Seòmar agus comataidhean

Good morning, convener, members of the committee and other members. Thank you for having us at the meeting to discuss some very important amendments. I will speak to amendments 143 and 144.

First, with regard to amendment 143, as the bill stands, the definition of “terminally ill” is extraordinarily broad. It would include individuals who could live not for weeks or months but for years. People who are managing long-term conditions, those who are receiving treatment that stabilises their illness, and people who still have meaningful time ahead of them would all fall within the scope of the bill as it is currently drafted. I do not think that that is what members of the Parliament or, indeed, more importantly, members of the public would imagine when they hear the phrase “assisted dying”. They would think of someone who is in the final stages of their life or who is perhaps days or weeks from death, not someone who still has years to live but is facing difficulty, fear or despair.

If the law is to mean anything, the definition must be clear as the bill proceeds and if it ultimately becomes an act; otherwise, future generations risk the reach of assisted suicide expanding far beyond what advocates publicly claim to intend, and what the member in charge has publicly stated.

This amendment seeks to restore that clarity. It would define “terminally ill” as a condition that,

“in the opinion of two independent registered medical practitioners ... can reasonably be expected to result in the person’s death within three months.”

That is not a technical tightening; it is a moral safeguard. It ensures that, if the Parliament chooses to go down this path, it does so honestly, with the legislation restricted to those who are truly at the end of life and not those who yet have years of life, love and care ahead of them. By supporting the amendment, members will protect the integrity of the bill’s purpose, and they will protect vulnerable people from a profound expansion of what assisted suicide could mean in Scotland. If we cannot agree on that limit—if we cannot even confine assisted suicide to those who are imminently dying—we must ask ourselves what kind of law we are truly making.

With regard to amendment 144, there is, as I said, an alarmingly broad definition in the bill. I have written to the Presiding Officer and to you, convener, about legal issues around that, and I await responses from both of you. However, as the bill is written at the moment, the door to assisted suicide is open for people who have many years—decades—of life ahead of them. As I said, that is not what people think of when they hear the phrase “assisted suicide”. They think of someone who is in the final stages of terminal illness, not someone who is living with mental illness, disability or poverty. Yet, as written, the bill risks crossing that line. It risks sending a message that assisted suicide could be open to someone like me, who is struggling with disability. It opens it to those who are struggling with disadvantage or despair. That is a profound moral error and a betrayal of the very people who need our care and solidarity.

My amendment seeks to put that right. It makes it clear that a person cannot be deemed eligible for assisted suicide if their primary reason for seeking it is a non-terminal condition, such as an eating disorder, an intellectual disability, a mood or anxiety disorder, receipt of disability benefits, loneliness, financial hardship or unsuitable housing. At the same time, the amendment recognises that people may live with those conditions alongside a genuine terminal illness. It therefore would not automatically exclude people with non-terminal conditions from being eligible; it would require only that the driving cause of a request is truly a terminal condition. We heard at stage 1 from members across the chamber that that is what they were seeking to do. The amendment is not about narrowing choice but about protecting meaning and, perhaps most importantly, protecting the most vulnerable in our society.

The amendment would ensure that assisted suicide is not even inadvertently offered as a substitute for care, community or hope. If the state begins to respond to suffering not with support but with death, we will cross the line of the compassionate society that we all want to be part of. I believe that we should not cross that line. This amendment asks us to hold that line with clarity, conscience and compassion.

I move amendment 143.

Thank you.

Thank you. As the convener said, witnesses from the Scottish Youth Parliament do not have to answer the questions, but do you have a view on the definitions?

Absolutely.

I go back to the duty in the bill to

“have due regard for the need to promote wellbeing and sustainable development.”

Should the duty be about delivering wellbeing or its promotion? Perhaps Lloyd Austin can start on that, as he was the last witness to answer the previous question. Should the duty be about promotion or delivery, or both? Can those be mixed together?

Do Skye Allan or Kristers Lukins want to add anything?

That is absolutely fine.

My final question for the moment is directed to Lloyd Austin. Lloyd, in your submission, you refer to the

“opportunity to repeal or amend outdated duties that can contribute to public bodies acting in a manner that undermines sustainable development and/or wellbeing”.

Will you expand on what you mean by that?

This is probably not a fair question, so please feel free to ignore it. I am interested in what you have said. Do you know whether there are previous examples of where a bill has gone back to amend a lot of different acts? You may not know that—we can go away and look it up ourselves—but what you describe seems like quite a novel approach.

Having read your submission and seeing how you want to define the term quite widely to take in the third sector, I am seeking clarification. If a third sector organisation were found by the commissioner to not be fulfilling its duties, would that result in the third sector organisation losing its funding? What sanctions would the definition bring if a third sector organisation or private company that was getting Government contracts was not doing that? What sanctions would you want to go with it?

That is helpful.