to ex-partners, but to other members of the same family living in the same household. Therefore, it would potentially cover the abuse of a grandparent or even abuse between adult siblings.

We have taken the approach in the bill because, based on stakeholders’ evidence during the two consultations, abuse of partners takes a different form from other types of abuse. Furthermore, our approach keeps the definition of abuse in line with the Scottish Government’s wider definition of domestic abuse.

I think that it is reasonable to say that the types of coercive control that can happen between people who are—or who have been—in an intimate relationship tend to be different from abuse between adult family members.

I appreciate that there is a distinction but I am not clear why, in draft legislation that covers both those areas of law—areas that are provided for in law, but which the bill seeks to extend—the opportunity has not been taken to broaden the definition to cover those examples. Those cases may be fewer in number and different in nature; nevertheless, by any definition, they could be described as abuse in a domestic context.

I will pick up on Patrick Down’s comments. We followed, to a certain extent, the views that were offered in the consultation. There was relatively strong support—it was not universal—for restricting the bill to partners and to ex-partners. Our approach is to have, in section 2, what we call the list of effects. In the same way that we do not think that that could be adapted easily to the context of the abuse of a child, it would need some work were we to broaden the definition. That is not to say that it would not be possible to do that. However, we are aware that, more generally, the offence is quite novel—I am sure that certain elements of it will be scrutinised closely in the coming weeks. Ministers were keen to focus on the established understanding of domestic abuse in the context of partners and ex-partners.

I take what you are saying; I understand your explanation. The consultation responses have clearly steered you and ministers in a particular direction. I suppose that the risk is that there may be those who argue a different case. Age Concern is an obvious example—there may be others—whose voice on the issue is not necessarily as clear. The numbers articulating that position are perhaps not as numerous; nevertheless, on the opportunity that the bill presents, their arguments are pretty compelling. However, they are being set aside at this stage because of the overwhelming numbers that argue for a more targeted approach. That seems to be, at best, a missed opportunity. It possibly also leaves older people who find themselves in a domestic abuse situation at heightened risk because—for understandable reasons—our focus is on partners and ex-partners. While we focus on that, inevitably, we will not focus our attention on other areas.

I would not necessarily disagree with anything that you have said. Coming back to the offence being relatively novel, if the bill is passed by Parliament, perhaps part of the task will be to see how it works in practice so that the lessons can be applied to different situations—for example, to different relationships. That will probably cover looking at domestic abuse of children, siblings, elders or other vulnerable people who are living with parents. There are potential lessons to be learned.

As you suggest, we have been guided by the general view from stakeholders to focus on the established definition of domestic abuse; that is why this is an offence of domestic abuse. However, although I do not want to speak for ministers—you will, no doubt, explore the issues with the cabinet secretary in due course—it is not about closing the door in terms of what we are doing in the bill.

I want to touch briefly on one of the other distinctions between the Serious Crime Act 2015 and the approach that is being taken in the bill in relation to behaviour that does not cause a partner or ex-partner to suffer “physical or psychological harm”. The Serious Crime Act 2015 requires that such harm was committed. Can you explain the rationale for having a crime in which the harm has not yet been committed? To the layperson, the former would probably seem to be the logical approach.

Sure. The test in the bill is whether the accused’s behaviour was such that a reasonable person would think it likely to have caused the victim to suffer physical or psychological harm. In a sense, it is an objective test that focuses the court on what the accused did. If the accused’s behaviour was such that it was very likely to have caused the victim to suffer harm, the fact that the victim was especially stoical and unexpectedly was not harmed by the behaviour would not prevent a conviction. Equally, the provision ensures that there is not as much risk of—for want of a better word—re-victimising the victim by forcing them to come to court and explain exactly how their partner’s behaviour had harmed them either physically or psychologically, in order to ensure a conviction. I imagine that, in many cases, the evidence that is led will include such an explanation, but the test ensures that that is not necessary in all cases in order to secure a conviction.

Is there a risk either that that sets the bar too low or that a case can be brought as part of an exercise in exacting some kind of retribution within a relationship that is not functioning as it should, and in which the abuse is not solely in one direction? It strikes me as being a slightly unusual provision for a situation in which demonstrable harm has not been caused.

It might be helpful if I run through exactly how the offence can be committed. Three tests have to be met. The first test is that

“the person (‘A’) engages in a course of behaviour which is abusive of A’s partner or ex-partner (‘B’)”.

The second test is that the court is satisfied that the course of behaviour is

“likely to cause B to suffer physical or psychological harm”.

The third test is that the accused must either “intend” to cause that harm or be “reckless” as to whether harm is likely to result.

There is the possible defence that the accused’s behaviour was, in the particular circumstances of the case, “reasonable”. You mentioned a problem with counterallegations—of somebody who is accused of abuse saying that they, too, were being abused. I do not deny that that is a possibility. If you were to speak to the police or prosecutors, they would say that counterallegations are a feature of domestic abuse cases, as things stand; that is not a situation with which the police and prosecutors are unfamiliar. They will have ways of dealing with that—for identifying where there is merit in allegations and where allegations are being made maliciously and there is no good evidence that the person is a victim of abuse.

I want to pick up on that point. There will always be challenges around definitions. In relation to the defence of behaviour that was reasonable in all the circumstances, Scottish Women’s Aid’s position is that that might risk providing legal cover for coercive behaviour under the guise of reasonableness. What are your thoughts on that challenge? I know that everything is about interpretation, but this seems to be at the nub of it.

As you suggest, exact definitions of, and meanings for, individual words is a tough area. We need to ensure that behaviour that should not be classed as criminal is not inadvertently criminalised, which is part of the purpose of the reasonableness defence. There will always be cases in which a person who is actually abusing somebody will try to make the case that their behaviour was reasonable, so it will be for prosecutors to disprove that and to show that the claim that the accused’s behaviour was reasonable is not valid.

The committee recently did some work on sexual abuse, during which we did private interviews with survivors, who gave quite harrowing testimony. I and others who interviewed one particular gentleman were struck that some of the things that we found pretty horrendous were normal for that person, so the individual did not see them as being abusive. Are you confident that such matters will be picked up through the process, as it is laid out? I know that that is a big ask, but I am asking anyway.

In some ways, the biggest barrier is a victim not recognising that what they are suffering is not normal. A public awareness effort might therefore be required if and when the new offence comes into law.

Police and prosecutors being aware is perhaps less of a problem; they will be much more aware that abusive behaviour that a victim might have been conditioned to see as normal will not seem to be normal to everyone else. The biggest barrier will be in encouraging initial reporting to the police so that abuse can be identified and prosecuted.

One of the legislation’s policy goals is to reflect in the offence our modern understanding of what constitutes domestic abuse. At the moment, incidents of domestic abuse have to be prosecuted individually. They can be prosecuted at the same time, but are separate charges under general legislation.

We have included in section 2 the relevant effects that behaviour can have on the partner or ex-partner. One of the benefits of that is that it will help people to understand that they are being abused. I know that people will probably not study the words on the page, but organisations such as Scottish Women’s Aid and others can help to show them that the criminal law reflects the fact that they are being abused in a way that they may not, at the moment, recognise as abuse. They might even recognise it as abuse, but think that the justice system will not respond appropriately. That is one of the aims of trying to capture within the offence the totality of what constitutes domestic abuse.

Police Scotland has done tremendous work with serial offenders and abusers who have abused a series of partners over prolonged periods. Could any element of the bill, particularly with regard to coercive behaviour, have a retrospective application?

The short answer is no. As a general principle, we cannot criminalise behaviour that was not criminal when it took place. Behaviour that occurred before the offence comes into law would have to be prosecuted using the law that was in force at the time. You might want to ask the prosecutors, if you take evidence from them later, whether they think that there will be any scope to label behaviour that would clearly be criminal under any law using this single offence. I think, however, that they would be reluctant to do so. The law will always be the law that was in force when the behaviour is alleged to have taken place.

Thank you.

12:00  

To follow up on John Finnie’s point about the definition of normal behaviour, there is perhaps a distinction to be made between what is normal and what is normalised. In other words, someone outside a relationship might regard the behaviour in it as being overwhelmingly abnormal, but the nature of the relationship could mean that that behaviour has become normalised and seems to be normal within it. Would the process of normalising behaviour that people outside the relationship would regard as abnormal be, in and of itself, potential evidence of the relationship’s abusive nature? That is a bit Sir Humphrey-ish, but I hope that you get my point.

Raising awareness is important not only among people who might be affected by abuse, but among people—family, friends and so on—who may see, as Stewart Stevenson has suggested, something that the person who is at the centre of the relationship cannot see.

If the offence is included in the bill, we think that the question of what domestic abuse is will become much clearer in criminal law, which should be an advantage. At present, of course, there is nothing to prevent a person from going to the authorities to raise concerns; it would be for the police to respond appropriately and look into the matter. I do not disagree with what Stewart Stevenson said.

To close off my point, is the policy intention of the bill partly to empower those who observe a relationship from outside to intervene in some way in order to protect a person in the relationship who does not realise the extent to which they are being abused?

The bill does not do that explicitly, but it seeks to raise awareness of what domestic abuse is, which we hope will be beneficial.

To be clear, I was asking whether that was the policy intention.

It is certainly the policy intention for potential victims themselves and for those who may know potential victims.

The Law Society of Scotland, the Glasgow Bar Association, the Scottish Police Federation and Andrew Tickell, who is an academic, have all expressed uncertainty about the bill. One reason for that concern is what they perceive to be a lack of evidence that there is a gap in the law that requires to be closed. Can you comment on that?

Sure. The background is that, in a speech in 2014, the then Solicitor General for Scotland highlighted concerns about what she saw as a gap in the law in relation to domestic abuse, and in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute the type of abuse that may involve long-term coercive conduct.

As a result, in 2015 the Scottish Government consulted stakeholders on whether they thought that there was a gap in the law. A couple of messages came back from that consultation. First, the responses reflected the Solicitor General’s concerns about the problems of prosecuting long-term coercive conduct and domestic abuse, given the current law’s focus on individual incidents, such as incidents of assault or of threatening and abusive behaviour. Secondly, there was concern that, although it is reasonably easy to prosecute physical assault or overtly threatening behaviour using the existing law, it is much more difficult to prosecute the kind of insidious, coercive and controlling behaviour that constitutes psychological abuse. It was suggested that only a change in the law would make it practical to do that, because it could not easily be done using the existing law.

That is more or less spelling it out.

Yes.

In relation to the accused’s state of mind, the bill provides—as some members have mentioned—that the offence may be committed intentionally or recklessly. Can you expand on what that would mean in practice?

The reason why we included a mens rea element—to use the legal term—of intention or recklessness is to some extent twofold. First, it may be difficult to prove that an accused person intended to cause harm to the other person. The accused will always be able to turn round and say that they did not mean to harm anyone, and it might be very difficult to disprove that claim.

Secondly, if a reasonable person would think that such harm was always going to be the likely result of the accused’s behaviour, it is almost irrelevant whether or not they intended to cause that harm. If they knew, or ought to have known, that such harm was likely, it is reasonable that the criminal law should apply regardless of whether that was actually the intent behind their behaviour. I suspect that a lot of perpetrators of that kind of long-term abuse might, in their own minds, see their behaviour as being perfectly reasonable.

It is good to get that on the record.

I have one last question. Section 8 provides for a maximum custodial sentence of 12 months under summary procedure and 14 years under solemn procedure. Will that apply to coercive behaviour that does not have a physical abuse element?

Yes. The maximum penalty will be 14 years if a case is prosecuted in the High Court—obviously imposing such a penalty would need to be done in the highest level of court. The penalty could be for an offence in which there was no physical element to the course of conduct or behaviour. It would be for the court to determine, but that is what we had in mind when setting the maximum penalty at 14 years. That is an increase on what we consulted on, which was a maximum of 10 years. There were a number of views on that. Some people suggested that it was about right, some suggested that it should be lowered, and quite a few suggested that it should be increased.

What we have in mind is a course of conduct that might have gone on for years in a relationship. It might include physical abuse, psychological abuse or a mix of the two. Where, in effect, someone has been living in that situation for year upon year, we want to ensure that the court has sufficient power to sentence appropriately, which is why we determined that the maximum penalty should be 14 years.

The maximum penalty is reserved for the most serious offences. In answer to your question, that could include an offence in which the course of conduct is entirely one of psychological abuse. I would add that it is sometimes quite difficult to distinguish between physical and psychological abuse; there can on occasion be quite a lot of overlap.

Stewart Stevenson has a supplementary question.

It is a tiny wee question. I take it that if a case does not start as a solemn case and it becomes clear as the facts emerge that a sentence of one year will not be sufficient, sentencing can be referred upwards.

It could not, in the scenario that you suggest. The summary court sits without a jury, so cases cannot be remitted upwards. That can happen only if a case starts in a solemn sheriff court. Those courts’ jurisdictional limit is a maximum penalty of five years. If, in a case that starts in front of a jury in a sheriff court, a person is convicted and the sheriff considers that enhanced sentencing is needed, the sheriff can remit the case up to the High Court. However, if a case begins in summary court, that is where it ends.

So, there is a substantial obligation on prosecutors to ensure that a case goes in at the right level.

Absolutely.

You explained well the rationale for why you have got to where you have got to with the 14-year maximum. I do not want to appear to draw too many simplistic parallels with the Serious Crime Act 2015, but I have been told that the maximum custodial sentence in that act is five years, which seems to be quite a significant discrepancy. Is that because the 2015 act is not picking up on the kind of pattern of behaviour over multiple years that you have talked about?

I would not want to say why the limit was set at five years down south. Patrick Down will keep me right, but I think that the offence in the 2015 act is one of only coercive control; it does not include physical elements. In the answer that I gave I said that, in our offence, the course of conduct could be one of entirely psychological abuse or psychological harm, although perhaps a more realistic example might include a mix of the two, in which very serious violent abuse and psychological abuse are wrapped up together in one course of conduct. We came to the view that a maximum five-year sentence was insufficient. We consulted on 10 years, but we determined to increase the maximum to 14 years in the bill as introduced.

I take your point about the ways in which the types of abuse can become conflated, but it is not beyond the realms of possibility that in a case that involves only psychological abuse the penalty could be up around the maximum, depending on the specific circumstances.

Obviously, the sentence is for the court to decide in any case. We want to ensure that the court has what we consider to be appropriate power to sentence; that is where the 14-years maximum came from.

That concludes our questioning. I thank the bill team for providing evidence that has informed the committee and helped us to understand the bill.

The next meeting will take place on Tuesday 16 May.

12:09 Meeting continued in private until 12:29.