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I think that we accept that. I do not think that the bill suggests that we should not control predatory behaviour by animals—no one is proposing that. However, that does not mean that the animal is not sentient. I would have thought that every member recognises that all animals are living, breathing creatures that feel pain and suffer. I think that that is a basic thing that any human being would recognise.

I have heard it argued that we do not need this ethical approach, because the NatureScot position statement on wildlife welfare and the shared approach to wildlife management that NatureScot currently uses to guide its decision making in the area are sufficient. That is a bit of a red herring—it seems to be more of an excuse for not supporting my amendments rather than a credible explanation. If you compare the seven international consensus principles for ethical wildlife control with those two current policies, you will see that the latter are outdated and simply do not go far enough, and I think that the Government recognises that in its thinking on, for example, the coming changes to deer management.

The current policies are commendable statements of intent, but they are not a proper framework that will act as a guide for decision making in any application process. In contrast, the seven principles can easily be converted into seven questions in any licence application process, literally providing a step-by-step protocol to follow when a potential problem is identified and a decision on how to approach it must be made.

Crucially, NatureScot’s definition of wildlife welfare is outdated. It contains no recognition of sentience. Although I think that it would be perfectly logical—this would be my preference—to say specifically that the ethical principles should be the international consensus principles for ethical wildlife control, my amendment 116 does not do that; it simply says that ethical principles should be used. I believe that such ethical principles could be drawn up by NatureScot, working with those involved in wildlife management, animal welfare charities and others when developing the licensing scheme.

One criticism of the bill is that there is a lack of detail about what would guide the licence application process, and my amendments would help to overcome that by setting a clear direction of travel. Anyone who is considering an application under a licensing scheme that follows ethical principles has nothing to be concerned about because, frankly, if they cannot justify the licence on ethical grounds, they should not have a licence in the first place.

I have outlined exactly—

I will not confuse the two, because we are dealing specifically with the bill. My reference was to the fact that, in the Government’s proposals for upcoming changes to deer management, it recognises that it needs to go beyond existing policy.

I think that I have covered all the points that have been made. As I said, one criticism of the bill is that there is a lack of detail. My amendments 116 and 130 would set a direction of travel for the discussions on that lack of detail. I have been very clear that the amendments are quite tight. They do not specify all seven of the ethical principles—I gave an example of one that could be incorporated—but they set a direction of travel that ethical principles should direct any licence application process.

I would be happy to work with any member on the practicalities of that, if the amendments are not agreed to. However, I urge members first to support amendments to remove the licensing scheme from the bill; failing that, I urge them to support amendments to include the ethical principles for wildlife management to ensure that the licensing scheme is as robust as possible.

Amendments 111, 119 and 127, in my name, seek to ensure that the use of dogs in hunting is a last resort. They would require a person using dogs, if asked, to be able to show evidence that the use of dogs meets the purpose of preventing damage, not simply reducing the number of a certain species—the two are not necessarily linked—and that they had considered more humane methods and had reasonable grounds to believe that those would not be as effective. The amendments would not prevent the use of dogs; they would merely require a justification for their use, which introduces accountability that is currently lacking in the bill.

Amendments 112, 118, 144, 145 and 147 would introduce a close season for the use of dogs, which is a basic animal welfare and conservation measure that would reduce the perceived need to send dogs underground to relieve the suffering of a dependent fox or mink, which is currently permitted under section 5(2)(d). Amendment 118 is consequential to amendment 112. If amendment 112 is agreed to, amendment 118 would be required to provide a close season for wild mammals during their breeding seasons and obviate the supposed need to use dogs below ground to dispatch orphaned fox cubs that would otherwise die of dehydration or starvation. Not killing animals with young is a basic animal welfare and conservation measure. Section 5 allows for the use of dogs underground, so the two are linked.

Amendment 122 seeks to remove subsection (4), which states:

“In this section, ‘dependent’ means that the mother of a fox or mink is dead and it is too young to survive on its own.”

Amendment 122 is consequential, and if amendment 118 is agreed to, amendment 122 is no longer needed, as there is no other reference to dependent animals in section 5.

I urge members to support my amendments to ensure that using dogs to kill wild mammals is a last resort and that we do not create loopholes in a bill that is designed to close loopholes.

It would be necessary to prove that the exception existed. If there was an email from those who carried out the hunt that contained information about their belief that there was a high level of predation of lambs—that is the example that I gave—that would certainly be an argument to be considered with regard to whether the exception applied. An email that simply said, “We were hunting on your land,” would obviously not prove that an exception applied. The evidence would have to relate to the specific exception that the person argued was applicable. I presume that the individual would have to argue that under the bill as drafted. The only difference in what I am suggesting is that there would be some evidence to back up the claim.

As the bill stands, we would have to interpret whether the individual “reasonably believed” that any of the exceptions applied. In effect, we would have to rely on that individual saying that they “reasonably believed” that the exception applied. Under my amendment, instead of simply relying on the individual, we would rely on evidence, which would make it clearer and easier to prove one way or the other.

The current policy does not recognise the priority of animal welfare or the sentience of all animals. The Government itself has recognised that that is the case in some areas. For example, in its approach to the upcoming deer management policy, it is going further than the current policy statements that are in place. There is a recognition that those statements are outdated and need to be updated. We are not specifying exactly what the detailed policies should be. The detailed application process should be part of a discussion and consultation.

I will finish my point first.

The approach should be to discuss it with all stakeholders, including those involved in wildlife management and those involved in animal welfare. As part of that—they are very small amendments—the direction of travel should be to follow ethical principles in developing a licensing scheme.

I would turn the question round and ask any member to look at the seven ethical principles—I have given an example—and say which of them should not guide the process when it comes to an application.

I support amendment 14, in the name of Ariane Burgess, and consequential amendments 2, 4, 6 and 8, which seek to remove the whole of section 6. I do not believe that we should be killing animals for sport or that removing the section would undermine the bill’s purpose and overall effectiveness. The minister has stated in oral evidence that, in the bill, the Scottish Government is

“pursuing the highest possible animal welfare standards”

and seeking to

“rectify what was supposed to have been done 20 years ago”.—[Official Report, Rural Affairs, Islands and Natural Environment Committee, 29 June 2022 ; c 2, 11.]

If the bill is to rectify the flaws in the 2002 act, there must be the minimum of exceptions and they must not be made for sporting reasons.

If members do not support the amendment to remove section 6, I direct them to amendments 123 and 146, in my name, which seek to remove falconry as a permitted use of dogs. The RAINE Committee rightly questioned the inclusion of falconry in its stage 1 report, and members asked for further information on why such an exception had been included in the scope of the bill and raised concerns about section 6(2)(e), which requires that

“the wild mammal which is being searched for, stalked or flushed is shot dead, or killed by a bird of prey”.

The Scottish Government’s response does not adequately explain how the flushing of a wild mammal to be killed by a waiting bird of prey can be considered any more humane than its being killed by a dog, and its argument that falconry is a permitted activity is even less convincing. The question is, should it be a permitted activity? From the point of view of animal welfare, the answer is very much no. I therefore urge members to support the amendments to remove falconry, at the very least, from the bill’s exceptions.

I thank the committee for considering my amendment 110, which relates to a defence for a person who is charged with the offence of hunting a wild animal with a dog.

The bill provides that

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence ... to show that the person reasonably believed that any of the exceptions”

in the bill applied. In effect, that would require proof of the individual’s state of mind, which would on its own be difficult to evidence. My amendment 110 simply seeks to shift the emphasis on the grounds for that reasonable belief so that it is objective rather than subjective, and so that it is capable of being demonstrated by the landowner. As currently drafted, the bill would require speculation on the state of mind of a person who believed or claimed to have reasonably believed that the relevant exception would apply.

My amendment would change the emphasis from the person’s assertion of their belief to the available evidence that gave them the grounds for that reasonable belief. The requirement for evidence would not be onerous and it would depend on the specific exception. For example, the evidence could be an email to the landowner or occupier from the person who was using the dog or dogs stating that the reason why they were carrying out fox control on the land was the identification of a high level of predation of lambs there.

The term “reasonably believed” is open to interpretation and difficult to quantify, so I believe that it should be backed by a requirement for evidence. My fear is that, if we fail to include that, it could allow an unnecessary loophole. Whatever position members take on hunting, I do not believe that my amendment is in any way unreasonable. I note that the Scottish Gamekeepers Association, NFU Scotland and the National Sheep Association Scotland do not oppose it.

Edward Mountain raised the issue of who would make the judgement. It would be dealt with in the same way that, under the bill, the term “reasonably believed” would be dealt with. It would be up to the courts and others to decide whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the exception applied. In the same way, it would be necessary to prove that the landowner “reasonably believed“ that the exception applied. My amendment would make it easier to prove than it will be if we rely on the phrase “reasonably believed”. I urge members to support amendment 110.