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That is helpful. The other side of the coin, but very much a related point, is the fact that there is an increasing imbalance between the working population and the dependent population, which is what you have been flagging up. If we are going to close some of the fiscal gap, the other part of the policy has to ensure that the working population is able and willing to work, apart from anything else, and that it is also able to widen the tax base and return the revenues that we need in order to fill some of the gap.

There is lots of discussion at the moment about the working population and how we attract more people back into the workforce. Again, I do not want you to comment on the policy, because I know that you will not do that, but how easy is it to measure the effectiveness of those policies for getting more people who can work and should work back into the labour market?

It is just that it was quite striking that the OECD report showed that we are not doing very well in relation to other countries. There must be lessons in the fact that we are not getting enough people back into the workforce for whatever reason. We cannot set the policy until we know why people are not coming back into the labour market in the ways that we would like. Anyway, thank you for that.

Would Mr Greer comment on whether he thinks that part of the issue that we are facing is that we are trying to put structures around education in Scotland without knowing what the future vision of education in Scotland will be?

I speak with a bit of experience, having sat on the Parliament’s education committee, along with other members around the table, on two separate occasions—under Mike Russell and then under John Swinney as education secretaries—where we tried, and I think that we all failed, to come to an agreement about what the vision of education in Scotland should be, and therefore what the structure should be.

I have been following this debate quite carefully. There is a danger that we will create structures that do not necessarily articulate the vision that we are trying to establish. Would Mr Greer agree with that?

Does the member accept that the weakness that he has just identified—rightly, in my opinion—is hampering improvements in educational standards, because the system does not have sufficient trust or sufficient accountability? That is creating some of the limbo that he has mentioned for parents, pupils and teachers.

Thank you for your evidence so far. I want to ask about a specific issue. Although you are obviously not responsible for policy making, you have to respond to it. In recent times, at the UK and Scottish levels, we have seen some very late adjustments. At the time of the spring budget statement in the UK, the OBR stated that the welfare reforms would not deliver as much money as the Government had previously estimated, and so last-minute adjustments had to be made.

In Scotland, the Scottish Government was very late in announcing its mitigation of the two-child cap, and it did not provide enough information in time for the SFC to build that into a forecast. To what extent do such adjustments present a problem with forecasting? I know that you cannot set the policy in any sense, but does it create considerable difficulties when Governments make changes to their policy proposals that are a bit late for forecasting?

Is it your view that we are getting better at forecasting over the short, medium and longer terms?

Thank you for the excellent evidence that you have provided for us. I will concentrate on scrutiny by Parliament. Professor Bell, I noticed your interesting comment about the role of committees and why the committee system might not lead to the most effective scrutiny. Professor Spowage has made clear some of the issues with Parliament itself.

If we wanted to improve parliamentary scrutiny, would we need to make structural changes to the scrutiny process during the next session of Parliament, or is it a question of improving the culture within Government and the relationship between Government and Parliament regarding how scrutiny takes place?

What would be the difference between what we have, which, I would agree, is not particularly cutting edge, and something like the arrangement that Finland has? You mentioned that it has a discreet body that has been set up to do that work. What is different about those two options that makes Finland a bit better?

I make the point because, to go back to the convener’s question about transparency, the situation becomes increasingly difficult if things are done at the last minute. As you said, if that happens, it is difficult to expand on the implications that a policy change might have for the labour market, inflation or whatever. Therefore, we run the risk of having less accurate forecasting, which concerns us. That is on top of the fact that the SFC and the OBR produce forecasts at different times—the convener mentioned that lag—which compounds the issue.

We have been taking evidence on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s review of how effectively the Scottish Fiscal Commission operates. The SFC was generally given a very clean bill of health. However, an interesting issue was raised about the SFC’s groundbreaking approach of giving a very long-term projection for the Scottish economy—it goes all the way up to the year 2070. On one level, that is very helpful, but there is the argument, which was part of some discussion and debate just last weekend, that those very long-term projections slightly take the focus away from short-term policy making to address serious issues in the economy.

I know that you cannot comment on the policy, but are you concerned that, if we go too far into the future, we will have issues with short-term policy making?

Thank you for that helpful answer about the committee set-up.

What can the Parliament do better? I think that there was cross-party frustration—it is nothing to do with party politics—at the time of the budget that we had a budget debate that was a bit dead in the water. Each of the committees is asked to make a presentation in the budget debate, which is made by the committee convener and, therefore, must be objective. The limited scope for MSPs to debate in that forum is not very helpful and the debate is also constrained by time.

Some of us around the table have been arguing for a finance bill in order to enhance scrutiny, but I wonder whether a structural change in the Parliament, as opposed to committees, could make it easier for there to be good quality scrutiny and whether it could heighten the general interest of MSPs in the budget process. It would be quite easy for an MSP to avoid getting involved in the budget, yet it is one of the most important things that we do—some would say that it is the most important. Do you have any suggestions about how we could change the structure of the Parliament to improve scrutiny?