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Good morning. First of all, so that you understand where I am coming from, we are all agreed that virtual attendance can be helpful to the court system when everyone is content with its use. I am trying to drill into the detail of the balance between the saving of time and the fairness of the processes. That is what I am interested in.

This might be a question for Laura Buchan or Malcolm Graham. Defence agents have raised a lot of concern about the importance of their ability to talk to their clients, which needs to be tied up. I attended a virtual custody session in Glasgow sheriff court about 18 months ago and could see that there were lots of issues. In fact, the sheriff had a break and said to me that that was just what it was like and that it was impossible, which speaks to the importance of the quality. To be frank, I could not even identify the accused on the screen from what I could see. We all want to be in a different place from that.

We all know how stretched defence agents are. Simon Brown gave evidence last week that they cannot easily be in two places—a virtual hearing and one that is not virtual. How will you ensure that defence agents can deal with the virtual attendance of accused persons?

Have you now discussed with defence agents whether they think that that will work?

I agree with that, but I am also concerned about those provisions. To be honest, it looks like a case of “We’ll take all these powers just in case we need them.” Your assurances are really helpful, but, as Katy Clark said earlier, we must deal with the black letter of the law, and, as it stands, I am not entirely comfortable with a subsection that says that only one person decides the jurisdiction and that the case can be taken in any court. I would want reassurances that pleadings could be made to apply the common sense that we have had all along, on the grounds of special reasons. The bill really opens up that power.

Right. I am happy. That is what I needed to hear.

My question is about national jurisdiction, which we have not yet covered. I will do my best to be brief.

Through my line of questioning last week, I established that the national jurisdiction question is quite separate from that of virtual custody. Initially, I thought that that would make sense if we are aiming to deal with custody courts. However, on my second reading of the explanatory notes I thought that there was a bit more to that aspect.

Section 7 of the bill, which would insert new section 5B into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, says that the Lord Advocate will decide the jurisdiction, which is quite different from the established legal principles in Scotland, and that sheriffs can sit in any sheriffdom. I would like you to help me with subsections (6) and (7) of proposed new section 5B, which seem to me to go further than the current rules. I will read out the explanatory notes on those subsections. Subsection (6) allows the continuing jurisdiction to go on

“until the conclusion of proceedings”,

unless they

“come to an early end”.

On petition cases, which I am particularly interested in, the notes say:

“Subsection (7) means that a court which began dealing with a case at the petition stage can continue dealing with it ... In practice, because jurisdiction under subsection (5) ends with an accused being fully committed for trial”.

I presume that the Crown Office had input into the drafting of those provisions. I am trying to understand why you would want to go further than the current rules, because that would seem to involve a lot of additional change. Sheriffs can already sit in any sheriffdom. Unless it could be challenged, the Lord Advocate would decide on jurisdiction anywhere in Scotland, but those rules will go beyond the custody courts.

At last week’s meeting I put that question to the witness from the Scottish Solicitors Bar Association because, in all honesty, I was struggling to understand the provisions. He confirmed that the association has a bit of a concern about them, too. Could you possibly speak to those provisions?

We are not given much indication of where evidence could be given from. Let us imagine a murder trial, in which a lot is at stake and a witness’s evidence could be crucial to the defence. In what conditions should a witness give such evidence? Would that be done in a designated space or could it be done in any old place?

I know: I have seen that.

Can I stop you? I know all that, but I am asking about something else. If the Lord Justice General, using the powers in the bill—because permission has to be granted—tells someone that they can give trial evidence remotely, is there a requirement for them to use those facilities? Do you see where I am coming from? Could someone say, “We’re not going to use those facilities,” and use others instead? People would have to take the oath and so on.

I now want to ask questions about the other power that the Lord Justice General can exercise, which covers whether other people can appear virtually. Just so that I have got this right, Malcolm, is it the case that the Lord Justice General will decide on that question for each individual court hearing, and it is not a blanket power?

I would like to get an answer, if that is all right. I need to be satisfied. I have seen the facilities and they are really impressive. Will you expect every witness who has been granted permission to give evidence virtually to use those facilities to give evidence? Do you see what I am saying? Is that a yes?