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As you have set out, it is a really positive model that we would like to think could be used more widely as we engage on such issues.

George Burgess wants to come in.

Good morning, everyone. Thank you for inviting me to give evidence on common frameworks.

We are coming to the culmination of a process that started all the way back in October 2017, with the agreement of the framework principles by the joint ministerial committee on European negotiations. I know that there have been concerns about the delays during the development of the frameworks, and I share the frustration of the Parliament and, indeed, stakeholders at the time that it is taking to finalise and deliver them. However, the most significant factors in causing those delays lie outside the Scottish Government’s control, and I am, of course, grateful for the committee’s patience on that. Despite those frustrations, we remain committed to working collaboratively with the United Kingdom Government on common frameworks, on the basis of consensus and in line with the framework principles.

The frameworks, including the ones that the committee is currently scrutinising, are being established to manage policy divergence on the basis of agreement and in a way that respects devolution. They have been operational on an interim basis since the end of the transition period, and they will, of course, remain provisional until all four UK legislatures have completed their parliamentary scrutiny.

It is important to note at this point that the frameworks are policy neutral. They are intergovernmental arrangements for managing policy divergence and are not, in themselves, policy innovations.

The fundamental reason for putting the frameworks in place has not changed. When we were taken out of the European Union, after the 2016 referendum, we accepted that there would be some areas in which the practical, regulatory and market implications of that decision would need to be managed. The frameworks offer a model by which to manage such implications by agreement and collaboration between equals rather than by imposition. That approach could be usefully applied to intergovernmental relations in the UK more widely, but, sadly, that is not much in evidence in other UK Government efforts.

The United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 is a glaring example of the UK Government’s willingness to drive a coach and horses through the devolution settlement when it suits it. We remain fundamentally opposed to that legislation, which continues to pose a significant threat to the implementation of the common frameworks. I am sure that we will pick up on that issue later in the evidence session.

Several of the frameworks that were published earlier this year fall under this committee’s remit. As I have said in previous sessions with the committee, I am committed to being open and transparent in relation to the common frameworks and to working with the committee as much as possible during the scrutiny process for the frameworks.

Well, that is the thing. I do not think that I have contradicted myself. It is a really strong model, and, if all the Administrations commit to adhere to the process that we have set out, as we have done, it could work well. However, the problem is that we have seen the process undermined. I talked about the example of the exclusions process—it was the first time that we used it, and it did not work perfectly, so I hope that lessons will be learned from that.

If we all adhere to the process, it will be a good process and model. The point is that we need it to be adhered to. We cannot have the process undermined by the introduction of legislation that constrains the policy choices that we can make. That is the complete opposite of what we all committed to through the common frameworks process.

Yes, it is there to manage policy divergence, when that takes place.

I would be happy to come back to you with further information on that and to keep the committee apprised. That may be an area for further monitoring and review as part of our consideration of the frameworks.

That is no problem. It is really frustrating that we are still in that place. I have been liaising with the UK Government on that, but we remain in dispute over the exact responsibilities in relation to organics. However, I do not think that that hampers too much the work that we would be looking to take forward through the framework.

George Burgess may want to come in on that.

That is why we have the common frameworks processes—they allow us to discuss matters at an early stage. As part of the common frameworks, we share information early and try to resolve any potential issues as early as possible, so that they do not need to be escalated. If it looks as though there might be policy divergence, the common frameworks ensure that we discuss at an early stage what the impact might be and how it might be managed.

At an early stage, we would discuss our proposals and how we would intend to bring them forward. I am sure that George Burgess can talk you through the detail of the process, but I come back to my previous concerns. Although the common frameworks process is a positive and collaborative way of working, there are, at the same time, pieces of legislation coming in at the side that seek to undermine that way of working and that could constrain our policy choices.

It is important that we work on the guidance, so that we can see the practical implications of the 2022 act, because we have been concerned throughout that it could constrain the Scottish Government’s policy choices. The direction that we might like to take could be completely hampered by the legislation and some of its principles, given the very different landscape that we have in Scotland. Some of the voluntary and coupled support schemes that we have, for example, do not exist in other parts of the UK. We have them in Scotland for the very specific reason that we want to continue to support people who are farming in the most difficult terrain and the most remote and rural parts of the country. We have been concerned that the 2022 act could hamper our ability to provide that support or that it could lead to disputes further down the line. Again, though, we will continue to work through the process. George Burgess will talk you through how that works practically.

The common frameworks process itself allows us to address or work through potential issues when they emerge. Again, common frameworks in themselves will not necessarily protect our position if another piece of legislation comes in at the side and undermines it completely.

Yes, because it is the legislation. The common frameworks are not a legislative mechanism; instead, they are a mechanism through which we have all agreed to work as a means of collaboration and on the basis that we are collaborating with each other as equals. That is where I come back to the concerns about the UK Internal Market Act 2020 and the Subsidy Control Act 2022. They undermine that process. Indeed, that has been recognised through the work that the House of Lords has done on the issue, too.