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If a dead weight of 791 tonnes was within the permitted flexibility, it would have met the contract specifications as originally outlined, because built into that was a degree of flexibility. Is that correct?

Okay. I have no further questions. However, when we are having an exchange in the future, I urge you to make it meaningful to members of the public. For example, saying that there could be two less fully-laden articulated lorries on one of those vessels at another port, if it was deployed elsewhere, and that, in the context, that is pretty minimal would be helpful, because, with the numbers that are flying about, it looks as though this is way off course in terms of the dead weight. Again, it would be helpful to have something in writing that puts that in plain speech rather than doublespeak.

Oh, it is back to me again.

If we look at the small vessels replacement programme, there is around £185 million wrapped up in phase 1. Six bidders came forward for that, and I guess that those bids are currently being considered. We are keen to know how those bids will be assessed and the criteria that will be used. For example, what weight will be given to factors such as price—in other words, the reliability of what the overall cost will be to the public purse—and the quality of the bids. Quality is a very subjective word. I am keen to know a bit more about how a bid will become successful on the basis of price and quality and about other criteria that may lead to the final outcome of the contract—or contracts—being awarded.

Has that been done? I am told that you invited six to bid.

That is really helpful. Thank you.

So, you are comparing the quality of all six bids, but your belief is that all six bids will be of high quality. Then you have to determine what is best for the public purse.

It might not matter in those terms, in relation to what you say about the aggregate position of the Scottish finances, but it certainly matters in our scrutiny role here, when we are trying to work out the long-term implications of UK decisions for policy decisions that the Scottish Government makes, as we are trying to do today.

Professor Roy articulated the position very well, but what I am trying to get at is that the winter fuel payment change was like a bolt out of the blue. It would not have been reasonable to have forecast what the risk was in relation to that, because most people did not expect the UK Government to do that. However, there is an expectation that there could be a squeeze on spend on disability payments in the UK.

Does the Scottish Fiscal Commission identify the risks of potential UK policy changes—because those are in the public domain and are being floated, if you like, proactively—then cost some of that and give it to the Scottish Government, or does the Scottish Government say, “Here are three things that have potential policy implications for Scotland—go and cost up our fiscal risk in relation to them”? Does any such proactive work happen, Professor Roy?

Good morning. I am really interested in this line of questioning. The demand-led spend that any Government makes is potentially open-ended for the longer term and must be a risk. It is right for the Fiscal Commission to step away from the policy decisions on that, but to map out the financial exposure of the public purse.

That is helpful because, for example, we can see that the mitigation of the bedroom tax is now baked into Scottish Government spend for the longer term and, soon, winter heating mitigation will also be baked in. We look forward to your statistics on the two-child cap, which will soon be baked into future spending, as well.

On the issue of a risk register for Scottish finances, does the Scottish Fiscal Commission take a longer-term look? There are fiscal framework implications in terms of policy spillover from the next steps that a UK Government might take in relation to its spending decisions. There has been a lot of rhetoric and comment about the cost of disability payments in England and the rest of the UK, and the UK Government is wrestling with that. There is quite a lively debate about how much it is possible to humanely squeeze those payments to get lower expenditure in England, and about whether that is appropriate, policy-wise. I would say that it is not, but that is not the point.

The point is that, if the UK Government goes down one road in the rest of the UK and—rightly or wrongly—gets many people off of disability payments, the policy spillover will have a direct financial consequence for the Scottish budget because we will receive less in block grant adjustments. Does the Scottish Fiscal Commission map out the implications of UK Government policy and draw to the Scottish Government’s attention future potential implications for the Scottish budget, be they in relation to disability payments or anything else that a UK Government might wish to do?

Good morning. I am really interested in this line of questioning. The demand-led spend that any Government makes is potentially open-ended for the longer term and must be a risk. It is right for the Fiscal Commission to step away from the policy decisions on that, but to map out the financial exposure of the public purse.

That is helpful because, for example, we can see that the mitigation of the bedroom tax is now baked into Scottish Government spend for the longer term and, soon, winter heating mitigation will also be baked in. We look forward to your statistics on the two-child cap, which will soon be baked into future spending, as well.

On the issue of a risk register for Scottish finances, does the Scottish Fiscal Commission take a longer-term look? There are fiscal framework implications in terms of policy spillover from the next steps that a UK Government might take in relation to its spending decisions. There has been a lot of rhetoric and comment about the cost of disability payments in England and the rest of the UK, and the UK Government is wrestling with that. There is quite a lively debate about how much it is possible to humanely squeeze those payments to get lower expenditure in England, and about whether that is appropriate, policy-wise. I would say that it is not, but that is not the point.

The point is that, if the UK Government goes down one road in the rest of the UK and—rightly or wrongly—gets many people off of disability payments, the policy spillover will have a direct financial consequence for the Scottish budget because we will receive less in block grant adjustments. Does the Scottish Fiscal Commission map out the implications of UK Government policy and draw to the Scottish Government’s attention future potential implications for the Scottish budget, be they in relation to disability payments or anything else that a UK Government might wish to do?

So, it could be a joint space.