Seòmar agus comataidhean

I will speak to my amendments in a different order, which I hope does not make things too confusing.

Amendment 100 would expand the sentencing condition in the bill so that an MSP may be removed if they receive a community sentence. As you know, I am tough on crime. At present, the removal provision focuses on custodial disposals. However, I have argued elsewhere that the public expect clear and meaningful consequences for any criminal sentence, not simply those that result in imprisonment. A community sentence is not a minor administrative disposal; it is a criminal sentence that is imposed by a court following a finding of guilt. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate and necessary that the receipt of such a sentence should form grounds for removal. Amendment 100 would ensure that.

Amendments 98 and 101 are consequential to the change that amendment 100 would make. The bill contains a detention condition as part of the removal test, but it is framed around custodial sentences. As I have stated, I want to add community sentences to the list of sentences that form grounds for removal. Amendments 98 and 101 would tidy things up so that the changes are coherent and consistent.

My amendment 99 would expand the grounds for removal by specifically adding instances in which a member is remanded in custody. Members have challenged that proposal, but being remanded is a serious judicial action as well. It involves the court determining that an individual must be detained pending trial, and it signals the gravity of the circumstances before the court. I do not believe that the public would expect an MSP who has been remanded in custody, even for a short period, to continue serving in the Parliament in that time, as that would fundamentally undermine public confidence in the institution.

This group concerns the removal of an MSP for non-attendance. The Conservatives support Mr Griffin’s amendments 85 to 87 in the group, because the committee heard strong evidence that a rigid non-attendance trigger could unfairly impact members with disabilities, long-term health conditions and caring responsibilities, as well as those who face sudden crises. I had intended to lodge amendments along similar lines, so I was content to see Mr Griffin’s amendments today. However, I have concerns about amendment 90. I will listen to what Mr Griffin has to say about it, and I might come back to him on it during the debate.

My amendments in the group are about modernising attendance in a way that is designed to future-proof legislation and ensure coherence with modern parliamentary practice. The committee considered having the attendance element removed completely. However, if a member cannot be bothered to dial in or to connect and take part in a hybrid manner, we should consider that element. It is simple. As we permit remote or electronic participation, members can be involved in parliamentary proceedings at any time, irrespective of their roles and responsibilities at home. The approach set out in my amendments would prevent a loophole whereby an MSP who refuses to join meetings, even remotely, can evade the non-attendance consequences. It would avoid unfairness to MSPs who cannot physically be present for legitimate medical or disability-related reasons while acting against those who cannot be bothered. It would keep the statute aligned with standing orders as they evolve.

My amendment 109 defines “attendance” as including attendance by electronic means. It provides that

“‘attendance’ includes by electronic means”,

and it signposts that standing orders, or the guidance under them, may set out the detailed criteria for what counts as attending “by electronic means”—for example, criteria on the platform and on connectivity, authentication and participation standards. The amendment would allow the Parliament to adapt that practice without any further primary legislation. Although I support removing non-attendance as a ground for removal, I am not sure where we are on that. I want the whole non-attendance element as it is right now to be removed, but I want attendance in a hybrid manner to be included if the non-attendance element of the bill is ultimately retained at later stages. I am going in circles a bit here. What I mean is that, if the bill stays as it is, with non-attendance defined as it is, despite my wanting that element removed—

I lodged my amendments in the group to test the water. There has been much debate in this parliamentary session about the role of hybrid involvement and the second-tier element. People sometimes think that members who participate remotely are not engaging, even though, as platforms have evolved, we now have mechanisms to allow those members to intervene in debates and so on.

As I said, I lodged my amendments to test the water and see how people feel. I get the sense that it might be cleaner, as the member who introduced the bill, the minister and Mr Griffin have said, to completely remove the provisions on attendance. However, we need to be mindful that, visually, the public expect us to be in the Parliament. We must look outwardly and think about how members of the public view us and how we participate in this building as their MSPs.

I was just testing the water, so I will not press amendment 102.

Amendment 102, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendment 85 moved—[Mark Griffin]—and agreed to.

Section 27—Standing orders to set process for removal for non-attendance

Amendments 103 to 109 not moved.

Amendment 86 moved—[Mark Griffin]—and agreed to.

Section 28—Minor and consequential provision

Amendment 87 moved—[Mark Griffin]—and agreed to.

After section 28

We are all probably looking a little bit puzzled. We have read the suite of amendments that you have lodged. I know that you are going to speak in depth about the amendments, but could you perhaps put them into context and give us a quick, high-level explanation of the overall process, in succinct language, so that we can understand the detail behind it? I ask that because that is not how we are interpreting your amendments, Mr Simpson.

No, it is fine.

In your opening remarks, you mentioned concerns about cost. You have spoken about having a regional poll process and a constituency petition process for the various MSPs. The bill’s financial memorandum found that the regional poll process could still cost the taxpayer—that is, everyone in Scotland—£1.3 million compared with £0.3 million for the constituency petition process and the subsequent by-election. Do you think that that represents value for money for the taxpayer?

Again, I go back to public expectation. I do not think that the general public is that concerned about human rights when people have broken the law and when those people are there to represent them and therefore should be held to much higher standards than anyone else. We have to hold ourselves to far higher standards. You see what happens when people are cancelled and when social media gets hold of things. We must behave in a far more righteous manner—I use that word for want of having a lexicon or a thesaurus with me this morning.

My amendments 93 and 94 are consequential amendments that would restructure section 3 to accommodate the proposed new provisions. Amendment 95 would extend the ground for recall further so that it would apply where a member received a community sentence or a custodial sentence of less than six months. I want to make it clear—to address some of the points that you raised, convener—that, under that amendment, there would be no minimum requirement in the remand ground and even a single day in custody would trigger it. That reflects the seriousness with which the public view an MSP being held in custody.

Although the term “community sentence” is not a technical term in Scots law, I have used it deliberately as an umbrella description, because it is language that the public understand. I believe that the public genuinely expect that any community-based criminal sentence should have consequences for an MSP’s status. That reflects the high standards that the public rightly demand of their elected representatives.

My amendment 123 would adjust section 25 so that the disqualification provision would apply to a sentence of less than one year’s imprisonment. That would ensure that sentences of between six months and one year are no longer left uncovered once the bill reshapes the recall landscape.

Collectively, the amendments would strengthen the principle that MSPs should be held to the highest possible standards of conduct. The public have made it clear—through consultation responses, scrutiny of the parliamentary conduct that we see day in, day out, and wider civic expectations—that they do not want individuals who have committed criminal offences to continue to represent them. The amendments would provide the Parliament with clear and coherent mechanisms to give effect to that principle.

I move amendment 110.

Amendments 91 and 92 are, again, both in my name. When we heard evidence in committee, a constant theme emerged: that there was a real, recognised risk that a parliamentary sanction ground for recall could become politicised. Several stakeholders expressed concern that, without safeguards, the process could be misused, whether deliberately or inadvertently, in a way that would undermine fairness and due process. We heard the minister and Graham Simpson speak about that in relation to the previous group.

One point that was made strongly in evidence was that women and members from minority backgrounds are disproportionately targeted by complaints, including politically motivated ones, and Elect Her highlighted that clearly in explaining that women politicians are more likely to face orchestrated or malicious complaint activity and that, in extreme cases, such behaviour could escalate into the triggering of, or attempts to trigger, recall or removal. Given that recall is—or will be—a very serious constitutional mechanism, and one that can result in the loss of a member’s parliamentary seat and role as an MSP, it is essential that safeguards are strong and as transparent as possible. Our stage 1 report acknowledged those concerns and pointed towards the need to calibrate complaints and sanctions in the framework accordingly.

My amendments 91 and 92 seek to modify section 2, which deals with that parliamentary sanction. Before any motion can be lodged to trigger the recall process on the parliamentary sanction ground, the standards committee—this committee—must first report that the complaint that has given rise to the motion has been made in good faith and with a legitimate basis. I know that that is putting more work on us, convener.

I think that that highlights the complexity and difficulty of the issue that we are facing here. I know that Mr Stewart has amendments in this group, too, and it shows that, when we are looking at sanctions and the standards process being the trigger, we have to be very careful in that respect. With these amendments, I am trying to find a way that is proportionate and which provides that safeguard.

Nothing is really straightforward when it comes to this sort of thing. We have seen how complaints can be weaponised—there are bad faith complaints. The convener can cut me off if he thinks that I am not allowed to go any further, but with the last complaint that we looked at, the complainant—

On anonymity?