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The issue is about protecting the individual. Wherever the claim comes from and whatever proceedings follow, it is about ensuring that the individual who is being accused does not have to prove the case, and that it is for the other party, whoever that is, to prove the case.

I move on to amendment 193, which is, in some ways, similar to the amendments from Stuart McMillan and Daniel Johnson. I would be deeply concerned if we were to say to hospices and other charitable organisations whose ethical framework defines their care as “life affirming” that they had to go through this procedure. To compel them to participate or risk losing public funding—as we have heard with regard to Switzerland—would violate their moral integrity and betray the trust of those they serve. The amendment seeks to put that right by effectively expanding section 18.

If healthcare providers are going to be exempt, surely hospices, hospitals, care homes and hostels that formally have ethical, religious or philosophical policies that refuse to permit assisted suicide must be allowed to opt out. If not, we are going to see hospices or organisations not taking on certain individuals so that they are not in breach of the law.

We could also see the reverse, with people who want care or help—

Will the member take an intervention?

Let me just finish this sentence.

People who want help would not be taken in because providers do not want to have to move them or do something else.

Just let me develop this point.

We already have that in other areas of law. We say that people have to have certain beliefs or follow certain practices to take certain jobs. It is not a new concept, and it is important to note that we are not telling people that they must think in a certain way. All that we are saying is that particular homes, hospices, refuges or whatever will not carry out the procedure. That gives clarity to staff and to those who might want to use the service.

With regard to your first point, the overwhelming majority of people in Scotland now go to hospices at a very late stage. They do not go there for weeks or months; they go there for the very last few days of their lives. Very few people will go to a hospice for a long period of time. That is not how the hospice movement works in Scotland.

I would have more sympathy with that view if we were going down the road of Miles Briggs’s amendment 198. If there was a list that was available to somebody who wanted this, they could see who was and who was not willing to facilitate it. That would be very clear. I would be able to look on a website and see who was willing and who was not willing to do this and I could then go through that process. That is one of the issues.

I also think that the amendments do not deal with those at an administrative level who would be asked to do things that go against their views. I am worried that, again, we are going to exclude people from a workplace environment where they would be happy to do everything else that might be required, but not this particular thing. We may end up losing people from those workplaces.

I appreciate what Mr McArthur said. However, my amendment 190 is not about trying to obstruct patient choice, but about ensuring that individuals who are against assisted suicide are not drawn into it. To compel participation in assisted suicide, even as a referrer, is to turn conscience into mere compliance. My amendment, if it is accepted, would give protection in that regard.

My amendments 191 and 192 are follow-on amendments. Again, I accept what Mr McArthur says, but this area of law is new and depends on individual choices. That is why I think that the burden of proof should be reversed from what is in place for other areas of law.

Amendment 191 specifies that if

“a claim of conscientious objection”

is alleged to have

“been improperly or falsely made”,

the responsibility to prove or justify that claim

“lies with the person or institution”

making the allegation, rather than with the individual who is exercising the objection. The rationale is simple: it is to protect individuals and organisations that conscientiously refuse to participate, ensuring that they are not unfairly required to defend their ethical or moral stance.

Amendment 192—[Interruption.]. I am happy to take an intervention.

I am grateful. Thank you.

I fully support the amendments in the group that have been discussed so far.

At the heart of the bill lies an interesting assumption, which is that every individual has the capacity to make a decision about life and death. However, I would argue that, both within law and within practice, that assumption is not true. Capacity is not constant. It can fluctuate with illness, medication, fear, depression or external pressures, as we have heard from Brian Whittle and, very powerfully, from Pam Duncan-Glancy, but the bill begins with the presumption that everyone is capable of giving fully informed consent to their death.

That is an extraordinary presumption to make in law, and a dangerous one too. When the decision is irreversible—when it involves the deliberate ending of life—we must hold ourselves to the highest possible evidential standard. Anything less would be a profound failure of our duty to protect those whose vulnerability may be obvious to others, even if it is not obvious to themselves.

Amendment 146 strengthens that safeguard. It reverses the default presumption so that an individual must be presumed not to have capacity unless it can be proven on the basis of clear evidence that they do. It also sets a higher bar to “beyond reasonable doubt”, which is clearly understood by lawyers and, I think, most people in the public. It also defines what true capacity means in that context: that someone has a full understanding of the nature and consequences of the decision, an awareness of all available care, treatment and palliative options, and the ability to communicate the decision and the reasoning behind it clearly and voluntarily.

Amendment 146 says exactly what Mr McArthur and others have said that they want to be in the bill. As Pam Duncan-Glancy clearly articulated, for many people with disability, life could become almost not worth living if their care package was taken away or reduced. I could imagine a situation where I had no family, the care package was cut and I could not get dressed in the morning—would I want to continue living, being housebound in my pyjamas 24/7? That is why we have to think very carefully about Pam Duncan-Glancy’s amendments.

Let me be clear that the amendment is not about creating obstacles; it is about ensuring integrity. It ensures that only those who truly comprehend the gravity of what they are deciding can do so. If we are to legislate on life and death, let us at least do it with humility and humanity that recognises how fragile human judgment can be and how permanent death always is.

I move to amendment 147. We have had a lot of discussion around the terminology and what I believe is the vagueness in it. As I said, I believe that that could lead to including people who have not had the appropriate treatment. There is a real risk that we could include people suffering from anorexia nervosa, as Jackie Baillie pointed out, which is a severe and life-threatening mental illness, but one from which recovery is possible. I believe that to treat such a person as terminally ill is not compassionate, but the opposite.

When someone’s judgment is clouded by an illness that distorts their relationship with life and death, surely our duty as a Parliament and society is not to confirm that despair but to offer hope, treatment and care. If the bill’s wording allows those who can recover to access assisted suicide, it fails in its most basic moral duty—to protect life when life can still be saved.

Amendment 147 would ensure that that cannot happen. It makes clear that an illness cannot be classed as terminal if it can be controlled or substantially slowed by medical intervention such that death is not reasonably expected within six months. It also specifies that an illness cannot be considered terminal if it is a result of

“voluntarily stopping eating and drinking.”

Those are not minor technicalities; they are essential safeguards, particularly for those battling anorexia, to ensure that the Parliament does not, however unintentionally, create a legal pathway for suicide among people who could otherwise be treated, supported and restored to health and often live very fulfilling lives. Any law that touches on life and death must draw its boundaries with precision and compassion.

Will the member give way?

Will the member take a quick intervention on that point?