Seòmar agus comataidhean

It is difficult to tell the full extent of the numbers of people who have felt forced to move to private dental care, but, from what we have heard anecdotally, it is not uncommon, and there is a risk of a two-tier system being created that exacerbates inequalities. In fact, that can even happen with the upselling that takes place in what are ostensibly NHS dental practices. Are you concerned that that is an issue, and what can be done to reduce the number of patients who feel that they have to go private to get timely treatment?

One of the main difficulties that has been reported in accessing a dentist has been getting an appointment. The Scottish dental access initiative funding was intended to address that concern, but it has been made clear that only nine dental practices have received that funding over the past four years. Will you provide some context as to why so few practices have benefited from that funding? What could be done to develop that further?

I thank the witnesses for their helpful contributions so far. I will turn to the particular concerns that have been raised around community-based housing associations that are subject to statutory intervention. Concerns have been raised about the rigour of the process for the appointment of a statutory manager.

Usually, an options appraisal is carried out, which tends to conclude that a transfer of engagements to another housing association should take place; even before that process happens, there is the appointment of a so-called transfer specialist. Does the relationship between statutory managers and transfer specialists raise concerns? That could be particularly the case when all those people are on the statutory managers list and no clear declaration of interests is required, which perhaps suggests an inherent bias in favour of transfers of community-based housing associations.

Thank you. If no other witnesses wish to comment on that question, I will move on to ask my final one.

I want to talk about the nature of the bidding process for a preferred transfer partner. It is clear that larger RSLs are inherently better resourced and able to devote greater time to providing a highly—although perhaps superficially so—attractive offer. In the case of Reidvale, for example, we saw the offer of a rent freeze, the takeover of a local community centre and the offer of very intensive engagement prior to the undertaking of any formal ballot process. The regulator is insistent that it is neutral about structures—that is, whether the RSLs are larger ones or smaller community-based ones—but will the process inherently favour larger housing associations that are able to offer a loss-leading bid, if you like, to attract tenants to a transfer, even though that will ultimately lead to the loss of asset wealth in that community?

Thank you, convener. I appreciate your kindness in allowing me to speak in addition to my written submission.

In addition to what colleagues have already outlined in relation to the dysfunctional nature of the bus network in the west of Scotland and greater Glasgow area, I highlight that the control of the fare box is a critical factor in a franchising structure. It is not about nationalising the assets of bus companies—going down that route would be a red herring. It is about centralising and having public control of the fare box, which would allow for rational, coherent management of an integrated bus system and enable its integration with other transport modes, such as rail, subway and so on.

The concern relates to the lack of progress with the implementation of the provisions in the 2019 act. We feel that it is bizarre that UK legislation within a similar timescale has been implemented but implementation has not happened nearly as quickly in Scotland. One could surmise that it might be that the Government was reluctant in the first place to entertain the amendments to the 2019 act, which introduced provisions for franchising and that, therefore, it was not as eager to enact the provisions. However, we are where we are.

There is contention over the act’s provision on the traffic commissioner’s panel having veto power over democratic decisions made by regional transport authorities on the implementation of their preferred structures. Therefore, I wonder whether the committee could take further evidence from, say, the Law Society of Scotland on the differences between the UK and Scottish legislation and what can be done to improve it. It could also ask for evidence from SPT and, indeed, seek evidence from the Better Buses for Strathclyde campaign, which initiated the petition, about the nature of its concerns with regard to the legislation. After all, it has studied it in great detail and understands the issues with it in great depth.

The committee could also consider inviting the Secretary of State for Transport and, perhaps, the UK Minister for Buses—Louise Haigh and Simon Lightwood—to offer their views on the appointment of a new traffic commissioner for Scotland. That role is currently vacant; it was advertised earlier in the year, but the appointment process was disrupted by the general election. Given their policy position, it might be interesting to get their perspectives with regard to their support for franchising in Scotland and how they might be able to assist colleagues in Scotland with its implementation, through the appointment of a bus traffic commissioner who would be minded to support such measures.

I just want to emphasise the point about UK ministers having input to the committee—

You highlight the fact that financial resources alone are not the solution and that other metrics must be considered, and you have outlined some examples. To what extent are you considering legislative amendments? For example, could you amend the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014, the Social Care (Self-directed Support) (Scotland) Act 2013 and the Carers (Scotland) Act 2016 to give effect to some of the goals that stakeholders have highlighted and to address problems in the system?

Could you furnish the committee with an outline of where the Government sees an opportunity to make progress, regardless of the bill, at the moment? You highlighted collective bargaining, but perhaps areas including the right to breaks, Anne’s law, ethical commissioning and the national social work agency could be progressed without the NCS bill going forward, unlike the areas that you have highlighted, which include information sharing, that would require new primary legislation. What discrete elements could be taken forward under existing legislation, and which depend on the NCS bill progressing?

Do any of your colleagues wish to come in on that?

Clearly, there is a problem with gathering support from trade unions, local authorities and, indeed, Parliament. Do you think that one way to break through that impasse would be by highlighting where there are opportunities to implement reforms incrementally using existing legislation, and then pointing out where there is a clear need for a discrete piece of overarching legislation that could come in later? Trade unions have expressed a view that action is needed in the social care sector now, and perhaps they would be more likely to lend you their support if certain actions were taken sooner.