Seòmar agus comataidhean

I appreciate that we have all been able to work together on this, and I thank Ms McNeill for her comments. I will quickly say that the allocation of prosecutors is a matter for the Lord Advocate and those who act for her, so the proposal would get us into legal competency issues. I would be happy to discuss that further or to provide further information for Ms McNeill’s consideration prior to stage 3. At the moment, it is my clear understanding that that is not an area in which I could lodge amendments, because of legal competency issues.

Amendment 206 responds to a recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, while amendments 204 and 205 are technical amendments.

Amendment 204 amends the bill to clarify that the reference to “the High Court” in section 54(5) is to the High Court of Justiciary. Amendment 205 amends section 54(5) to clarify that the reference to “the Keeper” is to the keeper of the records of Scotland.

Amendment 206 adjusts the provision in section 55(2) that gives the Scottish ministers the power to make regulations that make further provision for the procedure that applies in the sexual offences court. In line with the recommendation of the Lady Dorrian review, the bill provides that High Court procedure will apply in the sexual offences court. Section 55 provides for the wholesale adoption of High Court procedure in the SOC, except where the bill makes specific provision to the contrary.

High Court procedure will form the foundations of the process and practice that will be followed in the sexual offences court, with the bill introducing some variations to the way in which current High Court procedure will apply to the sexual offences court, such as in relation to the pre-recording of a complainer’s evidence ahead of a trial.

However, the wholesale adoption of High Court procedure comes with the risk that certain aspects of that procedure will not operate in the sexual offences court as intended and may result in unexpected inconsistencies or inefficiencies that we will need to respond to. Therefore, the aim of the power in section 55(2) is to ensure that Scottish ministers are able to make regulations that would enable any issues that may arise from the adoption of High Court procedure in the SOC to be addressed swiftly and without the need for new primary legislation.

Amendment 206 responds to the issues that were raised by the DPLRC and limits the power of Scottish ministers to make regulations to those

“for the purpose of ensuring the proper functioning of the Court”.

It will restrict that power to circumstances in which issues are identified that are fundamentally problematic to the operation of the SOC.

I hope that the committee will support the amendments in the group. I move amendment 204.

Amendment 204 agreed to.

Amendment 205 moved—[Angela Constance]—and agreed to.

Amendment 44 not moved.

Section 54, as amended, agreed to.

Section 55—Sexual Offences Court procedure

Amendment 206 moved—[Angela Constance]—and agreed to.

Amendment 45 not moved.

Section 55, as amended, agreed to.

Section 56—Prohibition on personal conduct of defence

Amendment 46 not moved.

Section 56 agreed to.

Section 57—Vulnerable witnesses

Amendment 47 moved—[Sharon Dowey]—and agreed to.

Section 57, as amended, agreed to.

Section 58—Ground rules hearings

Amendment 48 not moved.

Section 58 agreed to.

Section 59—Pre-recording of evidence

Although the overriding purpose of the sexual offences court is to improve the experience of victims and survivors in their interaction with the courts system, it is, of course, imperative that we do so without losing sight of how the reforms will impact the accused.

I therefore welcome the detailed scrutiny that the committee gave at stage 1 to the issue of legal representation for accused in the SOC and the subsequent recommendation that stage 2 amendments should be lodged that embed the principle that cases that are currently prosecuted in the High Court should attract the same level of legal representation when heard in the new SOC. I share that view and, in response to the committee’s stage 1 report, I undertook to explore mechanisms that would hardwire that principle into the model of the SOC for stage 2.

I am pleased to say that my amendments 200 to 203 and amendment 228 deliver against that commitment by developing a mechanism that maintains that principle. My amendments embed an approach that achieves broadly the same balance of accused represented by counsel and those represented by a solicitor.

My amendments mean that accused persons in the type of cases that are currently prosecuted in the High Court will retain access to representation by counsel in the SOC, and the accused in the type of cases that are currently prosecuted in the sheriff courts, with representation by a solicitor, will continue to be represented by a solicitor in the SOC.

I have previously spoken to the committee about the risks of adopting an approach that would lead to a significant redistribution of cases to one part of the legal profession and about the potential for that to result in significant delays in cases reaching trial, which is an outcome that we must avoid.

My amendments in this group provide the accused with three routes to counsel where they have been indicted to the SOC. The first of those routes is provided by extending the list of offences in respect of which only advocates and solicitor advocates have a right of audience in the SOC. Amendments 200 and 201 extend that list beyond rape or murder to encompass a number of additional offences that, based on data provided by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, are always or almost always indicted to the High Court. Those offences are attempted rape and attempted murder; offences under section 1 of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 that libel conduct that amounts to rape; offences that attract a minimum custodial sentence of five years; and offences that are brought forward under the new evidence exception to the double jeopardy rule. The change in respect of the last category is linked to my amendment 218, which was debated in group 23 and extends provisions in the legislation that governs double jeopardy to the SOC.

Amendments 200 and 201 require that accused prosecuted in the SOC for any of those offences must be represented by counsel. Our estimates indicate that those revised rights of audience will capture two thirds of accused who are prosecuted for sexual offences in the SOC who would otherwise be indicted to the High Court. To ensure that we can remain responsive to changing practices, amendment 202 introduces a power that allows Scottish ministers to make regulations that would vary the list of offences for which rights of audience are restricted in the SOC.

The second route to counsel is introduced through amendment 228, which extends legal aid funding for counsel to the accused where the Scottish Legal Aid Board considers that there is a reasonable expectation that, if found guilty, the accused would receive

“a custodial sentence in excess of 5 years”,

or the courts would impose a risk assessment order, which is a necessary prerequisite to considering an order for lifelong restriction. The decision to grant the accused an entitlement to representation by counsel where those criteria apply recognises that only the High Court has the power to impose custodial sentences in excess of five years and to make orders for lifelong restriction.

The third route to counsel is provided through the existing mechanism whereby the Scottish Legal Aid Board may grant sanction for counsel where it considers it appropriate in any case, notwithstanding that that case does not include an offence caught by the first two routes that I have already set out.

We anticipate that the comprehensive process that is introduced by the amendments, which is the product of close collaboration with a range of justice partners, including the Crown Office, the Scottish Legal Aid Board and defence practitioners, will extend access to counsel for the accused in the overwhelming majority of cases that would otherwise be indicted to the High Court.

To ensure that the process created by the amendments is operating as intended and to provide additional assurances to Parliament, amendment 203 will place a requirement on Scottish ministers to conduct a review of legal representation in the sexual offences court. That will allow us to assess whether the approach has met our ambition of delivering access to counsel for the accused in cases that would otherwise be prosecuted in the High Court and to consider what, if any, adjustments to the approach might be required.

Pauline McNeill’s amendments 70 and 71 would remove provisions that give solicitor advocates rights of audience in the sexual offences court in cases that include an offence of murder. The amendments are linked to amendment 69, which was debated earlier and which sought to remove the jurisdiction of the SOC to hear cases that involve an offence of murder. The committee has already voted to retain murder within the jurisdiction of the SOC. Solicitor advocates can represent the accused in cases that involve an offence of murder in the High Court, so it follows that they should also be able to appear in those cases in the sexual offences court. I therefore ask Ms McNeill not to move amendments 70 and 71 and the committee to oppose them if she does.

I move amendment 200.

I have paid careful attention to views on independent legal representation during and following stage 1. My amendments in this group reflect that and the close working that has been carried out by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service to ensure that the amendments clarify roles and responsibilities and will streamline operational processes.

Amendments 222, 223 and 225 will create notification duties that the complainer’s independent legal representative—ILR—should have by amending the proposed new section 275ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which is being added by section 64 of the bill. The amendments would ensure that the complainer’s ILR has a statutory duty to notify the prosecutor and the court “in writing” and

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

that they have been instructed by the complainer. Similarly, and by virtue of amendment 225, the ILR would have to make the prosecutor and court aware if they were no longer instructed. As well as ensuring procedural parity with the defence, amendments 222, 223 and 225 will facilitate the efficient flow of relevant information between all parties.

Amendments 219, 220, 224 and 226 relate to the new disclosure of evidence provisions, with amendment 226 setting out a new, improved process. Key changes include the onus being placed on the complainer’s ILR to write to the Crown, outlining whether they wish to receive copies of any evidence based on what is set out in the section 275 application. If the complainer’s ILR requests evidence, the Crown must notify the defence, which can give consent to that evidence being disclosed; alternatively, they have up to seven days in which to object. In cases of objection, the defence must specify what items they object to and the reasons why. Crucially, the court would be involved only when there was an objection. The Crown would be able to disclose any evidence to the complainer’s representative that was not objected to without the need to involve the court.

The new process removes the obligation that would otherwise be placed on the Crown to sift all evidence and decide what should be made available to a complainer’s ILR. Instead, the complainer’s ILR will determine what evidence they may, or may not, require to fulfil their role. It also aims to reduce the need for court determination, as that would be required only in cases in which there is an objection. Furthermore, the objection period acts as a safeguard, ensuring that evidence that is shared is either agreed upon or determined by the court. Linked to that, amendment 226 also ensures that the complainer’s ILR and the complainer are subject to a duty of confidentiality in relation to any evidence that is disclosed.

Although the restrictions in section 274 apply to deceased complainers, amendment 221 puts beyond doubt the fact that the right to independent legal representation does not apply to deceased complainers, as it would, of course, not be possible for a deceased complainer to provide their views on the accuracy or relevance of the evidence sought to be led. That said, the Crown would retain its common-law obligation to consider and contest applications that did not meet the statutory tests. As I said earlier, the rape shield protections would still be engaged.

I am aware that, during stage 1, committee members met with individuals who had lost a close family member because of a serious crime. They argued that independent legal representation should be made available to them and could have a role in providing legal advice when they are called as witnesses. It should be noted that that is a very different ask from the provision of independent legal representation to deceased complainers and, as such, requires its own separate consideration and scrutiny. The complainer’s ILR is appointed for a very specific purpose in relation to a section 275 application, not to provide general advice on criminal justice proceedings.

I have considered carefully whether the family of deceased complainers should have access to independent legal representation. We need to remember that a section 275 application is, by its very nature, often related to intimate behaviour. Therefore, if independent legal representation were allowed in those circumstances, in what way might family members be able to challenge with any degree of authority or evidence the veracity of the evidence that the section 275 seeks authorisation to lead? Also, how would we define the family in those circumstances? Would it be possible to arrive at consensus among the relatives, noting that, if family members who had already suffered greatly were involved, it would expose them to highly traumatic and intimate evidence? Perhaps most significantly, there is also the question of the complainers’ dignity and privacy and, of course, their consent, which they would be unable to provide.

It is a very emotive and sensitive issue, but I have arrived at the conclusion that the risk of trauma outweighs any benefit that could be derived by a family member and that it far exceeds any impact or the ability to affect the outcome of the application. I hope that my reasoning assures members that I have considered the issue extensively and have given due consideration to the impact of trauma versus outcomes.

Finally, amendment 227 is a technical amendment that ensures that a complainer who is to give their evidence before a commissioner is afforded the same period of 21 days as any other complainer to instruct a solicitor and receive advice prior to the determination of any such application.

I move amendment 219.

The amendments in this group feature a mixture of substantive and technical amendments related to the offences and cases that the sexual offences court—the SOC—will have jurisdiction to hear.

My position is that the SOC should be given a broad jurisdiction to ensure that its benefits are extended to as wide a cohort of victims of sexual offences as possible, while ensuring that the way in which that is done protects the court’s resources. It will then be for the independent prosecutors, acting with the delegated authority of the Lord Advocate, to decide whether to indict specific cases to the SOC, based on the facts and circumstances of that case. It would disadvantage victims if we were to place arbitrary restrictions—in my view—on the cases that the SOC can hear.

We have just heard from Pauline McNeill on her amendments 157 and 69, and I appreciate her comments on her intentions. I have a different perspective on the matters that she raises, and I am particularly concerned about the impact that amendment 157 would have if agreed to.

Amendment 157 would restrict the SOC to being able to hear only cases that can be prosecuted on indictment in the sheriff courts. In effect, it would mean that the SOC could not hear cases that included an offence of rape or murder, on the basis that those offences cannot be prosecuted in the sheriff courts.

I have significant concerns about the suggestion—whether it be Ms McNeill’s intention or otherwise—that the SOC should be prevented from hearing rape cases. Rape is, without question, the most serious sexual offence that can be committed against an individual and, as such, it is victims of that offence who arguably stand to benefit most from the specialist trauma-informed approaches that will be at the heart of the sexual offences court.

We will not have a credible or effective sexual offences court that will deliver for the very victims for whom it is intended to deliver if rape is excluded from its jurisdiction. Depriving victims of rape access to the SOC while victims of other sexual offences benefit from the important reforms that it will introduce seems to me to be without justification and would serve only to exacerbate existing challenges that those victims face when interacting with the courts and the criminal justice system. I would also add that sheriffs sitting as temporary judges can currently preside over rape cases in the High Court. I therefore strongly urge members to reject amendment 157.

I also ask members of the committee to reject Ms McNeill’s amendment 69, which would remove murder from the SOC’s jurisdiction. Following the committee’s stage 1 report, I have carefully considered whether the SOC should be able to hear an offence of murder where it appears on the indictment alongside a qualifying sexual offence.

I respect that there is an argument for and against that. However, I remain of the view that there is a clear rationale for empowering the SOC to hear murder cases when combined with sexual offences charges on the same indictment. Indeed, that view was articulated at stage 1 by the Lord Advocate, and she gave the committee specific examples of such cases, which she has recently repeated in correspondence to the committee. On balance, I have heard no compelling rationale for depriving such victims of the specialist, trauma-informed approaches that will be a key feature of the SOC.

I acknowledge the view that the role of the High Court of Justiciary, as Scotland’s superior criminal court, means that it is the proper place to hear cases that feature an offence of murder. However, on balance, I believe that our paramount concern should be the experience of complainers and that we should not be constrained by court hierarchies and tradition. Historical function and status have not delivered the system that we want for victims of sexual offences. I want all victims and survivors of sexual offences to be able to have their case heard in a forum that is specifically designed to support them.

I now turn to my amendment 218, which will ensure that the new evidence exception to the rule on double jeopardy applies to all cases that are prosecuted in the SOC. The new evidence exception will allow the Lord Advocate to apply to the High Court to set aside an acquittal where the statutory test that is set out in section 4 of the Double Jeopardy (Scotland) Act 2011 is met.

That test broadly relates to the emergence of new and compelling evidence that was not available at the time of the original trial and which would appear to show that the accused might be guilty of the offences of which they were previously acquitted. The High Court considers the Lord Advocate’s application and decides whether an acquittal should be set aside and permission for a new prosecution granted. At present, the new evidence exception can be sought only in cases that were originally prosecuted in the High Court, but in recognition of the serious offences that will be heard in the SOC, including rape and murder, I consider it important that the new evidence exception apply to that court, too.

As well as allowing cases heard in the SOC to be reprosecuted under the new evidence exception, amendment 218 will allow such cases to be retried in the new SOC to ensure that complainers can also benefit from the specialist, trauma-informed approaches that it will introduce.

Amendment 218 will also require that, where an accused who is being prosecuted in the SOC makes a plea to the judge against prosecution on the basis that the indictment relates to offences for which they have previously been acquitted, the plea be remitted to the High Court for consideration. That will ensure that the High Court retains sole authority to grant the right to bring a retrial under the new evidence exception.

The remaining amendments in this group are technical in nature, their primary purpose being to ensure that the SOC has appropriate jurisdiction and will function as intended. Amendments 180 and 181 make it clear that the SOC will have jurisdiction over non-sexual offences that appear on an indictment alongside a qualifying sexual offence from the point at which the indictment is served on the accused. They put beyond doubt that the SOC will be able to take action in relation to non-sexual offences, such as accepting guilty pleas, before a case reaches trial.

Amendments 198 and 199 adjust the provisions that relate to the timeframe for the prosecution to submit applications to transfer cases into and out of the SOC on cause shown. The amendments move the timeframe for applying to transfer cases into and out of the SOC from the day before the commencement of the trial to the day before commencement of the trial diet. As the trial can commence on any day within the period of the trial diet, moving to a deadline that is linked to the commencement of the trial diet, which is set at the preliminary hearing, gives parties greater certainty on the deadline for submitting applications.

Amendments 183 and 216 provide the SOC with the powers that it needs to deal with cases where an individual is charged with

“aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring and inciting”

sexual offences, and amendment 182 makes the offence of conspiring to commit a sexual offence, as defined in section 39 and schedule 3 of the bill, a qualifying offence for the purpose of defining the SOC’s jurisdiction.

I urge the committee to support the amendments in my name and to oppose the others in the group.

Yes.

It is my firm belief that the success of the sexual offences court depends, perhaps more than any other single aspect of the model that is set out in the bill, on the judges who are appointed to preside over cases that call in the SOC. Judges play a hugely important role in any court, but that role will be particularly pronounced in the SOC. Judges will set the tone and culture of the SOC and will be responsible for embedding the specialist trauma-informed practices and procedures that will be central to improving our approach to the treatment of sexual offences cases and the complainers involved.

Given that important role, it is imperative that we maximise the court’s ability to take full advantage of the pool of experienced and trauma-informed judges who have the commitment and specialism to make the SOC a success. Of course, the judges must be allowed to exercise the full powers of their office without fear or favour.

We must have processes for appointing and removing judges of the sexual offences court that strike the correct balance between rigour and proportionality. By that, I mean that appropriate safeguards must be in place to ensure that a sufficient number of judges are appointed and that those judges are, and continue to be, the right people to preside over cases in the sexual offences court.

Provisions in the bill at introduction gave the Lord Justice General a broad power to remove judges of the sexual offences court, provided that the Lord Justice General had consulted with the Lord Justice Clerk and the president of the sexual offences court in advance. During stage 1, it was suggested that that power could undermine the security of tenure of judges, which could ultimately impact on the independence of judicial decision making. That resulted in a stage 1 recommendation from the committee that amendments be lodged at stage 2 to adjust the process for removing judges of the sexual offences court. In my response to the stage 1 report, I committed to doing that, and I indicated my intention to review the process for appointing judges to ensure that there is an appropriate balance.

Before setting out the substance of the amendments, I want to be clear with the committee on what they do not change about the appointments process. It will remain the case that judges of the sexual offences court can be appointed only from among those who hold substantive judicial office as a High Court or temporary judge, sheriff principal or sheriff, and that their role as judge in the SOC will continue to be contingent on their holding that substantive office. Additionally, my amendments will not change the requirement that only those who have completed a course of approved training in trauma-informed practice in sexual offences cases can be appointed to sit in the SOC.

I turn to the amendments. Taking up the committee’s recommendation, the amendments remove the power of appointment from the Lord Justice General and establish distinct processes for appointing those who currently have rights to preside over High Court cases and those who currently have rights to preside over sheriff court cases. Amendments 184 and 195 will mean that all those who hold judicial office as a High Court or temporary judge are automatically appointed to the role of judge of the sexual offences court, provided that they have completed the necessary training in trauma-informed practice.

That approach recognises that those judges already preside over cases that involve the most serious offences that are heard in our courts, including rape and murder, and that they have the necessary associated sentencing powers when they do so. Putting it beyond doubt that those judges will be able to sit in the SOC underscores the status of the SOC and the seriousness and gravity of the crimes that it will consider.

The process for appointing sheriffs and sheriffs principal, as modified by amendments 185 to 193 and 196, is closely modelled on the process for appointing temporary judges under the Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008. The Scottish ministers will be responsible for appointing sheriffs and sheriffs principal to the role of judge of the sexual offences court, based on the recommendation of the Lord Justice General.

Individuals will be appointed to sit in the court for a period of five years and will be automatically reappointed unless specific exceptions apply. Individuals can be appointed only if they have completed a necessary course of training in trauma-informed practice in sexual offence cases and the Lord Justice General considers that they have the skills and experience to hold office as a judge of the sexual offences court.

The temporary judge appointment process has been an effective and proportionate mechanism for giving sheriffs the additional responsibilities and sentencing powers that are associated with that office. We continue to engage with partners to ensure that the appointments process strikes the right balance between rigour and proportionality that I spoke about earlier, so that the approach will prove effective at ensuring that the SOC can access and take advantage of the talent and commitment in the Scottish judiciary.

Amendments 229 to 232 respond directly to the concerns that the committee raised regarding the process for removing judges of the sexual offences court. The amendments remove provisions in the bill that give the Lord Justice General the power to remove judges of the sexual offences court and, instead, tie that process to removal from the judges’ substantive office.

Under existing legislation, High Court and temporary judges, sheriffs principal and sheriffs can be removed from office only by the First Minister, following the recommendation of a Fitness for Judicial Office Tribunal. That provides an established safeguard against unfair dismissal and provides security of tenure for judges.

As provisions require that a judge of the sexual offences court holds that position only by virtue of their substantive office, it is therefore unnecessary to have provisions in the bill that create specific powers to remove judges of the sexual offences court from that office. Instead, the approach adopted through the amendments is to rely on the existing, long-standing and fair Fitness for Judicial Office Tribunal process related to their substantive post, so that if they are removed from that office, they also cease to be a judge of the sexual offences court.

Amendments 230 and 232 also make it clear that the conduct of an individual while sitting as a judge of the sexual offences court can be taken into account in a Fitness for Judicial Office Tribunal for their substantive post and can, in fact, trigger commencement of a tribunal.

Amendment 197 gives the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service the power to pay expenses to judges of the sexual offences court in connection with expenses incurred in fulfilling that office. The amendment also enables the Scottish ministers to make bespoke arrangements for paying judges of the sexual offences court.

That is an enabling power, similar to that provided for in the legislation relating to temporary judges. I consider that it is important for the Scottish ministers to have that power and the flexibility that it provides to ensure that the SOC works as it should and that the framework that establishes it is future proofed to account for changing circumstances.

We will, of course, hear directly from Pauline McNeill on her amendment 270. Following our discussions, I believe that it is designed to address her concerns that moving rape cases to the sexual offences court somehow constitutes a downgrading of rape. However, I have profound concerns about the amendment, which would, in effect, not enable the sexual offences court to function as intended.

In considering the amendment, I encourage members to reflect on the evidence at stage 1. The victims and survivors who spoke to you were not concerned about the status of the SOC nor about the title of the judge appointed to preside over their case. Victims and survivors told us that what they care about is how their case is managed by the court system and that they are treated in a way that recognises and responds to the trauma that they have experienced.

Although senators may be the most senior cohort of judges, sheriffs sitting as temporary judges already preside over rape cases in the High Court, where, as Lady Dorrian told us,

“they do a very good job indeed”.—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Committee, 10 January; c 13.]

There are a great number of sheriffs with many years of experience presiding over sexual offences cases. The positive impact of that expertise and experience would be substantially diminished if sheriffs and temporary judges were to be prohibited from presiding over rape cases in the SOC.

By placing restrictions on which judges can preside over certain offences, amendment 270 impinges on the capacity of the Lord Justice General to deploy the most suitable and effective judges to preside over the cases that are indicted to the SOC. In doing so, it prioritises adherence to existing hierarchies over and above good practice in the management of rape cases. In my view, that would not be to the benefit of victims. In addition, amendment 270 would present significant operational challenges for the SOC.

Prohibiting temporary judges from presiding over rape cases would fatally undermine the ability of the SOC to deal with the cases that will be indicted to it, let alone provide a sustainable model for the management of those cases moving forward. Temporary judges play a crucial role in managing the business of the High Court, including the many rape cases that are indicted to it. By excluding those who hold office as a temporary judge from presiding over rape cases in the sexual offences court, amendment 270 would lead to a substantial reduction in the judicial resource available to manage the current volume of rape cases. There would simply not be enough judges to deal with the SOC’s case load.

I ask the committee to support my amendments.

I move amendment 184.

I am at the committee’s mercy, and I respect the fact that there should be debate and scrutiny on all matters—every member of the Parliament has the freedom to roam in that regard. What we have all wrestled with, perhaps at different points in the process, is that any change from what has ayewis been comes with challenges. We all want to make changes for the better, and we all come to this with different degrees of what we want to give up from what has ayewis been. I am not saying that with any judgment.

I will not rehearse the arguments about why I fundamentally believe in the establishment of a sexual offences court, because I suspect that that would incur the wrath of the convener, but that is the underlying bedrock to the changes that have been made or are proposed in the previous group of amendments, this group and, indeed, in subsequent groups. This group of amendments is about the pragmatics. I want a pool of experienced judges. I am of the view that, ultimately, it is for the Lord Justice General to decide which judges are allocated to which cases.

Our stage 2 proceedings had been very constructive until we reached group 31. We had managed, until Mr Findlay’s appearance, to have robust and respectful exchanges, including in and around the previous group on independent legal representation. I acknowledge Ms McNeill’s point that the bill is large and complex. However, I think that it is somewhat puerile and childish to say that I am the reason why it has taken two years; that shows a lack of awareness of parliamentary process and proceedings—

No, sorry; I said no.

I start with a point around substance. I still believe that it is vital that we do not lose sight of the substantial evidence that the current approach to decision making in rape trials is denying women justice. Data from the Scottish Government that was published last April show that, in rape and attempted rape cases, where there is a single complainer and a single charge, the five-year average conviction rate for cases that reach court is just 24 per cent. That is sobering, and I do not hear many comprehensive answers as to why that is.

That is why it is crucial that we understand more about the barriers to justice for rape victims. One way that we can do that is through research that looks into the content of jury deliberations, in order to help us to better understand whether, and how, rape myths affect verdicts and what measures could effectively address them. I am pleased that the committee supported my amendments to the Contempt of Court Act 1981 in the previous group, which will help to pave the way for that.

It is also important that we continue to challenge rape myths, not just with jurors but in society as a whole. I have confirmed that we will set up a working group to look at that in more detail, and I hope that members across the committee will support that.

As you know, convener, I have always recognised that views on the proposed pilot of juryless trials are mixed. During stage 1, some stakeholders and members spoke compellingly in support of a pilot, while others expressed their concerns. I have listened carefully to all those views and reached the conclusion that there is not enough parliamentary support for a pilot of juryless trials at this time.

When I wrote to the committee in October, I made it clear that I would remove the pilot from the bill. In the interests of building as much consensus as possible, and as amendments were already lodged that would remove the relevant sections of the bill, which meant that I could not lodge my own amendments, I have lent my support to amendments 53, 54 and 59. Consequently, I note Ms Clark’s remarks on her amendments.