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I am trying to understand the amendment. It would mean that every single case would go to the Parole Board for the final decision and the person would be released on licence in every case. I will give way if you want to address your point about the parity of short-term and long-term prisoners, which is not something that I had considered before you raised it. Perhaps that could be addressed in the summing up, although it was Jamie Greene who made that point.

I do not know whether it is Russell Findlay’s position that there should be no difference between the release of short-term and long-term prisoners. I am not offering an opinion; I just want to know what the rationale is for saying that there should be no difference between short-term and long-term prisoners.

I confess that some of this is technical, and you will appreciate that it is difficult to follow all the dots and commas and work out which prisoners are excluded and who has the powers. However, I do not know whether you have addressed why you want to introduce the measure. What is the philosophy behind it? I read the purpose and effect note, which is quite thorough. However, I still want to know what the philosophy is. Is it because you think that it is time to change the way that we do things in releasing prisoners? Is it time to give certain prisoners the opportunity? Is there another reason? I am still struggling a little with the question of why.

This is an important group and discussion. Like Katy Clark, I would be sympathetic to any Government having permanent powers if it thought that that was justified, given that we cannot know all the emergency circumstances that we might ever face. I would not want to think of an emergency situation arising in which the Government’s powers were inadequate.

Like Katy Clark and Jamie Greene, however, I am interested in drilling down into the regulatory framework, the extent of those powers and the language in the bill. One provision refers to an “emergency”, but that is not defined, whereas proposed section 3D uses the term “urgency”. I would like clarity on whether that would amount to the same thing in the ordinary meaning of the words.

I appreciate that intervention from Jamie Greene, which speaks to his own amendment in so far as it seeks to allow Parliament to properly scrutinise the use of any powers or adjustments.

I have three further points. Am I right in saying that there is a provision that gives prison governors additional powers for release? I would like clarification on that. Why is that necessary? Is the rationale the same?

Jamie Greene’s further point about the early release of prisoners during Covid speaks to the need to give thought—as I am asking the cabinet secretary to do—to whether, in any of the situations in which there is provision for early release for emergency reasons, there are conditions attached to that. There must surely be conditions to protect and notify victims, but I am not sure whether those are contained in the bill.

It also speaks to the fact that, as with a lot of other provisions, we have not really scrutinised large elements of this one. I feel that, at stage 2, I am having to draw conclusions on big issues around what powers to give the Government on sentencing and early release. I have concerns about that now.

Finally, I turn to Rona Mackay’s amendment 90. I am sympathetic to it but I am not sure—I do not know whether Rona Mackay will want to intervene here—about the requirement for a person to be released not

“more than 180 days earlier than the Scottish Ministers would otherwise be required”

to release them.

If someone is serving a year’s sentence, would the 180-day rule still apply? Would it apply regardless of what sentence someone was serving? It would seem disproportionate to apply the 180-day rule if someone was serving a sentence of two years. Perhaps I have misunderstood it. I want to be clear, before we come to the vote, as to what that would actually mean. I support the notion behind it, which is to give victims safety and certainty. These are all important issues of principle.

Jamie Greene puts that really well. That is where we started out, and it is where we are now. We are having to drill down into the details of the new test so that we are satisfied, which is one of the points that I now want to address.

On the new bail test, one view—to take another point that Jamie Greene made—is that we need to trust the judiciary to an extent within the parameters of the law to make the right decisions, and we set the parameters in the law. However, with regard to the new bail test, the bill clearly states that bail can be refused if the court determines that that is necessary

“in the interests of public safety, including the safety of the complainer from harm”.

I feel that that speaks to some of the concerns of victims organisations.

The other part of the test is that bail can be refused

“to prevent a significant risk of prejudice to the interests of justice.”

My reading of that provision would partly address the amendments in Russell Findlay’s name, which probe how prescriptive we need to be in that regard, and rightly so. It seems to me that that provision could cover the concerns of victims organisations, depending on how it is interpreted.

I will finish on a point that is similar to one that I made in the debate on the previous group. We have the judiciary asking for a definition of “public safety”, which leads me to be a bit concerned that there is no common understanding of what that provision is expected to do. The Government needs to be clear with us about that; otherwise, I feel that we need to be more prescriptive to ensure that the provisions are commonly understood by the people who will make the decisions.

Will the member give way?

That is the point that we needed to get to, so that is helpful. The question is what the equivalent would be of “exceptional circumstances”. I think that we are suggesting that the current test means that it would be that the information that was before the sheriff would include previous convictions and the sheriff would have to consider the matter under the umbrella of the provisions on public safety, including the safety of the complainer,

“to prevent a significant risk of prejudice to the interests of justice.”

Jamie Greene referred to a very important point that the committee examined. In fact, members of the committee specifically put that matter to the Crown Office.

We heard evidence previously that, if a case is marked to oppose bail, the procurator fiscal who is in court cannot depart from that because of the centralised marking system. I need to put on record that the Crown Office said that that is not the case. However, that is what we had heard, and, when we did, we wondered why there does not seem to be flexibility. I wanted to amplify what Jamie Greene said, because it is important to consider that.

I was trying to intervene, too.