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With regard to your first point, the overwhelming majority of people in Scotland now go to hospices at a very late stage. They do not go there for weeks or months; they go there for the very last few days of their lives. Very few people will go to a hospice for a long period of time. That is not how the hospice movement works in Scotland.

I would have more sympathy with that view if we were going down the road of Miles Briggs’s amendment 198. If there was a list that was available to somebody who wanted this, they could see who was and who was not willing to facilitate it. That would be very clear. I would be able to look on a website and see who was willing and who was not willing to do this and I could then go through that process. That is one of the issues.

I also think that the amendments do not deal with those at an administrative level who would be asked to do things that go against their views. I am worried that, again, we are going to exclude people from a workplace environment where they would be happy to do everything else that might be required, but not this particular thing. We may end up losing people from those workplaces.

I appreciate what Mr McArthur said. However, my amendment 190 is not about trying to obstruct patient choice, but about ensuring that individuals who are against assisted suicide are not drawn into it. To compel participation in assisted suicide, even as a referrer, is to turn conscience into mere compliance. My amendment, if it is accepted, would give protection in that regard.

My amendments 191 and 192 are follow-on amendments. Again, I accept what Mr McArthur says, but this area of law is new and depends on individual choices. That is why I think that the burden of proof should be reversed from what is in place for other areas of law.

Amendment 191 specifies that if

“a claim of conscientious objection”

is alleged to have

“been improperly or falsely made”,

the responsibility to prove or justify that claim

“lies with the person or institution”

making the allegation, rather than with the individual who is exercising the objection. The rationale is simple: it is to protect individuals and organisations that conscientiously refuse to participate, ensuring that they are not unfairly required to defend their ethical or moral stance.

Amendment 192—[Interruption.]. I am happy to take an intervention.

I am grateful. Thank you.

I am interested to explore that a wee bit, because the member is saying that someone could say, “My life is no longer meaningful because I have been diagnosed with something,” even if that person has X number of years to live. For example, motor neurone disease is a cruel, horrible disease, but the prognosis can be very short, or someone can end up with a Stephen Hawking situation where they live for 40 years. If someone is diagnosed with MND and they say after day 2 of that diagnosis, “My life is no longer meaningful,” would the member be open to them being allowed assisted suicide if the bill goes ahead?

This has been a really helpful debate, although contributions from members have probably raised more concerns for me. There are some contradictions in what we are hearing. If we accept that prognosis is flawed, how can we ever offer assisted suicide? Prognosis is open to debate. I understand that it is difficult for general practitioners and other doctors to give people an accurate prognosis.

I accept that, and I am sure that Liam McArthur has spoken to many people in the medical profession who feel very uncomfortable about this bill, because they will be asked to make decisions. At the moment, when it comes to prognosis, they are making decisions about what future treatment might be wanted, rather than saying, “Do you want to end your life?” That is a very different position to put general practitioners in.

As many know, my older brother is a GP, and he tells me a story. Many years ago, somebody came into his surgery. He did the usual tests and things. The person said, “How long do I have to live?”, and he replied, “Probably six to eight months.” However, last week, he was still playing golf with that person.

The situation is therefore very open, and I understand that it is very difficult to put time limits on a prognosis, but we are having to make law not just for the next two or three years but the future. Unless we have clear interpretation and clarity in the bill, we are open to judicial creep. That is a concern.

I absolutely agree—and I was coming on to that.

In his contribution about whether someone’s life is meaningful, Sandesh Gulhane seemed to say that, if I have an early diagnosis but take the view that my life is no longer meaningful, the process can start. I accept that people would have to go through discussions and all that, but I am deeply worried that, as a society, we are saying to somebody that, although they can have years to live with the appropriate treatment, we will open the door for them. The disabled community will be very concerned by what we have heard this morning from some members of the committee. We are opening a door, maybe not next year or the year after but in years down the line, for disabled people to face extreme pressure from society.

On reflection, I think that Daniel Johnson’s amendment 4, which suggests a six-month timeframe, is appropriate for the committee to look at. For that reason, I ask the committee to support Daniel Johnson’s amendment and I seek to withdraw amendment 143.

Amendment 143, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendment 4 moved—[Daniel Johnson].

Will the member give way?

Will the member take a quick intervention on that point?

If the committee—and the member—is willing in principle to accept what I have said, and members feel that there is just a technical drafting issue that needs to be tidied up, I am happy to look at that. I am interested to know whether that is the member’s view or whether he is opposed to the amendment in principle, which I think is a different issue.

I conclude by saying that my amendments ask us to protect the vulnerable, to defend hope and to ensure that no one’s darkest moment is mistaken for their final one.