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My last question is on how all this works with other countries that are not in the European Union but that might align or be part of an acquis with it. I refer to countries that are in the European Free Trade Association, such as Norway, and other countries that have a presence in Brussels and keep well informed about policy development there. How have they dealt with the question? How do they stay aware of policy changes and develop discussions with their stakeholders and public bodies?

Unless it is not in Scotland’s interests. That is what you caveated earlier.

When our predecessor committee considered the replacement for the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals—REACH—regulations, one of the points that the non-governmental organisations raised at the time was that they very much valued the EU policy development forum, not just in relation to policy development, but from the point of view of on-going scrutiny of the evolution of those regulations over time in the EU. With the advent of the UK REACH regulations, there was a real sense of loss that that forum had not been replaced. As a result, although NGOs might be consulted, they are not involved in co-producing the regulations and taking part in their on-going scrutiny and evolution. The depth of EU policy making has been lost, and I think that that is worth reflecting on.

As you were speaking, I started to think about whether there is a role for wider public bodies. I will stick with the environment. I presume that the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and NatureScot would be very aware of any decisions that were made on environmental regulations by the Commission or the European Court of Justice and that they would at least flag up to ministers if there were potential divergence over, say, species licensing proposals.

Do you have any thoughts on the role of Environmental Standards Scotland, now that the Commission has gone? Should it play a fuller part in the architecture of scrutiny and in understanding what alignment actually means on the ground?

My question is in a similar vein. Wider transparency is important. The report that is before us talks only about the use of the section 1 powers and not about alignment in the broadest sense, which, as Ms Boyack has just explained, is about not just legislation but the interpretation of law.

I want to move on from that conversation to think about what the different levels could be. You have described some of the challenges that parliamentary committees face with the sift process, but you have also said that consultation on those areas generally takes place with stakeholders. What kind of in-depth information can we get, particularly in areas in which, as you have said, there might be a divergence that is in Scotland’s interests? How can that be flagged up at an appropriate level for the committee and stakeholders? That is not really clear in the report that is before us, and it is clear that decisions have been made where Scotland has diverged from the European Union.

That is useful. I think that the cabinet secretary explained things well earlier when he talked about laws that are effectively redundant now that we are outside the structure of the European Union and those areas in which powers are reserved under the current settlement. However, there are also the conscious decisions to diverge, and transparency in that respect is perhaps missing at the moment.

Perhaps I can give you an example. An assumption has been made that we are in alignment with the EU climate change laws, because we have our own climate change legislation, which was updated quite recently with enhanced targets that actually go beyond EU law. However, I am doing a piece of work with a colleague in the Bundestag on the EU taxonomy, which is effectively part of EU law, with regard to which sectors are deemed to be climate neutral and therefore worthy of investment in the European Union. As I am sure the cabinet secretary is aware, that is a big area of debate not just in Germany but elsewhere in the EU. Are we or are we not aligned with the EU taxonomy on green investment, which is part of EU climate law? Has there been any consideration of that? If so, where did the conversation go? That is one example in which things are not entirely clear.

[Inaudible.]—area of alignment with EU policy, such as climate.

That shows the level of information that it would be useful for wider stakeholders to understand, particularly if we are going to get into a debate about joining the EU. We might like what is in the EU taxonomy and we might like the way that European investment is going, but we might not. That is an example of where that level of information and consideration within the Scottish Government—I hope that there is consideration of that—

It is not directly on finance, but I will take the opportunity to ask it. The agreement uses the phrase “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”. Obviously, private finance is coming in that will, we hope, eventually lead to a just transition, but a lot of public finance is going on tax subsidies and other forms of direct support for fossil fuels. What are “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”? I am interested in the views of both of our witnesses on where they would draw the line in deciding what is an efficient fossil fuel subsidy and what is an inefficient one?

Malini, your connection dipped out earlier when I asked about the text in the agreement on the need to move away from

“inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”.

Jim answered from his perspective. What are your thoughts on how we move the debate forward on what is an inefficient fossil fuel subsidy and when it is and is not acceptable?