Seòmar agus comataidhean

The convener can dictate who the committee’s witnesses are only if the committee lets them do that. There is an element of interpersonal dynamics to that. It is easier to disagree with some conveners than with others, and it is easier to disagree with some members, whether they are conveners or not, than with others. I have seen situations in which conveners have—in my view—been trying to bounce the committee into agreeing with what they want to do or to present something as if it is a fait accompli by saying, “By the way, note this,” and then they move on.

A bigger problem is when members of the committee do not come prepared to make alternative suggestions for witnesses. We do not set a clear or high enough expectation on committee members that every one should come with proposals for whom we take evidence from. That goes back to Douglas Ross’s point about the size of the country: essentially, there are professional witnesses, because there are some organisations that we need to hear from on some topics and they always send the same people. That creates the groupthink that the Parliament and our wider political sphere is often accused of having. There should be a challenge to all committee members: whether we agree or disagree with the convener’s approach to the selection of witnesses, we should all be expected to come forward with proposals of our own.

Perhaps we should set an expectation that we should come forward with proposals to seek evidence from people who have never given evidence before. On that, we might need to be more relaxed than we often are—for good reason—about whether somebody has submitted written evidence before they are called to give oral evidence. If we are trying to get a more diverse range of views, we should consider that perhaps someone did not provide a written submission because they feel so distant from the Parliament, so we should make the effort to invite them to come here.

Yes.

I understand the nervousness that a lot of members have because the perception of us spending public money and forever leaving this building is often down to misrepresentation and manipulation. However, we need to be brave enough to say that there is a necessity for that and that the range of advantages in doing that is vast. My understanding is that that would require a change in what has been the dominant culture of hesitation in the Conveners Group towards authorising such outward-bound activities. I do not know whether that is the case right now, but it has certainly been the case over the time that I have been here.

However, that is a responsibility on all members, not just on the convener.

That is part of it.

I remember hearing one anecdote—I will not mention what session or what committee it was in—in which one convener could not get authorisation to go to Coatbridge but the next convener got sign-off to go to Brussels. The first convener felt rather bruised by that, and it was observed that it was perhaps the showmanship of the presentation of the value of the second trip that swung it.

We all know the underlying nervousness there. Money is finite, and we should be effective stewards of the public finances. Every committee trip is subject to a freedom of information request—each gets FOI-ed. We had a recent Finance and Public Administration Committee trip to London for the meeting of the interparliamentary finance committee forum, which does what it says on the tin. There is a necessity, once or twice a year, for all the finance committees of this country’s Parliaments to come together. However, it still ended up as a Daily Express story in which all of the committee’s collective spending, which came to about £3,000, was attributed to me personally, because the Daily Express loves a Ross Greer headline, apparently. I did not mind that—

I do not think there is much to add, because Douglas Ross has summarised it well.

My only other point is that members can be elected with a particular interest that may not appear to be the issue of the day or that may not seem topical at the time. If members are aware of a particular topic, they can suggest it for an inquiry and bring it into the process of planning the committee’s work. That has, in the past, led to some really effective inquiries that have resulted in change. I do not think that that is more important than legislative scrutiny, but being able to bring topics to the table, even though they have not appeared on “Reporting Scotland” the night before, can also be an important part of the role.

I agree with that. I would add to Willie Rennie’s point that the turnover of committee members can exacerbate one of the problems with Scottish Parliament information centre questions that we highlight in our submission. If a member has been on a committee for a short period and is going to be off it within a couple of months, there is less incentive for them to become familiar with the topic at hand. Turning up, reading two SPICe questions, switching off, doing your emails and then leaving for another week is not effective scrutiny.

As Rhoda Grant said, committees offer the opportunity to take a really dive deep into an issue, which is what we want from that process. The SPICe questions are there as a broad guide, but they are too often used as a script, and they will get a scripted answer, particularly from a Government minister, in response. That might happen for quite understandable reasons. When non-Government witnesses come to committees, they are given a pretty good idea of the specific questions that they will be asked, because we want them to feel comfortable in the setting. However, that results in scripted questions and answers, and I am not convinced that it makes for particularly effective scrutiny.

I have also been on committees for which very high-quality SPICe papers have been prepared but the convener’s decision has been that no questions should be provided in the papers. It is then up to members, based on the SPICe briefing, to decide what they want to talk about, and that improves committee effectiveness.

My other point, based on the clear consensus that we do not do enough post-legislative scrutiny, is about use of the full parliamentary session. The first half of a parliamentary session is often spent doing topical inquiries into committee members’ various areas of interest, and the second half is spent on an incredibly pressured legislative timetable—it is often bill after bill—so there is no space to do topical or reactive work. That is partly because, at the start of a Parliament, a strong steer is given that not many bills will be introduced in the first couple of years. That should be the time when committees have the opportunity to do post-legislative work, particularly on everything that was passed in the previous session, as it will have had a couple of years to bed in.

It might be worth considering the guidance that we give to individual members, particularly as part of the new members’ induction, but also to committees ahead of their first work planning session in the recess after an election. We probably cannot build a rigid structure—that should always be up to each individual committee, and a lot of discretion should be given to conveners—but there should probably be a bit more guidance. It should be, “Here’s what you can realistically achieve over a parliamentary session, but bear in mind that, in the second half, you’re going to be able to do far less of what you want, and your work is going to be largely dictated by the legislation coming forward.” In that way, in the first half of the session, committees can plan to do all the other work that members collectively agree is necessary but is not happening.

Yes.

Yes, our options are extremely limited. It is often not really a choice.

Having been on the education committee for nine years now, I agree. I think that my party’s position would be, as you would expect, that the Net Zero, Energy and Transport Committee is the most important for us.

Paul Grice mentioned the potential for intervention. The ultimate stick that the SFC can wield is to claw back funding. In reality that does not happen because, in the situation that may give rise to that intervention, taking money out of that institution is probably one of the worst things that you could do. Some other stakeholders have raised the concern that that is not really an effective stick to wield. It is not an effective enforcement power. Last year, I believe, the previous chief executive of the SFC gave evidence and she hinted that there was a need for the SFC to have a wider range of enforcement or intervention powers. Presumably, you will never want money to be clawed back from your institutions. What would other effective enforcement powers look like from your perspective? What would provide an incentive but still be a realistic option for the SFC in those worst-case scenarios?