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The Scottish Government’s aim is to bring the bill’s provisions and the section 104 order on pension trusts into force at the same time, as that would have the effect of applying the updated trust law in the bill to all types of Scottish trusts, including Scottish pension trusts, at the same time. That is the preferred approach, because it would avoid fragmenting trust law by creating different regimes for pension trusts and other kinds of trusts.

Should a 104 order not be forthcoming in time for the bill’s commencement, there is a range of options to ensure that no gap in the law is created for pension trusts. Sections 78 and 80 would allow provision to be made to keep the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 and any other parts of pre-reform legislation in force for pension trusts for as long as required. It would complicate the legislative landscape, and it is not a desirable solution, but it is possible.

Another option is to defer commencement of the bill as long as is necessary to ensure co-ordination with the section 104 order. Again, that is not desirable, but it demonstrates that a gap in the law would not be created.

No, I do not, but we will have to wait to see once we move that forwards.

I ask Michael Paparakis, who has worked on the bill during its history, to comment on that.

I will bring in my officials to give you the history on that.

In terms of accessibility for laypersons, I am confident that the bill represents a vast improvement on what we currently have under the 1921 act and in other trust legislation. Given that trusts are used in a widely varied and ever-changing range of circumstances, producing and maintaining guidance that accommodates the breadth of purposes to which they are put would be a significant undertaking.

The Government has set out its priorities for this parliamentary session. I take on board Mr Balfour’s points regarding enhancing accessibility to people who are volunteering, but at this stage I think that any sort of campaign in that respect would not be a good use of public resources.

I am not concerned that it is going to put people off, but I am willing to consider the issue further. I will bring in my officials, who might be able to give you some history on the work that has been done previously.

The Scottish Government is committed to exploring the views of the wider general public on intestate succession and we have commissioned research from the Scottish Civil Justice Hub, which is a venture led by the University of Glasgow’s school of law in collaboration with the Scottish Government’s civil law and legal systems division. That phase of research has finished and we are awaiting the report on its findings, which will be published by the hub. When we receive a copy, we will consider whether any next steps need to be taken on succession law reform. The research will be used to inform any future reform, but we have no plans to progress any further primary legislation to reform fundamental aspects of succession law during the current parliamentary session.

On the risks of abuse, section 7 contains a number of safeguards against abuse of the power by trustees. First, a majority of the trustees must agree before a co-trustee can be removed from office; the power cannot be exercised by a minority of trustees or a single trustee acting without the support of a majority. Moreover, if a trustee abuses the power, it can be challenged in court. Trustees who wrongfully remove co-trustees might be in breach of a fiduciary duty and might find themselves removed, and if they have acted negligently or in bad faith, they can be personally liable for court expenses. My view is that the bill contains sufficient safeguards to ensure that trustees exercise the power appropriately, but I will ask whether any of my officials want to add further to the history behind this.

I am happy to take on any recommendations that the committee makes.

Perhaps my officials might want to come in on that point.

It is the Scottish Government’s view that there should be a default time period that must elapse before the proposed jurisdiction can be exercised. The 25-year limit was chosen because that section of the bill is intended to deal predominantly with long-term trusts and the problems that can arise in relation to those.

The SLC considered that 25 years provided an easily workable default route that represented a short generation. A default time limit also helps to avoid the risk that family members who are unhappy with a trust might mount an early application to have the trust’s terms altered before any material change of circumstance has occurred.

The 25-year limit cannot be extended by a truster, but a truster can shorten that limit or do away with it altogether. I have heard evidence from stakeholders on the matter and, although some have suggested that 25 years is too long, none have suggested an alternative time period.

I will consider any recommendations that the committee makes in its stage 1 report, including any alternative recommended time limit.