Chamber and committees

I note the concerns that we expressed last year about the increased levels of fiscal fines and, more generally, the lack of information that is available to the victims of crimes.

The second issue concerns the increased time limits, especially for prisoners who are on remand. In the same year, up to 500 prisoners have been released early due to catastrophic overcrowding in prisons, but I have not really heard from the Government today any sense of urgency or any evidence about what has been done in the past 12 months to remedy the problems so that we would not need additional 12-month extensions for both issues. I therefore cannot support the SSI.

I have a final question. Do you or your officials have any data on how often the extensions have been used since the temporary measures were introduced?

The other issue of concern relates to the power that the Crown Office has been given to extend how long it has to put someone on trial. Previously, it was 80 days from the serving of an indictment in a solemn case, which, of course, are the more serious cases. However, that was increased by way of these temporary Covid measures to 320 days for those who are not on remand and 260 days for those who are held on remand. That is a huge increase and, as we know, was supposedly temporary, but if the motion is passed today, the extension will now run until 2025. Does the cabinet secretary agree that those extensions, which keep people in remand for so much longer, are only adding to the crisis in the prisons, which are already dangerously overcrowded?

When you asked the committee last year for a one-year extension, did you tell the criminal justice agencies at that point that they had one year to sort themselves out, or did you intend to come back to the Parliament again this year to ask for one more year?

I am sure that we would like to see those statistics. It is interesting to see that fiscal fines appear to have reduced significantly, but that should be seen in the wider context of all direct measures. If we are being provided with those figures, they should also include recorded police warnings, antisocial behaviour, fixed-penalty notices and any other such measures, because it might well be that some of them have reduced but others have increased.

Last year, I suggested that, if the Government wanted to extend the provision, it should introduce primary legislation. The cabinet secretary has today said that she does not intend to extend it after this one-year extension, I believe. Is that correct?

A couple of issues that we raised at this time last year are still of concern. The first relates to the increase of fiscal fines from £300 to £500. At this time last year, the cabinet secretary asked for a one-year extension to that. We objected and put the matter to a vote. Labour supported us but, nonetheless, the Government got its way. Here we are again: the cabinet secretary seeks another one-year extension to what was supposed to be a temporary power that was necessary only because of the pandemic.

When we raised that matter last year, the cabinet secretary told the committee that there would be a public consultation. The findings from that were published in July. Some respondents raised concerns specifically about the increased use of fiscal fines. Comments were made that that would

“negatively affect the ability of the criminal justice system to deliver its public protection function”.

Concerns were also expressed that those fines were being used for more serious offences that would normally be prosecuted in a court. That has been borne out by recent reports that a number of serious crimes, including assault, are being dealt with by way of fiscal fine—there is no trial and no conviction and, often, the victims are not informed of the outcome.

Does the cabinet secretary genuinely think that further extension is appropriate, given the misgivings about the use of fiscal fines?

I will speak to amendment 65, but I also note that I have formally supported amendment 41, which is where I will begin.

In the past couple of years, the committee has done some important work in respect of police officer suicides. When we first asked Police Scotland and the SPA about what had been a significant number of officers dying by suicide, it transpired that they did not even collect any data about it. I have been working with the families and friends of officers who have died, and they believe that the police complaints process to which those officers were subjected was a factor in the death of their loved ones.

For all that suicide is complex and those families were not assigning the complaints process as the sole reason for their loved ones’ deaths, I was struck—as, I think, other committee members were—by the fact that, when we asked Police Scotland and the SPA about the matter, not only did they appear not to record such data, but there was also what seemed to me to be a fairly strange lack of curiosity. That might be due in part to the sensitivities around suicide, which is perfectly understandable. However, I could not avoid the suspicion that it was sometimes to do with the fact that there were sensitivities around the way in which the protracted nature of the complaints process, the lack of transparency and so on may have been a factor, which would have reflected badly on those organisations.

Amendment 41 seeks to make it a statutory obligation for the suspected suicide of a police officer to be subject to a fatal accident inquiry. The cabinet secretary may argue that that would impinge on the Crown Office’s powers to decide when to instruct a fatal accident inquiry, but I would point to the fact that deaths in custody, of which there are far too many, are subject to statutory fatal accident inquiries—and rightly so—because they often yield important information about what has caused a death and how future deaths might be prevented. Police officers who die in these circumstances fully deserve a similar status and mechanism.

That speaks to a broader issue about sudden deaths in Scotland. Yes, the Crown Office investigates each and every one of them, but it is a private process. In England and Wales, there is a public inquest system, which is often a lot more transparent. If FAIs are not instructed by the Crown Office in cases of police suicide or other sudden deaths, significant and important information never reaches the public domain.

Amendment 41 might not be as clean or as competent legally as it could be, but does the cabinet secretary have sympathy for the sentiment behind it? Is she willing to work with the member to get it into shape for stage 3 or to have some form of discussion to that effect?

Amendment 65 is less specific, as it does not relate entirely to suicide. I propose that any sudden death of a police officer should be subject to a fatal accident inquiry, for the same reasons that I have put forward on suicide. An officer might have died through an accident or for some other reason—perhaps even a health reason—that is related to their service, or while on duty.

It goes back to the perception of there being a two-tier system whereby the lives of police officers who have died are not subject, in the main, to fatal accident inquiries. None of the suicides that we know of have been subject to fatal accident inquiries, although there is a statutory requirement to hold an FAI in other cases, not least for deaths in custody.

It is an important issue to address, and I hope that we are able to find a way of putting things right collectively.

Amendments 60 and 61 are connected. They seek to do something very similar but in different ways. I am keen to hear the cabinet secretary’s response to why I think that they are necessary and to hear whether, if the amendments are not practical, there might be a way of achieving at a later stage a practical agreement on the issue that they address.

Amendment 60 has come about via representation from HMICS, which has already influenced some of today’s proceedings. The amendment seeks to create an offence whereby an officer or member of police staff can face a charge of committing misconduct in public office. That would bring Scotland into line with the rest of the United Kingdom; in other parts of the UK, officers can face the charge of committing misconduct in public office if they abuse their position, but that offence does not exist in legislation in Scotland.

Some examples have been cited of officers committing wrongdoing in England and Wales, one of which involved taking photographs of a murder victim and sharing them on WhatsApp groups. As it stands, it seems that legislation in Scotland would not allow for criminal prosecution for misconduct in public office in that example. Amendment 60 would plug a gap and bring consistency.

Amendment 61 is a gentler way of getting to that point. Instead of legislating for the offence, my amendment 61 would require ministers to publish a report on police misconduct in public office

“no later than one year after the date of Royal Assent”.

The bill’s team in Parliament were kind enough to advise me of amendment 60’s potential legal difficulties and to suggest that amendment 61 might be a way in which the statutory offence could be introduced, after ministers have given consideration to introducing it and outlined the steps that they might take.

In an ideal world, amendment 60 would be the way to introduce an offence of misconduct in public office. However, amendment 61 might be a way for the Government at least to go away for a year after the legislation has been passed and consider whether the measure ought to be brought into play.

I move amendment 60.

The cabinet secretary made an appeal for common sense, which is good news, because I am big on common sense. I heard everything that she had to say. I was not aware that there is an offence of wilful neglect of duty by a public official in Scotland that is in some ways comparable.

In the spirit of common sense, therefore, I am minded not to press amendment 60 and not to move amendment 61. I would be interested to hear what HMICS might have to say about what we have put in the amendments and how the cabinet secretary has responded. That might give us scope to look at the issue again at stage 3.

Amendment 60 is clearly wholly impractical. Amendment 61 has its own issues, but at least it is food for thought and it gives us something to consider. The last thing that I want to do is create a two-tier process in which police officers are being held to a particular standard that we as politicians are not, so I will not be pressing the amendments.

Amendment 60, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendment 61 not moved.

I share the cabinet secretary’s view about the importance of body-worn cameras. It is worth repeating that Police Scotland, which is the second-largest force in the UK, is the only police force in the UK not to have them. Every one of the 40-plus other police forces has not only had them for many years but is on to second and, in some cases, third-generation technology. There has been a complete failing, in my view.

I agree that there will be a fundamental role for Police Scotland, the SPA and, indeed, HMICS in assessing body-worn cameras, as and when they are in use. On the basis of the reasons that have been given, I will seek to withdraw amendment 62.

Amendment 62, by agreement, withdrawn.

Sections 9 and 10 agreed to.

Section 11—Complaint handling reviews