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The 200m distance is one notable difference in your bill. The other is the private property provision. I believe that colleagues will come in on that—I am happy to come back if that is not covered, convener, but I do not want to tread on anybody’s toes.

Given your point that people might not know what that flag is, I will pick a more recognisable Christian symbol, such as the cross or the fish. Such symbols are associated with a faith whose church teachings are very clear on abortion. I am not referring to all Christians or all Catholics, but the Catholic Church has every right to be clear about its position on abortion. If a symbol that is clearly associated with a particular organisation—in this case, a church that takes an anti-abortion position—were to be displayed in the window of a home or from a flagpole in the garden, would that, in and of itself, be a breach of the bill’s provisions, or would it have to be something more than that?

As others have already noted, effective operation of the provision within the zones will depend to a significant extent on the judgment of police officers who are either called to or are already at vigils or protests. They will be asked to exercise their judgment about whether the behaviour—whatever form it takes; silent prayer is the one that has been identified as being the most difficult to judge—constitutes a potential offence because it either seeks to influence, or recklessly has the effect of influencing, women who are seeking an abortion. How will police officers be supported to make that judgment? Will there be operational guidance from Police Scotland? Will there be guidance from the Lord Advocate for procurators fiscal? The bill does not provide enough information in that respect, because that is not what legislation is for, but I would like to know how we will support police officers to uphold the legislation, if the bill is passed, because they will be asked to make quite tricky decisions.

I think that a priest visiting a parishioner for the purposes of providing pastoral support would be the opposite of reckless.

I will drill down into this point, particularly regarding silent prayer. We can all understand the intent element of the provision, where the intent is very deliberately to influence people who are having an abortion. However, you mentioned that the second element is about recklessly having that effect. How exactly is “reckless” defined? You mentioned that that term is present in other areas of law. As I asked the minister earlier—which you might have caught—is that covered by the reasonable person test, or is recklessness defined separately?

Does your office have a position on the solution? We are all now incredibly and wearily familiar with how hard it is to get a CSP and how few young people have them, and with the issues about getting a CSP but it still not making a difference. Does your office have a position on the need for the legislation to change, or is it an implementation issue? Alternatively, is it both, or both/and?

I think that I saw Marie Harrison looking to come in, convener.

Convener, can I just—

I can see that Megan Farr is looking to come in. First, however, I want to follow up on that point. The cynical answer to the question why local authorities do not understand that is that they do understand it; they just do not want to implement CSPs.

In general, a child’s plan will be less resource intensive or will, at the very least, mean that the local authority is somewhat shielded from potential legal redress through the tribunal system. Is the cynical explanation fair, given the amount of information that has been provided over such a long period of time?

At various points, everyone on the panel has been keen to talk about co-ordinated support plans, which you will all be delighted to know that we can now do.

Chloe Minto said that co-ordinated support plans are important because they open up the route for legal redress through the tribunal. This is my first question. Given that co-ordinated support plans are as rare as hens’ teeth—0.2 per cent of all pupils with a recognised additional need have such a plan—is it an issue that there are no other routes to access the tribunal? You can either fight really hard to get a CSP—the vast majority of children with additional support needs will not get one, though—or you can go for the somewhat nuclear option of trying to get a placing request and moving the child out of the mainstream school into a special school. Is there an issue, in that CSPs are the only route to access the tribunal while staying in a mainstream setting?

I would like to pick up on a point that is somewhat tangential, but I hope that it will make a neat segue. A moment ago, Lynne Binnie acknowledged that the legislation on additional support needs in Scotland sets out a very broad definition of additional needs that is universally—certainly widely—supported. Not every child or young person with a recognised additional need will require a co-ordinated support plan, but you will be aware that the committee has heard evidence that only around 0.2 per cent of kids with recognised needs have such plans. I am interested in hearing Lynne Binnie’s and Nicola Dickie’s perspectives on that. Do you recognise the concerns that we have heard from others that that proportion is simply far too small, or is there a different explanation here? Is it appropriate that there are CSPs for the 1,000 or so kids with the most complex needs—is that the proportion that you would expect?