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You could make a similar argument about withdrawal of treatment and refusal of food and liquids, and those things are happening at the moment. The international evidence from places such as Australia and California is that, when there is a view within the wider family, it is more often akin to what Liz Smith alluded to earlier: some family members are not necessarily happy with the fact that their family member has opted to go down the route of requesting assisted death. The resistance comes from an unwillingness to accept that, rather than a desire to accelerate the process.

That is why the assessments of terminal illness and mental capacity sit alongside an assessment of the rationale for why the individual has made the request. That is about understanding what led them to that conclusion and whether coercion or undue influence has been exerted on the patient. I would argue that that safeguard is not there to the same extent in other areas of medicine, where some of that pressure is perhaps being applied.

When it comes to protecting the interests of patients and of medical professionals, the safeguards in my bill are considerably stronger than what there is at present. They can bring a degree of robustness and transparency into areas of medicine that are lawful at the moment, and not just to the process that I am describing.

I refer back to the report that the Health and Social Care Committee in the Commons published in February. It found no evidence internationally of a so-called slippery slope in terms of eligibility criteria expanding over time in models that were based on terminal illness and mental capacity. That dates back to Oregon’s passage of its legislation in the 1990s, through to more recent examples in Australia. You can make the argument that it is maybe too early to say for Australia, but the committee found no international evidence of a change in the eligibility criteria.

I go back to what I said in my opening statement: I do not think that anybody knows. We can draw on the evidence from elsewhere, from which you can quite confidently predict a relatively low number to start off with. The rise in public awareness over time, as well as the rise in public confidence, perhaps, and the confidence of medical practitioners and their ability to get through the required training in order to carry this out, helps to support or explain the increase in numbers that you have seen.

It is extremely difficult to predict what will happen in the first year or two, and even in the first five years. What I have sought to do in the financial memorandum is to explain that Oregon and Victoria were chosen because they gave us data sets over a more prolonged period. Queensland’s legislation is more recent in its introduction, and therefore the data available in that respect is not so extensive over a certain time period that it avoids the problem of our seeing just a single year or a couple of years, which might not be reflective of longer-term patterns.

With Queensland, you are talking about a jurisdiction in Australia that followed not just Victoria, but other jurisdictions that were introducing such legislation. I think, therefore, that what you had in that case was heightened public awareness of assisted dying as a result of the debate that had already been taking place in other states in Australia. I suppose that Oregon and Victoria were the prime movers in the US and in Australia, so their situation is probably more reflective of that in Scotland, where we could be the first jurisdiction to introduce such legislation and would, as a result, need to go through the process of raising awareness and building confidence among medical practitioners.

I have been on committees that have been quick to criticise financial memorandums that have given broader ranges. I have acknowledged that there are different models that we could use, and that, if we used a different model, we would probably come up with different figures.

When it comes to the costs, there is an assumption that, with someone who goes through with an assisted death, as opposed to someone who simply makes an initial application, there will be a cost saving in relation to the treatment or care that they will forgo as a result of having opted for an assisted death. We would, therefore, see the savings go up with the costs, which is perhaps different from what we might see in financial memoranda to other bills. For example, if the figures for take-up were likely to be massively higher, the costs would be significantly higher, and that would just be a cost that would be borne.

Again, that is not an unreasonable assumption to try to build in, but it would be very difficult to reflect that.

It is fair to say, on the basis of the figures that we see pretty consistently across the jurisdictions, that those who are accessing assisted dying are largely those with various cancer diagnoses. Between 65 and 75 per cent, and even up to 80 per cent, of those who access it in Victoria, Queensland, Oregon and California fall into that range. The point that you make is not unreasonable, but it is very difficult to map that into additional figures.

I would think that most of the jurisdictions have a prognosis timescale. For example, in California, the six months is linked to entitlement to a hospice at home service. It is driven by a desire to ensure that assisted dying is accessed by those with, as I have described in my bill, an advanced and progressive terminal illness. The reason for shying away from setting a specific timeframe is that it is hellishly difficult to do so.

In the previous session, the Parliament considered legislation on access to terminal illness benefits. Initially, the Government came forward with a bill that linked that to a six-month prognosis. Understandable concerns were raised by people in the hospice and palliative care sector, as well as by medical professionals across the board, who pointed out how difficult it is to make that prognosis, particularly with certain conditions, and how the prognosis might even change over time, in relation to the timeframe rather than to the terminal illness itself. Having taken that decision in the previous parliamentary session, I felt that it was consistent to apply a similar logic in relation to this bill.

Again, international experience suggests that people do not access assisted dying at the point of diagnosis—unless the diagnosis is very late on, which cannot happen. Requests can come in relatively early on, but they are not necessarily acted on until much later. As I said in my opening remarks, one of the requirements on medical professionals is to ensure that the individual is aware of all the care and treatment options that are available, including palliative and hospice care. The decision then becomes more informed and will almost certainly be part of an on-going discussion, unless the patient is very close to the end of life.

Again, I do not think that there is anything to suggest that, even without a prognosis period, we are likely to see an inverse trend to pretty much every other jurisdiction. That includes jurisdictions with a more expansive model, but, even just sticking to those jurisdictions with a terminal illness and mental capacity model, I would suggest that the smaller numbers in the first instance are a reflection of public awareness, patient awareness and confidence and medical professionals’ confidence or preparedness, having gone through the requisite training and all the rest of it.

Whether you start with the number that I have put in my financial memorandum or with a higher or lower number, the trend or trajectory is reasonably consistent across a lot of jurisdictions. If you start with a higher number, I suspect that you will find that you will be taking in numbers that otherwise would have come later on. As I have said, with Queensland, some of this is a reflection of the public awareness raising and, indeed, the preparedness of the medical community in the area compared with Victoria at the point of introduction. Those numbers should, over time, end up tracking in a broadly similar way.

I chose to use Oregon and Victoria—in other words, I used two comparators. There are various differences in how healthcare is delivered in the US and how it is delivered in Australia, and there are various differences in how it is delivered in Australia and how it is delivered in the UK, so, in a sense, neither the US nor Australia is a direct comparator. There is no precedent that we can lift. This is the first proposed system of its type in the UK.

If I had relied solely on Australia, that would have been justified in informing our approach here in the UK, or indeed in Scotland, where health is devolved, as there are variances in how healthcare is delivered across borders. However, I thought that it was helpful to take examples from jurisdictions in two different countries, because that gets us away from simply relying on the similarities or the differences between Australia and here, or between the US and here.

In addition, the data sets that are available for Oregon provide a picture that speaks to the 20-year time horizon that is set out in the financial memorandum. Victoria was selected because it provides the longest-running data set in Australia. The situation is different when we are talking about the first jurisdiction in a country to introduce legislation on a particular subject. I take the convener’s point that awareness of assisted dying is likely to be heightened here because of the debates that we are having now. Nevertheless, when you are the first jurisdiction in a country to get a system up and running, that will present additional challenges in relation to the extent to which you are finding your way.

As I said, I thought that there was a benefit in having longer data sets and in not relying simply on one country-to-country comparison.

Well, no—the bill itself has served many useful functions, among which have been that it has shone a light on and opened up debate around palliative care, and around end-of-life choices as a whole, because it is not just about palliative care. Some people have quite reasonably made the argument that a lot of what the bill is about relates to issues related to social care.

Nonetheless, you have made a valid point. Hospice UK, in its submission, makes the point that that is an active decision for the Government, whether it is the Scottish Government or, in relation to the bill that is going through Westminster, the UK Government. As I said, the debate around this bill, and around Kim Leadbeater’s bill at Westminster, has allowed greater focus on palliative care. I am certainly lending what support I can to efforts from colleagues—notably, Miles Briggs, with regard to his proposed right to palliative care bill—to ensure that that—

As I said, it will ultimately have to be a decision for the Government whether to increase investment in that area. In the report from the House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee in February this year, which was produced on the back of an 18-month inquiry into assisted dying and end-of-life choices generally, the committee reached the conclusion that there was no evidence internationally of a detrimental effect on the quality of palliative care from introducing assisted dying. Indeed, the committee saw a number of examples of the engagement with and experience of palliative care having improved as a result of the introduction of legislation on assisted dying, and of where increased investment had gone in. Victoria is one such example. In a sense, that—