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The last comment segues very neatly into the theme that I want to ask about.

Cabinet secretary, you will have seen that, in previous evidence sessions, there has been a lot of focus on co-ordinated support plans. Colleagues will go into that issue in more detail but, as part of our examination of it, there has been a lot of discussion about the range of plans available to young people, with child’s plans, individual learning plans, individualised education plans and bespoke plans in local authorities, schools et cetera.

Can you say a bit more about the Scottish Government’s position on taking a more consistent and holistic approach to the issue? Specifically, is it GIRFEC compliant for a child to be in the sort of position that they are essentially in at the moment, where, to get a co-ordinated support plan, other plans have to be in place? It means that, by default, a child in the position of getting a co-ordinated support plan already has multiple plans, which, to me, is not GIRFEC compliant. After all, GIRFEC is about each young person having one coherent plan, whereas, in practice, kids with the most complex needs must have multiple plans to access or unlock the support that they require.

If you could write to us on the GIRFEC point, that would be useful.

On CSPs, the cabinet secretary has been a member of the committee and knows that we have taken evidence on the issue and gone round the houses over and over again on the challenges that it presents. Last week, though, we heard quite a significant bit of evidence from ADES and COSLA representatives on the criteria for a CSP. For them, the major barrier is the requirement for a young person to need at least 12 months of intense support from multiple services in multiple agencies, or however the provision is worded, and they are finding that young people who—everybody agreed—needed a CSP were unable to get one because that specific box could not be ticked. Is the Scottish Government open to revising the criteria for the CSPs and, indeed, that part of the 2004 act?

One point that was made in relation to that concerned the example of mental health support and counsellors. When the act was originally drafted, and up until quite recently, the vast majority of that support was provided outside schools. Because of a recent and welcome Scottish Government decision, that support is now provided in school, but that then creates the perverse issue that we are discussing. To what extent can the code of practice alone address that? As we have heard, the act is quite specific, which is a point of learning for the future: maybe primary legislation should be a bit vaguer and more flexible to allow for adaptation. Are you confident that we will be able to address the issues that were surfaced in the 2021 review through a revision of the code of practice alone, given that the underpinning legislation is so specific?

I said that it is unrealistic to expect that before the end of this parliamentary session, given the wider legislative timetable. However, there is a challenge here in that the specific legislative problem that we have identified could be improved through the code of practice but the fundamental issues could not be addressed by the code of practice, because the code of practice cannot be used to rewrite the law.

I will continue with examples, because the committee is really interested in how the bill would operate in practice. The principles behind it are well understood and, I think, well supported.

For example, if a priest goes to a hospital to visit a parishioner, that is totally normal and is an important part of their role. Let us say, though, that the priest stops outside the hospital to pray. I have prayed outside hospitals, on my way in, for a variety of reasons. If a woman who is accessing the hospital for the purposes of an abortion sees the priest and is familiar with the Catholic Church’s position on abortion, she could be alarmed and feel intimidated by that. The offence of causing alarm or distress could be made out. Would the priest’s behaviour constitute an offence? Even if he were not there for the purpose of influencing a woman who is seeking an abortion, alarm or distress could still be created. I presume that such behaviour would not be an offence, because, at that point, we would be criminalising priests for dressing as priests in hospitals.

It was essentially about that. I will paraphrase your position, but correct me if I am getting it wrong. As it stands, the police might well have the power to act in response to the distress that is happening and to the intimidation felt by women, but current provisions do not provide a deterrent effect. You are seeking deterrence but acknowledging that existing law would allow for action where behaviour crosses the line, whatever the line is.

I will now go back to basics. I said a minute ago that the broad principles are well covered, but there is an important matter to mention, particularly because you brought up the evidence given by Police Scotland, and you made a reasonable point about the potential tension between the written and oral evidence that was given. Will you address the point that some people have put to us in evidence that the police have sufficient powers as things stand to deal with people who are behaving in an intimidating manner, regardless of their proximity to a hospital or other such premises?

Minister, you said that the bill does not specify that silent prayer would be an offence. An offence is about behaviour that either has the intent of, or that recklessly causes the effect of, distress and so on to women who are seeking abortion. I will play that out with some examples. Say an individual is a patient who is accessing a hospital for whatever reason or they are a visitor. If, on their way into the hospital and within the 200m zone, they stop and pray, would that be an offence under the bill?

Finally, I have a general principle question. What makes you confident that the bill would survive the probably inevitable legal challenge? It is about a balance of rights—the right to freedom of religion and expression of that, the right to freedom of protest and assembly, and the right to access healthcare. Your bill is broadly similar to the Northern Irish and English equivalents, but there are some specific differences. The Northern Irish legislation in particular has survived a Supreme Court challenge, but your bill is not like for like compared with it—it is broadly similar, but it is not like for like. What makes you confident that, given the differences in your bill, you are maintaining a balance that the courts would support and that is in keeping with the ECHR?

I would like to go back to Ivan McKee’s line of questioning with regard to private property. Article 1, protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerns property rights. It is not an absolute right but, for a conditional right, it is really quite strong, because it was written from an anti-Soviet perspective and represents a really important liberal defence of property rights.

I accept that we do not have the right to do anything that we want in our private property, regardless of whether that property is within 200m of a hospital. That said, this is an area in which the balance of rights is really important, so I will pose another example, the context of which is similar to that of the previous example.

You have already explained that, if somebody purchases a private property facing a hospital for the purpose of putting up a big sign that says “Abortion is murder”, it is simple to see the intent. However, I have Catholic friends who are very passionate about their faith; they have a flagpole in their garden and literally fly the flag of the Holy See, because, for them, that is an important expression of faith. I presume that that sort of thing would not be covered by the bill, but I am just asking the question to give you the chance to put that on the record.