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They would be representative of victims. They would be able to—

I note the cabinet secretary’s acknowledgement that the views of victim support organisations and, indeed, of victims are crucial—except when they are not.

The issue appears to be that the cabinet secretary cannot see what role victim support organisations “would play”. That phrase was stated on more than one occasion. However, victim support organisations see my amendments as valid and they see—

I will try not to go over the same ground that others have covered. If the Scottish Government wants to fundamentally change sentencing such that electronic monitoring on remand counts towards a discount on a future prison sentence, that needs to be done as a stand-alone piece of work. It should not be snuck into this bill, which is about bail and remand. Jamie Greene’s amendment to the motion for yesterday’s Scottish Government justice debate pre-empted this discussion. He raised the subject because it is such an important and fundamental issue.

Bail conditions are commonplace. People might not welcome being subject to bail conditions, but it is a readily understood factor of the justice system that, although people are innocent until proven guilty, they might be subject to particular conditions pending the outcome of proceedings, whereas sentencing is a fundamentally different thing, which is the point that Victim Support Scotland made very strongly in representations to the committee.

When we questioned him about this, the previous cabinet secretary told the committee that such bail conditions are a diminution of rights. He seemed to be arguing that the direction of travel should be that sentencing should reflect that limitation on people’s rights. However, that position needs to be properly explained and properly evidenced, which is what is lacking.

Will the minister take an intervention?

I just wanted to make the point that the intention behind the amendment is not, as I think was said, to increase the use of remand. It is to give sheriffs as much information as they can get and to give them the flexibility to make the best possible decisions in order to protect the public.

The cabinet secretary mentioned the potential IT costs. What work has been done to quantify those costs? The issue sounds surmountable, and surmounting it might help in finding a way forward, as Jamie Greene has suggested.

I, too, welcome amendment 8, which is pro-transparency and comprehensive. In her earlier comments, the cabinet secretary talked about the frustrations that the committee has felt in acquiring data. We all agree with her. It is important to make the observation that we embarked on this whole exercise feeling frustrated about the lack of the very data that is now being built into the bill, which is a classic example of putting the cart before the horse. We would all have benefited hugely if we had been readily able to access data that is similar to the type now proposed in amendment 8.

I think that we heard evidence to that effect, but I cannot recall from whom. The lack of clarity could cause a sheriff to err on the side of caution and be more cautious than they otherwise would be. That is why our amendments, which lay out some of the serious issues that sheriffs should take into consideration, are needed.

Something else that Jamie Greene said, which is worth repeating, is that we have had no evidence whatsoever that sheriffs are overremanding, which is the phrase that he used. It is worth remembering that the default position is that bail will be granted unless there are reasons—whatever those might be—not to grant it. That is important.

There is also the more fundamental issue of judicial independence. I understand that, with regard to anything that relates to judicial decision making, although it is entirely right and proper that the Parliament legislates, we must be mindful that we do not overly restrict sheriffs in their ability to make good decisions.

I return to amendments 57 and 59, specifically. Such considerations are routinely used—similarly to what is set out in Jamie Greene’s amendments. Part of the emphasis of the Scottish Government’s bill is on a court’s ability to consider good information, which can be achieved through the involvement of criminal justice social work. No one disagrees with the importance of the court being as fully informed as possible, but, by the same rationale, sheriffs should not be restricted with regard to how they make decisions and on what grounds. Therefore, the more explicit options they have the better.

I have two amendments in the group—amendments 57 and 59. I would probably have had more, but Katy Clark was quicker off the mark than I was. I thank Victim Support Scotland for its assistance in helping with the amendments.

I would like to take the discussion back to what section 2 is about. It has the heading, “Determination of good reason for refusing bail”. In essence, the bill narrows the grounds on which a sheriff can remand someone in custody. Bail should be granted unless it is

“in the interests of public safety”

not to do so. We have already heard evidence about the lack of a legal definition of “public safety”. Some people have told us that that is problematic and that it will lead to all sorts of appeals, while others have said that it will not be much of a problem. We do not really know.

The other criterion for refusing bail is the existence of

“a significant risk of prejudice to the interests of justice.”

That is a more well-known and well-defined legal term. However, Katy Clark’s amendments, Jamie Greene’s amendments and my amendments try to be a bit more explicit.

I will take them in turn. My amendment 57 would give a sheriff the option of refusing bail if the individual in front of them was considered to present a risk of absconding. There is an obvious benefit to the interests of justice in people not disappearing and causing chaos with cases, disruption for witnesses, extra costs and all the rest of it. It is important that amendment 57 sets that out in black and white.

We heard evidence from the Scottish Police Federation, which warned that people who faced certain charges in relation to which a secondary conviction could result in a much higher tariff might be more inclined to disappear. Ergo, there is a need for amendment 57 to set out that risk in black and white.

The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service supplied us with evidence that suggested that limiting the use of remand in the way that the bill proposes would not be good for the efficient running of the court and could cause disruption to victims and witnesses. It is also worth putting on record that the previous cabinet secretary admitted that there were legitimate concerns in that area.

Amendment 59 is similar to amendment 57 in that it proposes that the sheriff be able to take into account past bail breaches. If someone who is in front of a sheriff has a long track record of breaching bail, including not turning up in court, as they were supposed to do, it stands to reason that the sheriff should be allowed to consider that. The cabinet secretary might tell me that that is covered by “the interests of justice” provision; I do not know. Amendment 59 is partly a probing amendment. However, if section 2 does not cover that, or if there is any doubt, I think that what is proposed in amendment 59 should be included in the bill. The same issues exist with bail breaches as exist with absconding.

I just want to clarify something. My understanding is that, if a mechanism exists through the Crown Office or the VIA service to provide complainers with information on decisions about someone being bailed, that information would only be on whether someone had been bailed or remanded, with no detail provided beyond that.