Seòmar agus comataidhean

I will speak to amendment 65, but I also note that I have formally supported amendment 41, which is where I will begin.

In the past couple of years, the committee has done some important work in respect of police officer suicides. When we first asked Police Scotland and the SPA about what had been a significant number of officers dying by suicide, it transpired that they did not even collect any data about it. I have been working with the families and friends of officers who have died, and they believe that the police complaints process to which those officers were subjected was a factor in the death of their loved ones.

For all that suicide is complex, and those families were not assigning the complaints process as the sole reason for their loved ones’ deaths, I was struck—as, I think, other committee members were—by the fact that, when we asked Police Scotland and the SPA about the matter, not only did they appear not to record such data, but there was what seemed to me to be a fairly strange lack of curiosity. That might be due in part to the sensitivities around suicide, which is perfectly understandable. However, I could not avoid the suspicion that it was sometimes to do with the fact that there were sensitivities around the way in which the protracted nature of the complaints process, the lack of transparency and so on might have been a factor, which would have reflected badly on those organisations.

Amendment 41 seeks to make it a statutory obligation for the suspected suicide of a police officer to be subject to a fatal accident inquiry. The cabinet secretary might argue that that would impinge on the Crown Office’s powers to decide when to instruct a fatal accident inquiry, but I would point to the fact that deaths in custody, of which there are far too many, are subject to statutory fatal accident inquiries—and rightly so—because they often yield important information about what has caused a death and how future deaths might be prevented. Police officers who die in these circumstances fully deserve a similar status and mechanism.

That speaks to a broader issue about sudden deaths in Scotland. Yes, the Crown Office investigates each and every one of them, but it is a private process. In England and Wales, there is a public inquest system, which is often a lot more transparent. If FAIs are not instructed by the Crown Office in cases of police suicide or other sudden deaths, significant and important information never reaches the public domain.

Amendment 41 might not be as clean or as competent legally as it could be, but does the cabinet secretary have sympathy for the sentiment behind it? Is she willing to work with Sharon Dowey to get it into shape for stage 3 or to have some form of discussion to that effect?

Amendment 65 is less specific, as it does not relate entirely to suicide. I propose that any sudden death of a police officer should be subject to a fatal accident inquiry, for the same reasons that I have put forward on suicide. An officer might have died through an accident or for some other reason—perhaps even a health reason—that is related to their service, or while on duty.

It goes back to the perception of there being a two-tier system whereby the lives of police officers who have died are not subject, in the main, to fatal accident inquiries. None of the suicides that we know of have been subject to fatal accident inquiries, although there is a statutory requirement to hold an FAI in other cases, not least for deaths in custody.

It is an important issue to address, and I hope that we are able to find a way of putting things right collectively.

I do not doubt that the cabinet secretary is acting in good faith—not for a minute would I suggest otherwise—and I have some sympathy with her position given that HMICS has come up with this reasonably late in the day. I have a couple of stage 2 amendments that are borne out of the representations of HMICS, but the difference is that they relate to existing procedures and structures, whereas a lot of what is proposed by these amendments on vetting will be done by way of regulation after the event, which is quite far reaching and significant.

I have genuinely seen enough cases of good police officers who have done nothing wrong and who have become whistleblowers under the legal definition of the word finding themselves subject to disciplinary proceedings that have, in some cases, destroyed their careers, health and finances. It would be irresponsible to push forward with these amendments without really knowing what their impact will be.

I have heard that the cabinet secretary does not want to press pause, but I think that it would be sensible to do so. We could look at the issue once we have had the benefit in the forthcoming weeks of the federation and others laying out in clear and articulate terms—rather than my trying to represent the position on the hoof with a week’s notice—why they believe that it is of concern. At that point, the Government could lodge stage 3 amendments, in all likelihood with the support of all parties.

Could I make a quick point?

I understand that amendment 62 may potentially seem to be out of place in the bill, but we have been told by the Scottish Government, the SPA and Police Scotland that Scotland’s police officers are finally about to start being required to wear body-worn cameras as standard. It has been a slow process, but the pilot scheme has begun. The last that we heard from the chief constable was that, although the roll-out had been delayed, it was—apparently—still going to happen.

The amendment’s purpose relates to the understanding that, when body-worn cameras do become commonly used, they will in all likelihood have a significant impact on the matters that the bill deals with—namely, police misconduct and regulation. Amendment 62 would request that

“Ministers ... prepare and publish a report on the”

value of

“body-worn cameras in ... enforcing standards of”

constables’ behaviour. For all that body-worn cameras will in the main—I imagine—be used in the pursuit of dealing with criminality by the public and as evidence in that regard, they may, in other cases, potentially be used to deal with police misbehaviour or other matters that relate to the bill.

Amendment 62 would ask the Government to publish a report within one year of the bill receiving royal assent or of the conclusion of Police Scotland’s body-worn cameras pilot—whichever of those dates was the earliest.

It has been said that body-worn cameras

“will transform policing in Scotland”.

My amendment seeks to future proof matters slightly in anticipation of body-worn cameras coming into use by legislating at least for assessing, in some way, how significant they may or may not be in respect of police misconduct cases.

I move amendment 62.

Although I have withdrawn or not moved most of my amendments today, I am minded to put amendment 66 to a vote, if necessary. Angiolini made a large number of recommendations, most of which were non-legislative and, on the face of it, relatively minor, but her recommendation that the PIRC should be accountable to Parliament is fundamental to the job that she was tasked with—that of looking at the entire picture. She saw the current arrangement as a weakness.

It is worth putting on the record the fact that the PIRC would still be accountable to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service on criminal matters. My proposal relates entirely to operational matters relating to non-criminal issues. It simply seems like a bit of sensible housekeeping. I have not been persuaded by the arguments against what I propose. There are some practical issues, but they could readily be overcome if the Government was so minded. I will therefore put the matter to a vote.

Amendments 60 and 61 are connected. They seek to do something very similar but in different ways. I am keen to hear the cabinet secretary’s response to why I think that they are necessary and to hear whether, if the amendments are not practical, there might be a way of achieving at a later stage a practical agreement on the issue that they address.

Amendment 60 has come about via representation from HMICS, which has already influenced some of today’s proceedings. The amendment seeks to create an offence whereby an officer or member of police staff can face a charge of committing misconduct in public office. That would bring Scotland into line with the rest of the United Kingdom; in other parts of the UK, officers can face the charge of committing misconduct in public office if they abuse their position, but that offence does not exist in legislation in Scotland.

Some examples have been cited of officers committing wrongdoing in England and Wales, one of which involved taking photographs of a murder victim and sharing them on WhatsApp groups. As it stands, it seems that legislation in Scotland would not allow for criminal prosecution for misconduct in public office in that example. Amendment 60 would plug a gap and bring consistency.

Amendment 61 is a gentler way of getting to that point. Instead of legislating for the offence, my amendment 61 would require ministers to publish a report on police misconduct in public office

“no later than one year after the date of Royal Assent”.

The Parliament’s legislation team were kind enough to advise me of amendment 60’s potential legal difficulties and to suggest that amendment 61 might be a way in which the statutory offence could be introduced, after ministers have given consideration to introducing it and outlined the steps that they might take.

In an ideal world, amendment 60 would be the way to introduce an offence of misconduct in public office. However, amendment 61 might be a way for the Government at least to go away for a year after the legislation has been passed and consider whether the measure ought to be brought into play.

I move amendment 60.

The cabinet secretary made an appeal for common sense, which is good news, because I am big on common sense. I heard everything that she had to say. I was not aware that there is an offence of wilful neglect of duty by a public official in Scotland that is in some ways comparable.

In the spirit of common sense, therefore, I am minded not to press amendment 60 and not to move amendment 61. I would be interested to hear what HMICS might have to say about what we have put in the amendments and how the cabinet secretary has responded. That might give us scope to look at the issue again at stage 3.

Amendment 60 is clearly wholly impractical. Amendment 61 has its own issues, but at least it is food for thought and it gives us something to consider. The last thing that I want to do is create a two-tier process in which police officers are being held to a particular standard that we as politicians are not, so I will not be pressing the amendments.

Amendment 60, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendment 61 not moved.

I share the cabinet secretary’s view about the importance of body-worn cameras. It is worth repeating that Police Scotland, which is the second-largest force in the UK, is the only police force in the UK not to have them. Every one of the 40-plus other police forces has not only had them for many years but is on to second and, in some cases, third-generation technology. There has been a complete failing, in my view.

I agree that there will be a fundamental role for Police Scotland, the SPA and, indeed, HMICS in assessing body-worn cameras, as and when they are in use. On the basis of the reasons that have been given, I seek to withdraw amendment 62.

Amendment 62, by agreement, withdrawn.

Sections 9 and 10 agreed to.

Section 11—Complaint handling reviews

In respect of whistleblowers, we have heard evidence from a lawyer who acts for a number of police officers, who says that, even now, with whistleblowing legislation being well established, in cases that she acts in, whistleblowers are not being treated as such and are not being given that protection. The legislation does address whistleblowers and helps to improve their rights, but there is a potential for the amendments to work against that or to change the whole dynamic.

I do not know whether the cabinet secretary does not want to press pause on a point of principle or whether there is some practical reason, but it seems entirely sensible to do so, given that we have had the amendments only for a week and we do not really know what they will do. There are genuine concerns, and there is the likelihood of cross-party consensus if we could just hold off for a short while. I again urge the cabinet secretary to reconsider.

I have dealt with cases in the past where there was sufficient evidence and a civil standard of proof of wrongdoing. I will give you an example. There was one police officer who was suspected of taking part in armed robberies with known criminals, going into the homes of elderly people, targeting them, tying them up, robbing them, and using police radios and fake police warrants. It was an extraordinary set of circumstances. That individual was charged with a criminal offence, and it went to the Crown, but nothing came of it.

The suspicion among some of the victims was that the embarrassment of what had transpired—that a serving officer could do that with police apparatus—was a factor in it not proceeding to court and in not having anyone criminally convicted.

Eventually, and ultimately, after many years of that officer being in receipt of full pay, he was finally dismissed on the basis of the evidence, under the civil standard of proof, being more than sufficient to rightly say that he could no longer be a police officer.

That is an extreme case, but, if a police officer did something in the workplace or related to their conduct at work that was black-and-white wrong, and that would result in dismissal in any other workplace, that should be allowed to happen. I do not think that it would pre-empt or prejudice any criminal proceedings, which would be wholly separate, so I think that it would still be the right thing to do.