Seòmar agus comataidhean

Throughout our justice system, we need to get better at giving the right information to victims at the right time. The issue that you raise is part of a much bigger discussion and, indeed, a much bigger body of work. The question pivots around the need to respect personal agency when it comes what information victims want to receive. I am sympathetic to the calls for the system to be more proactive, while respecting personal agency.

The issue with fiscal fines is that, given that they tend to be used in less serious cases—and I make it clear that there is no excuse for any offending—it might be difficult to identify the victim. From an operational point of view, I am not sure how that would be done. Those who operate the system might have more fruitful and practical ideas about that. As a point of principle, however, the justice system needs to find better ways to proactively inform victims.

I recognise and endorse the good work that the SCTS has led in tackling the backlog. The backlog has reduced by 52 per cent and, in fact, the Covid backlog is almost away. However, it is fair to talk about the increasing business for prosecutors and, therefore, the court system. I recognise that demand on solemn court capacity will increase.

I have been to the committee twice now to extend the temporary measures. We have always had a robust debate and there has been some reticence among members of the committee every time that I have come to extend those time limits. I have been clear, and the legislation has always been clear, that the remaining solemn time limits were going to come to an end.

Although there is scope to extend time limits on a case-by-case basis, and that has existed for a long time, I do not want court recovery to be jeopardised and I do not want our court system to be wrapped up in procedural hearings, as opposed to getting on with the business of trials. We are therefore looking closely at the notion of a savings provision, which was one of the suggestions. That would require a statutory instrument and, therefore, the approval or otherwise of the committee. It would ensure that the current temporary time limits would apply to cases that are already in the system prior to 1 December 2025. For new cases that come into the system after 30 November 2025, the pre-pandemic time limits would apply.

To me, that speaks of an orderly process of transition. I want to explore that possibility further with partners, but the view of committee members is also important in that regard.

I will address the national jurisdiction point first and then, if it will be useful to the member, Louise Miller can expand on any points of detail.

Perhaps I can distinguish, first of all, between summary and solemn cases. I am talking about national jurisdiction here, which, of course, can be either in person or virtual. Sometimes we assume that national jurisdiction equates to virtual custody cases, but it can happen in person, too. In summary cases, national jurisdiction applies to appearances from custody but ceases after the accused pleads not guilty. If the accused pleads not guilty, the case has to go on to further proceedings and to trial, so it is very clear when national jurisdiction stops.

There is also clarity on when national jurisdiction ceases in solemn cases. In such cases, it ceases after the accused is fully committed, so it is only used for appearances in relation to questions of bail, not broader appearances with regard to first diets or trial court.

Over to Louise.

No, I do not believe that that is a risk. That is partly because of the breadth and depth of the work undertaken by the task force, the members of which have included the Crown Office, Social Work Scotland, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, victim support organisations, Scottish Women’s Aid and academics. The issues have been well debated—notwithstanding the fact that it is also for this committee to debate and test them. I will not repeat what I said to the convener, to avoid the risk of incurring her wrath, but the purpose of the review is very different from the purpose of the previous legislation, which is to secure convictions.

I listened carefully to the comments that were made by, for example, Marsha Scott from Scottish Women’s Aid, and I have also seen the written representations that have been made to the committee. The point that we have to capture is that, although the term “child” is normally defined in statutes to mean a person below a certain age, that approach has not been adopted in the bill, because it is about relationship and connection, and the child could be an adult who is living independently.

We are all familiar with cases where children are harmed or murdered as part of a coercive control and domestic violence relationship but, for example, someone’s child can be an adult and can be living independently. Given the cases that have occurred in the past, across jurisdictions, if we get into defining children by age, we will have to define all sorts of other categories of people. Therefore, as things stand, my view is that we are trying to capture those who have been impacted, where there is a relationship between two people, and regardless of age. The phrase that we have used in the explanatory notes on the bill is:

“The nature of the relationship is what matters”.

The bill provides for joint reviews and multi-agency reviews. That is important, because a scenario could include both a significant child protection concern and a concern about domestic abuse or suicide. At the end of the day, we want to achieve one set of recommendations, and it is of central importance that they be joined up.

As for the broader public protection landscape, I chair a ministerial oversight group that is attended by several ministers. Mirroring that is a senior officers group that is led by the agencies and people on the ground at the local level. Alignment of public protection matters is a particular focus of my attention, which is why I chair the oversight group, and so I understand the importance of that point. If it would be useful, I would be happy to share with the committee some information on the group’s work to reassure members that we are not constantly creating new systems and that, in practice, our aim is to achieve such alignment and focus on core duties and responsibilities.

There is a gap in the current legislation, which the bill intends to address. None of the previous forms of review focused on domestic abuse or domestic abuse-related homicides or suicides, so we need to address that, but that work can be joined up with other reviews and other issues.

I wrote to the Finance and Public Administration Committee in response to its correspondence and pointed out that the financial memorandum outlined the substantial savings that have been made by the provisions that are currently in place. There are savings for justice partners—the police, in particular—if you think about things such as remote professional witness evidence. I set out largely what I have just outlined to you.

The most significant costs associated with the bill are those around the domestic homicide and suicide reviews, as opposed to those associated with part 1, with 70 per cent of the costs relating to the review chairs and secretariat. We have been very clear about that in the financial memorandum.

It is important that we have that power in the bill, because nobody wants to jeopardise criminal proceedings. A similar arrangement exists for other reviews. That said, the policy intention, which has been particularly informed by the experience of victims, is for reviews to take place earlier as opposed to later, because families and survivors need answers. The court process can give answers, but there is a deeper experience and learning, particularly in relation to prevention, so we want the review to take place sooner as opposed to later, notwithstanding the care that needs to be taken around the processes and procedures, as well as in engaging with people and protecting their welfare.

The two obvious examples in which the Crown Office might exercise the right to pause or end a review would relate to fatal accident inquiries or criminal proceedings. It is important that there is a protocol, as there is for other reviews in which there is interaction with the Crown Office. That needs to be transparent. My understanding is that there are no objections from the Crown Office in relation to that, because it is generally helpful for people to understand the relationships.

Our justice partners—in particular, the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service—have been acutely aware of the risks in and around digital exclusion and have their own policies in relation to that. Notwithstanding what I said earlier—heaven forfend that we return to wet signatures and so on—it is important to emphasise that the traditional way of communicating still exists. The bill does not remove the scope to communicate in the traditional way, if that is required; in fact, it simply makes permanent the temporary measures that are currently in force. It also retains the Lord Justice General’s power to give a direction that the provisions should not apply to specific documents. That power has never been used, but the flexibility is available, should it be required.