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I cannot guarantee that. The issue is partly about the board appointment process and making sure that the right individuals are appointed to the board. That is particularly important when it comes to the chair. In recent months, we have seen the difference that having a highly proactive board chair has made.

Nothing that we can do in legislation will guarantee that every individual on the board of qualifications Scotland will be as effective and as actively involved as we want them to be, but we can build in mechanisms that make that a little bit more likely. In this case, given the corporate plan’s importance to the organisation, ensuring that that document was actively considered and voted on would, I hope, improve the situation. There are no guarantees here, because, ultimately, we are talking about individual personalities and performance, which we cannot legislate for.

On amendment 35, we have touched on a couple of points in the past, particularly in relation to proposed new paragraph (c) of section 14(3), which relates to employers. What I am proposing in amendment 35 is that qualifications Scotland consults on the corporate plan before it is finalised. It should consult a range of key groups. As you would expect, that should include those undertaking the qualifications, namely the learners, and those delivering them, namely the teachers, college lecturing staff and so on. However, I also think that that is the appropriate point to engage with business and to bring in employers. We have talked about that in various other settings—for example, whether there is space on other committees for individuals representing industry and so on. It is important that employers who will be using the qualifications that learners will, we hope, obtain are consulted on the corporate plan. Amendment 35 would expand the list of stakeholders and service users who must be consulted in preparing the corporate plan, but it is not an exhaustive list. Proposed new paragraph (d) of section 14(3) states that qualifications Scotland can consult others, as required.

Some members who were involved in the stage 2 proceedings of the Scottish Languages Bill might recognise amendment 71, which is a proposal that the Law Society of Scotland has made on a number of occasions in relation to public bodies to improve transparency. It should be an incredibly unlikely event that Scottish ministers reject the corporate plan of any public body, but, in the event that they did, something would quite obviously have gone wrong. I would argue, as the Law Society has done a number of times in the past, that it would be in the public interest to publish the reasons for rejecting the plan. That is particularly to aid parliamentary scrutiny, which is relevant for this body, given the discussions that we have had about the difficulties of effective scrutiny and accountability in relation to the SQA.

I move amendment 280.

I am grateful for this last-minute intervention being accepted. I take the minister’s point. As I said at the start, amendment 60 was designed to be provocative, as it proposes something that is not the case elsewhere in legislation.

However, it is a reflection of the experiences that this committee and its predecessor committee have had. Given that the cabinet secretary was on the education committee at a point when there were particularly acute frustrations with the SQA’s resistance to accountability, to parliamentary scrutiny and to acting on committee recommendations, and taking on board her point that ministers are accountable to Parliament and that NDPBs are accountable to ministers, it is clear that that arrangement has not worked. That is one of the reasons why we are here.

Although I understand why amendment 60 is not necessarily the way in which to go about that, I ask the cabinet secretary to reflect on the fact that it sounds as though she is saying that the system that we already have is the appropriate one. If that was the case, I suggest, the bill would not be in front of us now. If amendment 60 is not the change that is needed—I accept that, and will not move it—what change is required to ensure a sufficient level of scrutiny, accountability and respect from qualifications Scotland for the Parliament? At the core, that is what has been lacking, up to now. There has been a lack of respect for not just the Parliament but learners, teachers and so on; however, in relation to amendment 60, there has been a lack of respect for the Parliament.

My position on many of these amendments, especially the large group of amendments in the name of Sue Webber, reflects our discussion on the convener’s amendments on a new independent regulator. The Finance and Public Administration Committee—of which, along with John Mason, I am a member—considered issues related to the creation of new public bodies and, in particular, SPCB-appointed bodies. In our report to Parliament, we made a strong recommendation and did something that it is unusual to do in the context of a committee report—we put forward a motion to Parliament in which, rather than asking Parliament as a whole to note our report, we asked it specifically to agree to a moratorium on the creation of new SPCB-appointed office bearers.

I also have some specific issues in relation to moving the inspectorate entirely within the purview of Parliament. Ultimately, ministers have responsibility for the setting of education policy in Scotland, which is a significant responsibility. If we were to have a wider debate about whether we should remove education policy entirely from the remit of ministers, I would have a lot of questions about that.

The example that I have used before—I think that I might have used it in the stage 1 debate—is that it is entirely legitimate for the Scottish ministers to decide on a specific element of education policy, to instruct and expect schools to implement it and, then, after a few years, to ask the chief inspector to conduct a thematic inspection on that. Five or six years ago, the Government made a decision on LGBTQ-inclusive education. It would be entirely legitimate for the Government to say that it wanted to carry out a thematic inspection to ensure that that has been implemented.

Recently, we have had many parliamentary debates about pupil behaviour and violence against women and girls in particular. It is right for the Parliament to hold ministers to account on such important issues, and it is appropriate for ministers to retain the power to instruct a thematic inspection on, for example, how schools deal with violence against women and girls. That is an issue that I think requires such examination, because there are significant inconsistencies in policy.

I want to strengthen Parliament’s role in relation to, and its relationship with, the inspectorate. My amendment 92, which we will come to later, seeks to do that in relation to inspection plans, although I am open to other ways in which we can do that. The best way to describe it is that I want the inspectorate to have greater independence in most areas of practice, but not in relation to its form and not in every area of practice. For example, Pam Duncan-Glancy highlighted the issue of the terms and conditions of inspectorate staff, and I would probably share her position in relation to home schooling.

Turning briefly to Willie Rennie’s amendments, I am minded to support amendment 147 in particular, although I have some questions about the practice of inspectors being appointed “on the recommendation of” the chief inspector when, in practice, they will be appointed by the chief inspector. However, the principle behind that amendment is sound. The same is true of amendment 160. I think that it is desirable to provide for some extra scrutiny of the regulations on the intervals for schools to be inspected.

I have significant concerns about amendment 156, because I can envisage situations in which ministers would want to instruct the inspectorate to inspect a school—for example, for specific reasons that relate to welfare concerns that have been raised—and the delay that would result from having to seek the approval or the input of a parliamentary committee would not be acceptable. There are non-urgent situations for which I would welcome some kind of mechanism whereby ministers would seek the input of Parliament, but I do not want anything that could delay ministers’ instruction of inspections—particularly if there is a welfare issue. I am aware that that has been the case in the past.

I welcome amendments 342 and 345 from Pam Duncan-Glancy. However, on amendment 340, my concern—on which I would welcome clarification from the cabinet secretary—is that, at the moment, in practice, ministers request a copy of every inspection report, and there are a number of those every week, and the process of laying all those before the Parliament would be not just an unnecessary burden on the inspectorate but an additional burden on the Parliament. The business bulletin would certainly get a lot larger each week. For that reason, I cannot support amendment 340. However, the proposals in amendments 342 and 345 are advisable.

This debate will be pretty similar to the ones that we have had in relation to the interest committees, the board of qualifications Scotland and, in particular, the strategic advisory committee.

Amendment 91 is consequential, and amendment 77 would expand the starting membership of the chief inspector’s advisory council because of what I am proposing in amendment 78, although members will note that ministers would still have the power to vary the size of the council as required.

Amendment 78 is the substantive amendment that I have lodged in this group. It seeks to bring in those who have direct experience of actually being in educational establishments that are the subject of inspection by HMIE. Those are primarily schools, so it would therefore relate primarily to pupils in schools and to teachers, but also to college lecturers and college students. Amendment 78 also seeks to ensure that the voice of the staff in the inspectorate—the inspectors themselves and their support staff—is heard as part of the process and is represented on the advisory council.

As much as we have paid a great deal of attention to governance arrangements in other parts of the education landscape in recent years, it is fair to say that the inspectorate is a bit of a black box for a lot of people in our schools and colleges at the moment. There is a real lack of understanding about it. There is an element of a somewhat stand-offish approach, with people feeling that inspections are imposed on them, that the process is top-down and so on.

The advisory council proposals that are in the bill are very welcome. They can be strengthened, not in an exhaustive way, but by our being a bit more specific about the kind of people we wish to see as part of that advisory group.

I will touch briefly on Pam Duncan-Glancy’s amendments. I would welcome it if she could explain her thinking a little. As I understand it, the amendments would replace the word “advisory” with the word “governing”. However, the council would still not have any governing powers over the chief inspector. I am worried about the ambiguity that that might cause, so I would welcome it if Pam Duncan-Glancy could talk about that.

Amendment 326 mirrors an amendment that I lodged relating to the board of qualifications Scotland, and I am happy to support it.

I do not think that I will support amendment 172, which is in the name of Miles Briggs. I voted for a representative of parents and carers to be on the qualifications Scotland strategic advisory council. I am less convinced of the need in the case of the chief inspector’s advisory council, but I am open to the case that Mr Briggs will make.

I move amendment 77.

I have already mentioned my concerns in relation to creating new SPCB-appointed bodies. However, I want to back up the point that the convener has made that this is not just about higher history and how, in response to the 2013 petition, the petitioner was told, “Don’t worry—the culture’s changing.”

Shortly after I was first elected to the Parliament in 2016, there was a massive problem with the national 5 computing science paper. It was a very familiar experience—one that had happened before and has happened a number of times since—in which the SQA repeatedly refused to engage in good faith with those who were raising concerns, right up until we were past the point at which the issue had been raised in the Parliament. The SQA had sent out the then Deputy First Minister to insist that nothing was wrong. In the end, the SQA had to acknowledge, as quietly as possible, that the paper was seriously flawed and it had to significantly lower the grade boundaries.

The reason why that process was lacking and why I ended up having to raise the issue in the Parliament was that swathes of computing teachers across the country who were trying to raise concerns about the paper with the SQA had those concerns summarily dismissed. There is a place missing in the structure of Scotland’s qualification system where the professionals involved, learners and anyone else can go to raise complaints and legitimate concerns. The issue is that the body that is responsible for the system has, by default, dismissed those concerns and has often engaged in quite aggressive and defensive public relations exercises instead of engaging in good faith.

I want to back up the convener’s point. Higher history is an acute example that we have all been aware of recently, but there is a pattern of this happening over a long period, and it often goes back to that missing piece of the structure. There has been nowhere for people to go other than to those who are marking their own homework.

On that point about capacity, what consideration has the convener given to the Finance and Public Administration Committee’s recent report on SPCB-appointed bodies? Bluntly, the conclusion that we came to is that, whether it is a matter of capacity or other structural changes that need to be made, as it stands, the Parliament is not effectively scrutinising and holding to account the existing group of SPCB-appointed bodies. That is why the finance committee recently put a motion to the Parliament, which was agreed to, that no more SPCB-appointed bodies should be created until we have taken stock of the whole landscape and what needs to change in it.

On amendment 354 in particular, although this applies to all the amendments in the group, I am interested in Pam Duncan-Glancy’s response to the position, which has been put by John Mason and that I mentioned last week, that what we are talking about is ultimately not the responsibility of a public body. The SCQF Partnership is a charity, and that fact is at the core of a lot of the difficulties with the amendments in the group. It is a charity that tomorrow could cease to exist or could take a completely different form or make completely different decisions about its role in the system. Its functions and the restrictions on those functions and so on are not currently legislated for.

We need a wider discussion about the role of the SCQF Partnership in the system. We all agree that it has been fantastically successful, but now its form and status as a charity are causing significant issues. I do not think that we can legislate for those elements when they are ultimately based on the operations of a charity that is not accountable to us through legislation.

I thank the cabinet secretary for her response. I like the implication in it that I am being too moderate in my proposal, and that the cabinet secretary actually wants to go much further. [Laughter.]

I absolutely agree with her more radical approach that the advice received, and the response to it, should be published on a more regular basis throughout the year rather than just in the annual reports. On that basis, I am happy not to press amendment 36 and, when it comes to it, not to move amendment 37.

Amendment 36, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendments 283 and 284 not moved.

Amendment 285 moved—[Pam Duncan-Glancy].

I am sure that this is the group that we have all been waiting for—I can feel an outbreak of consensus coming.

Believe it or not, the presumption behind my amendment is not that I am trying to declare a republic one public body at a time. My views on the monarchy are well known, and I think that it is an antiquated concept to have inspectors and so on serving at the pleasure of His Majesty. However, that is not the motivation behind my amendment; it is about Government efficiency. I do not believe that orders in council and appointments via the head of state, whether that is the King or, if Britain ever becomes a republic, the president, are an efficient process, in particular in relation to a body such as the inspectorate.

On exactly that point, if the King were to refuse consent for the bill on that basis, I think that that would be a constitutional crisis, because we operate on the principle that our monarchy is politically independent. I do not agree that that is the reality, but that is the position that the Crown has set out: that it is independent on political matters. To veto a bill on that basis would, I think, be unprecedented and would cause a constitutional crisis. Much as that may be entertaining for some of my colleagues, I do not think that it is a likely outcome in this case.

I come to my very last point—as you will be glad to hear, convener. Members will note that I am talking about orders in council not being an effective process for appointments. The reason that I have not included all of that here is a simple practical one. Between us all, and those lodging amendments to the Housing (Scotland) Bill and other bills, we have put a heavy burden on Parliament’s legislation team in recent weeks. Therefore, I asked the team to draft a set of amendments that would test the issue in principle, and if the committee were minded to agree to those, I would lodge subsequent amendments at stage 3 to lay out the alternative process to orders in council. That would be the regular appointment process that is used by all other public bodies that are not Crown appointments. At that point, I will conclude.

I move amendment 74.