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Young people told us—and the minister must acknowledge—that local authorities are really struggling to do anything in the margins that is not a statutory responsibility. Is that something that she thinks the bill will take—

I do not doubt that people have welcomed those provisions, but we have also heard significant evidence about what is not there. On that point, what is not there is the commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in some areas. Many stakeholders have said that the drafting of sections 1 and 2 specifically on aftercare and section 10 on the register of foster carers, for example, amend the Children’s (Scotland) Act 1995. As that is pre-devolution UK legislation, it is outwith the scope of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Incorporation) (Scotland) Act 2024. What is the minister’s view on whether the bill needs to be amended to bring the affected sections within scope of the 2024 act?

Thank you. I guess that that will happen as we progress to stage 2.

I have another question. What training and qualifications would you expect the single member on the panel to have?

Forgive me—I thought that you had reached the end of discussing my amendments.

I am not sure that I fully follow the argument about access to social care not having been offered, or, indeed, the previous argument about palliative care. I do not understand why the requirement would create an additional barrier, unless the member admits that social care and palliative care are in such a poor state in Scotland that the timescales involved would be difficult and the money involved prohibitive.

Will the member take an intervention?

I understand the member’s view, but surely it is not an unacceptable delay but a necessary delay to have in place those regulations before the act commences.

Will the member take an intervention on that?

I am listening carefully to the points that are being made. The point in amendment 24 about a person not being terminally ill only because they are disabled relates to Daniel Johnson’s point about timescales. I would argue that, without a timescale in the bill, it will be difficult to separate the difference between being terminal and being a disabled person under the amendment that the member has lodged. Does the member accept that, in most circumstances, anyone who is terminally ill is also considered to be disabled, and the two things are inextricably linked?

Will the member take an intervention on that point?

Amendments 220, 223, 237 and 238 would ensure that requests for assistance to end life under the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill are entirely self-initiated by the terminally ill adult and are made without any encouragement, suggestion or inducement from medical professionals, practitioners or other professionals involved in their care.

Amendment 220 is in reference to eligibility, amendment 223 is in reference to the person’s first declaration, amendment 237 is in reference to the statement by the co-ordinating registered medical practitioner and amendment 238 is in reference to the statement by the independent registered medical practitioner.

The notion of coercion has been discussed and debated at length in other jurisdictions, particularly in relation to gender-based violence. By definition, it is difficult to detect coercion but, nonetheless, it is incredibly important that, when we are considering legislation that allows someone to take their own life, we ensure as best we can that it is absolutely watertight that the people whose job it is to support a person to live do not take any part in suggesting that that person may end their life.

I want to speak for a moment about the wider coercion that I highlighted in the stage 1 debate—and I note that the amendments in Stuart McMillan’s name seek to look at some of these same issues of pressure and societal coercion. We live in a society where choice for disabled people—and by definition, therefore, people who are eligible under the bill for assistance to take their own lives—is not equal. Disabled people do not have the same choices as other people. They cannot get out of bed in the morning whenever they decide to do so; often, somebody else makes that decision, because it is all to do with the timings that suit the professionals around them. I am not saying that to critique the incredible social care professionals who support us, day in, day out; I am just recognising that there is a substantial element of control from other people in the lives of disabled people—and, indeed, the lives of terminally ill people. For reasons that I have rehearsed previously, the two aspects are difficult to unlink.

It is also the case that we live in a society in which disabled people’s lives, and the lives of people who have lost certain functions, are not valued in the same way as those of people who have those functions. She will not mind me using this example, but the incredible Paralympian Tanni Grey-Thompson, in a debate in the House of Lords, said that she was incontinent, and then talked about people saying, “I would rather die than be incontinent.” She had to face that in the House of Lords, and she said, “Well, I lead a very open and enjoyable life.”

We have already heard this from other members, but the fact is that, although everybody’s understanding of quality of life can be quite different, there is very much an understanding that disabled people’s lives are often valued less than non-disabled people’s lives. Often the loss of function, whatever it might be, can become something that people inherently fear. I fear it; I do not have a lot of function, but the very little function that I do have I would be scared to lose.

That loss can really be internalised. When people around us start to think that not being able to get out of bed on your own in the morning, not being able to shower yourself, not being able to take yourself to the toilet or not being able to feed yourself is a life not worth living, people who, by definition, have a terminal illness, or any other illness, can find themselves internalising that and thinking, “What is my life worth if I can’t do that? Other people do not think that that’s a life worth living.”

That sort of societal and everyday ableism exists and is a real danger in the context in which we are bringing in this piece of legislation. Disabled people are less likely to work. We are more likely to live in homes that are inaccessible; indeed, about 10,000 of us in Scotland are stuck in our own homes, because we cannot get into and out of them. Many disabled people—one in four—cannot access the palliative care that they need. High numbers of disabled people cannot access social care, because of the costs associated with it; high numbers of them do not access it because of the recruitment crisis; and many do not access it because the eligibility criteria determine that they are not able to do so. We are operating a system in Scotland in which we are literally providing life-and-limb care and support to a large majority of disabled people. In that context, the notion of choice and control is very difficult for a disabled person.

Therefore, my amendments seek to take out some elements of what coercion could be. They will not be able to address all of the issue, and I ask members to think carefully about that, particularly when listening to Stuart McMillan’s argument, which I am sure will be powerful, on the points around pressure and societal coercion.

It is those areas that really worry me about the bill. Unless we fundamentally change social care, unless we fundamentally change healthcare, unless we fundamentally change our housing system and unless we can get to a system that does not oppress or discriminate against large swathes of society, the context in which we are bringing in the bill will be very dangerous. The amendments that I have lodged in this group seek to try to protect at least some small part of this; I would have lodged other amendments dealing with the broader aspects of what I am talking about, but I was told that they were not within the scope of the bill. I ask members to reflect on that comment.

For the time being, I think that amendments 220, 223, 237 and 238 will provide some, if not all, of the safeguards that are needed in the legislation, and I ask, and encourage, committee members to support them.

I move amendment 220.