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A point has been made by Claire Baker, and Sandesh Gulhane has also made his point. I support the age being raised to 18 and urge the committee to do likewise.

On the age threshold that Claire Baker proposes, which was pre-empted by Daniel Johnson’s earlier intervention, I am not persuaded by the case that has been made to raise the age to 25, as provided for in amendments 152, 168 and 215. In other jurisdictions with similar legislation, 18 is typically the age at which someone becomes eligible. During stage 1 evidence, many of the witnesses appeared to consider 18 as the appropriate age of eligibility. Claire Baker has clearly set out the Sentencing Council’s views and I am conscious of Children’s Hospices Across Scotland’s concerns, following my interactions with the charity over the past few years on issues pertaining to young adults who are under the age of 25. I believe that those issues will be better addressed through training, which we will discuss in subsequent groups, and by ensuring the involvement of relevant medical and other professionals. Again, those provisions are contained in other amendments.

I urge the committee to back the amendments in the name of Sandesh Gulhane, and I encourage Claire Baker not to press her amendments to a vote.

I thank Brian Whittle for that further clarification. From the discussions that I have had with him, I understand his motivation, which is entirely constructive in intent. My concern is still that that process is likely to delay any decision being taken forward and to allow opportunities for family members—who, as he rightly says, might have their own strong views—to express their views on the decision that the individual is proposing to take. In relation to coercion, during stage 1 evidence, the committee heard from witnesses in Australia that, almost without exception, coercion is applied in trying to influence an individual out of making the decision. Unfortunately, the process—however well-motivated it may be—runs the risk of allowing that to be given effect. I do not think that that is in the interests of the patient, their family members or health professionals more generally. Again, I am happy to work with Brian Whittle to see whether there are ways to tease that out further ahead of stage 3.

I turn to Stuart McMillan’s amendments 216 and 217—I recognise that I am speaking before he has had a chance to present them, so I will bear that in mind and invite him to come in if needs be. Other amendments also seek to define “coercion” and “pressure”. My understanding is that the terms are well understood, both in the medical profession and by the courts, and do not require definition in the bill. The committee heard at stage 1 about the existence of guidance from the General Medical Council on the issue of coercion. There appeared to be general consensus among expert witnesses—and it was acknowledged in the committee’s stage 1 report—that cases of explicit coercive behaviour should be relatively straightforward to detect. However, I recognise some of the issues that have been raised in the context of these amendments. As I said in response to Bob Doris’s intervention, my bill is consistent with the GMC guidance. If more needs to be done in that area, I am happy to work on that ahead of stage 3.

Of course, there might be cases that are not straightforward, which is why the bill also allows for the Scottish ministers to prepare and publish guidance on such matters. That is also why I have lodged amendments to allow ministers to regulate for the training that a “coordinating registered medical practitioner” and an “independent registered medical practitioner” should have in order to fulfil those roles. Those powers would be in addition to those that are already given to ministers under the bill to regulate for qualifications and experience. On that basis, I encourage Mr McMillan not to move his amendments, and, if he does, I encourage the committee not to support them.

I appreciate Mr McMillan’s setting out the rationale for his amendments, which do not come as a surprise, as he and others have raised the issue before. Does he accept the points that Bob Doris made about the guidance from the GMC, which includes a firmly established process for assessing coercion? We need to make sure that the bill aligns with that. I believe that it does, but if further work needs to be done to allow that to happen, I am happy to take that forward.

Adopting a different approach is likely only to create uncertainty and confusion and to make prosecutions of offences more problematic. That is not in the interests of patients, their families or the health professionals who we are asking to operate the system.

I am saying that there is plenty of scope in the bill for instructing or requiring ministers to introduce secondary legislation, and for them to work with healthcare and other relevant stakeholders in doing so, and for requiring professional bodies and others to introduce guidance. I think that the public and we as parliamentarians would expect that to take place in a timely fashion and allow the bill to proceed. I would be reluctant to link the provisions, as set out in amendment 128, to commencement of the bill.

I will give way—very briefly—to Bob Doris.

This is probably more a question for the representatives of the fishing sector, but I will not be here for the session with that panel, so I will chuck it in now.

With regard to the discussions that Phil Taylor and Calum Duncan mentioned, to what extent is there an understanding of the likely impact of displacement of effort on other areas? If there is a displacement, there will be increased effort in those areas, albeit that they might be better able to sustain such activity. Phil or Calum, would you like to address that?

I am grateful for that answer.

As I say, “ordinarily resident” is a legal concept that is understood. I noted the concerns that Police Scotland raised. I would be interested to know whether Police Scotland feels that there is an alternative definition that would address its concerns. The concept is fairly well established, and I do not know whether there is a way of defining it in the bill any differently from what is set out in the explanatory notes and policy memorandum, which I think make the policy intent clear.

That is another area where I would be happy to reflect on any proposed changes. However, the fact that the “ordinarily resident” requirement sits alongside a requirement for people to be registered with a GP probably gets around the concerns.

I understand where Police Scotland is coming from because it engages more often with the criminal law, and perhaps that is where some confusion arises, but I am fairly comfortable that that concern has not been raised by others and that the concept is pretty well established and understood.

I was interested in those exchanges. To go back to Ms Mochan’s questions, I note that that element might well fall more appropriately into guidance. However, the self-administration element is an integral part of the process.

It is worth reflecting not so much on the differences between the bill that I have introduced and the bill that is being considered by Westminster but on the fact that, in other jurisdictions that have similar legislation, very often, the medication is dispatched to the patient and the medical professional is not present when the medication is delivered.

I am happy to look at whether further refinement of that is necessary. It is an important safeguard that the medic is there, not least to ensure that a final assessment of capacity and intent is made.

There is a feeling that an individual may wish, in their final moments, to have a degree of privacy. How you manage that while ensuring that there are safeguards is probably a question to reflect on further. As I have said, the safeguard that is in the bill seems to be robust; it is absent from other jurisdictions, which does not seem to be a problem, but that is for those jurisdictions, rather than me, to justify.

As you will be aware, the schedules to the bill are effectively the forms for this and other aspects of the reporting requirements. It is important that death certificates reflect the underlying progressive advanced terminal illness that gave rise to the application, as well as the fact that medication had been administered to allow for an assisted death. For clarity and transparency, both those things need to be captured, which is what the schedules to the bill set out.

From my initial discussions with the chief medical officer, I recognise the legitimate concern that there may be some sensitivity about the way in which the information is expressed and the distinction between suicide and assisted dying, which goes back to an earlier point. The chief medical officer and his colleagues helpfully suggested that codes are used for registrations that may allow for that information to be captured in a way that respects and acknowledges the sensitivity of what we are discussing.

I am keen to explore that further, but it is important that we understand who is accessing the option of assisted death, what conditions are involved, when people are accessing it and their sociodemographic characteristics. We need as much information as possible—anonymised, of course. As we might touch on later, it will be crucial to report on and understand the picture of how the legislation is working in practice. There are the annual reports, which will feed into the five-year review that is also set out in the bill.

If we look at other jurisdictions, we see that there are a lot of similarities in who is accessing assisted dying, the reasons why they are doing so and the demographic profile, but to my mind it is absolutely essential that we gather information in Scotland. In fact, the only element of my proposals that changed between the initial consultation and when I brought the bill to Parliament was in respect of tightening up the data-reporting requirements that were envisaged. For public confidence, and for the confidence of patients and medics, the more robust those requirements are, the better.