Seòmar agus comataidhean

Thank you, convener, and thanks, too, to Gillian Mackay for introducing the bill.

I appreciate the committee’s scrutiny. I know that members will have detailed questions, so I will offer only general comments on why the bill matters. In so doing, I hope to address some of the concerns that people have about it, even those who support its intent.

The fundamental—and, I hope, inarguable—starting point is that no one should experience harassment, intimidation or unwanted influence as they access essential healthcare. However, as committee members have heard over the past few weeks, that is exactly what is happening to some women when they seek an abortion—which is, first and foremost, healthcare.

For some of those women, such interference happens at a time when they are already particularly vulnerable or distressed, and for all of them it is happening at a time when privacy and respect should be assured. Instead, they can be met with vigils, graphic images, and sometimes shouting and name calling. I cannot articulate the impact of that experience more powerfully than the women who have appeared before you already have, and I will not try. I just ask you to remember it as you consider the bill, and to give it the enormous weight that it deserves. After all, the bill aims to prevent what happened to them and, in so doing, to ensure that access to healthcare can be provided without obstruction, as is protected under article 8 of the European convention on human rights.

It is, of course, still appropriate that the bill’s potential impacts on the rights to freedom of expression, religion and assembly be considered. In that respect, there are broadly two concerns: that the bill itself weakens those rights and that it might erode those rights by setting a precedent for restrictions elsewhere.

Freedom of expression and assembly and freedom of thought, conscience and religion are, of course, fundamental rights. However, under the ECHR, they are not absolute; they may be interfered with, provided that any such interference goes no further than is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. As I have established, protecting women’s access to essential healthcare services is a legitimate aim, but I can assure members that significant work has been done to ensure that the restrictions are no more than is necessary.

Contrary to the charge that the bill limits all protest in safe access zones, I point out that it targets only activity that intentionally or recklessly has specified effects, such as influencing a decision to access or to provide abortion services, and that those restrictions attach to only 30 premises in Scotland and will extend for only 200m beyond their grounds.

Everywhere else in Scotland, anyone can express opposition to abortion however they please, provided that what they do is lawful. They can protest outside court buildings and on street corners. They may erect billboards and lobby any member of the Parliament. If the bill passes, all that it will prevent is the direct targeting of individuals as they take what might be the most deeply personal decision of their lives.

That also explains why the bill does not set a precedent. No other medical procedure attracts the kind of activity that abortion services attract, and no other form of protest targets such a personal choice. That is all that the bill recognises. It safeguards access to healthcare and, in doing so, protects the article 8 rights and the privacy and dignity of women when they most need it.

I will conclude by saying that I was shocked when I first encountered anti-abortion activity outside clinics in Oregon in the United States years ago. It is disheartening to see that such activity has spread. I hope that the bill, and other legislation like it, reassures women that their rights and their health matter, and that we will defend both as vigorously as we can.

There is not a specific exemption for the chaplaincy or spiritual support provided within hospitals. It would be the choice of the person accessing the services whether to speak to those staff, so that is not an exemption.

I think that that is a similar example to the one that Mr McKee gave. As I indicated, churches often put out signs, and their intent is more welcoming. I agree with Ross Greer that intent does not exist in that example, and that it is not reckless, either.

I do not believe that they were. My officials engaged regularly with anti-abortion groups when shaping the legislation.

That goes back to your previous question about balancing the different rights of people. We have done a lot of work to ensure that we have the right balance by indicating where a safe access zone begins and ends. If someone is accessing healthcare, they will want to do that ideally in the safest of environments, and because the bill is specific and is narrowly restricted to protests against abortion, we have balanced that correctly.

I accept that. That is why we have to ensure that the consultation is at the right level with the right people and that we always balance the different pieces of human rights legislation. The question would definitely be whether it was proportionate, and we would have to make sure that that was the case. That is the key thing that we would need to consult on.

We have been very clear in the bill that it is not about specific actions, but the intent of those actions. The committee got very strong evidence from women who were concerned about walking past a group of people who were standing silently, because it could be deemed to be silent judgment.

However, we have to be cognisant that different people experience things in different ways. It is not for me to say how the police would look at any actions, although they would look at them in the wider context of what else was happening around about them.

I go back to the point that—as I said in my opening statement—the safe zone is 200m, so the behaviour can happen elsewhere. It need not necessarily happen right beside the hospital. I was struck by the theological debate that took place in an earlier evidence session about where it is appropriate to pray and whether it is appropriate to pray so close to a facility that is providing abortions, where you could impede people’s access and cause alarm or distress.

However, as I have said, it is for the police to determine what they would need in order to prosecute.

Silent prayer is a form of vigil protest that is impacting on women attending abortion clinics, so yes.

I am sorry—I am slightly confused. I am not clear where you mean chapels are. If a woman was accessing abortion services and was in the protected building and felt that she wanted to speak to the spiritual adviser or the chaplain in the hospital, that would absolutely not be captured by the legislation.

As I have said, women should be able to access abortion services without unwanted influence, harassment or public judgment. As we have been creating the bill, we have been looking carefully at the balancing of rights under the ECHR.

The bill is targeted. We have specifically said that the legislation covers zones of 200m from the boundaries of the protected premises. As I said in my opening statement, we have also been clear that those who protest or who hold vigils, as has been described in the evidence to the committee, can still do so, but not within the safe access zones.

Those points were brought out through the work that we have done on speaking to stakeholders on both sides of the argument and the amazing response to Ms Mackay’s consultation. We feel that we have struck the right balance. We use the same wording as was used in the Supreme Court ruling on the Northern Ireland legislation, in that we believe that the legislation is proportionate, which is key when balancing the various human rights.