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I believe that, as I have said, it will be a remunerated, legally competent chairing member, and that—following Sheriff Mackie’s words—we are able to put our trust in that member to take the right decisions with the best interests of the child or young person at heart. I am confident that they will be able to take an educated decision, based on the needs of the specific child in the specific case.

Yes.

I appreciate that, as I discussed with Roz McCall, continuity of panel members is a key theme that has been raised through our consultation on the bill, as well as by the many voices of children and young people who have informed our work over the past few years. Therefore, I note the intent behind Roz McCall’s amendment 107 and Martin Whitfield’s amendment 186 in seeking to promote continuity in the chairing of children’s hearings. However, I consider that our primary focus should be on whether continuity would be desirable, with regard to the best interests of the child rather than whether that would be practicable. If Ms McCall is open to the offer, I commit to working with her on the framing of an amendment for stage 3.

On Martin Whitfield’s amendment 187, I appreciate his interest in the role of the chairing member, but I do not consider primary legislation to be the appropriate vehicle for providing for recruitment into such roles, nor is it appropriate to restrict the independence of the national convener’s role.

It is for the national convener to recruit and train panel members, and I am satisfied that plans are well under way for a robust recruitment programme based on the qualities, competencies and skills that the national convener deems appropriate for the role. Chairing members are also children’s panel members, and it is for the national convener to strike the fine balance between the additionality that we seek from the remunerated chair’s contribution and the overall integrity and cohesion of the panel, including the volunteer members. The briefing that the committee received from the national convener about his work in this area addresses many of the suggestions that Mr Whitfield has made in amendment 187, so I hope that he will not move it.

On Mr Whitfield’s amendments 226 and 227, I think that we can all agree that, without the time, effort and expertise of so many people over so many years, we would not have a children’s hearings system of which we are proud. The introduction of remuneration is a seismic moment for children’s hearings, and it is a moment that has, arguably, been too long in coming, so I thank the committee for its support on the topic.

I ask Mr Whitfield to consider the impacts of limiting the scope of remuneration in the way in which his amendments would do. For example, we would not be able to put in place a scheme of remuneration for specialist panel members. I hope that committee members found the explanatory notes in response to the stage 1 report helpful in relation to the role and function of specialist panel members. In certain circumstances, a specialist panel member’s expertise in a particular subject is intended to provide expert insight regarding decision making in the hearing. Furthermore, that expertise, and a panel member’s willingness to be available when called on, should be remunerated appropriately. I know that the national convener shares that view.

The specialist role could, in future, become a powerful tool in the decision-making framework for the hearing, but that could be undermined by amendments 226 and 227 if there was no effective means to remunerate those panel members. The same goes for the future make-up of the panel. I do not want to confine our options or those of the national convener in that regard. We must be able to respond appropriately to the ever-changing demands on the hearings system, so I ask Mr Whitfield to consider his position and not move amendments 226 and 227.

I apologise for my lengthy speaking note.

I move amendment 22.

I appreciate that. Following on from Mr Balfour’s comments, although I cannot commit to any exact wording now, we can certainly look at the matter to perhaps provide more clarity around it. If it helps members, I am happy to provide an assurance that I can take that forward ahead of stage 3.

My amendments in this group will make important technical changes to the bill’s approach regarding a child’s attendance at hearings. Amendment 34 seeks to make it absolutely clear that the decision to require a child to attend a hearing can be made in advance of a hearing, and that that decision can apply to all or only part of the hearing. The amendment will affect an important part of the scheme in relation to attendance, because it will allow procedural decisions to be made at the appropriate time and ensure that hearings can be tailored to require attendance only as far as is completely necessary.

Amendments 35 to 38, 47 and 49 are consequential to the change that will be made by amendment 34.

Amendments 39 to 46 will make various minor changes that relate to a child’s attendance at hearings before a sheriff. The amendments will clarify the provision under which a requirement to attend is imposed and improve consistency when referring to

“all or part of the hearing”.

Amendment 48 will correct a minor typographical error.

The framing of Roz McCall’s amendment 108 is problematic from a legal and practical perspective, although I appreciate her interest in the area. It would be inappropriate for ministers to be seen to direct the decision making of an independent tribunal or the relevant independent office bearers who are carrying out their functions under the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011.

Guidance for attendance at hearings, which is based on the age and stage of the child, is rightly within the domain of the national convener of Children’s Hearings Scotland. Detailed guidance on attendance is already published and updated on a regular basis in the CHS practice and procedure manual. Just as it would be inappropriate for the Scottish ministers to interfere with decision-making functions that have been conferred on the courts, it would be equally inappropriate to interfere in relation to decision making by a children’s hearing, which is an independent and impartial tribunal.

Amendment 188, in the name of Martin Whitfield, would have the effect of retaining the child’s duty to attend hearings. Removing that duty was a key recommendation in the “Hearings for Children” report and the duty’s removal in section 13 of the bill was welcomed by the committee in its stage 1 report. Removing the duty was also well supported in the 2024 public consultation on the proposals. A child’s preference for how they participate in their hearing should be respected to the fullest extent possible, and that must include whether and how they attend. We must not confuse mandated attendance at a hearing for meaningful participation.

Section 13 of the bill will provide a simple power for a hearing to require a child’s attendance where it is necessary for them to have “a fair hearing” or to assist the hearing in making a decision. In exercising that power, the hearing must have regard to the child’s “age and maturity” and consider whether requiring their attendance would put them at risk. Section 13 does not seek to deprive a child of their right to attend their hearing. That right is absolute: no child can be excluded from their hearing for any reason.

The bill seeks to uphold a child’s preference for whether to attend a hearing, to respond to that preference with support and to provide assurance that a child will only need to attend if it is absolutely necessary and fully justified by the hearing. Amendment 188 goes against that well-supported proposal, so I urge Martin Whitfield not to move it.

Similarly, I ask Roz McCall not to move amendment 108. I encourage members to reject amendment 108 if it is moved and to support the amendments in my name.

I move amendment 34.

From what I have set out regarding the young person’s views being sought on whether they wish to attend and on how they participate in the hearing, I would say that the safeguards are already in place where it is necessary for the child to be there in order to have a fair hearing or to assist the hearing in making a decision.

I would respectfully disagree with Mr Whitfield. I believe that the safeguards are already built into the bill, following the gathering of the views of children and young people through the consultation.

I will press my amendment 34 and I resist Mr Whitfield’s amendment 188. We will be having a lot of discussions after this meeting, however. If there are concerns around this matter, we can always pick them up. I am not saying that I would go any further on it, but it would be helpful for us to get to the bottom of this disagreement.

Aspects of it could be, but at the crux of this is the fact that this relates to the children’s hearings redesign and Sheriff Mackie’s report. Obviously, the redesign programme is driving forward with the non-legislative aspects of this. This is centred around that, but it is something that I believe will help improve the situation and will be directed towards the next parliamentary session.

There might be merit in legislating in the bill to put timeliness reporting on a statutory footing and enabling the form, scope and content to be governed by future regulations, as Roz McCall’s amendment 198 seeks to do.

On publication and dissemination, we could include a duty in the bill provision, with further parameters to be set out in regulations in order to afford the Parliament appropriate scrutiny and oversight. It is important that any provision on time measurement reflects the redesigned system, not the current one. The detail of that is still emerging through the bill, so a regulation-making power is a sensible future-proofing measure and will afford the Parliament appropriate scrutiny and oversight. Thus, some technical refinements could be made to the amendment that would not materially change the effect of the amendment. For example, it could adopt the terminology of “time intervals and quality standards” rather than “waiting times”. In any case, I undertake to consider the issue further ahead of stage 3, to give best effect to the member’s intentions, which I absolutely support. With that assurance, I ask Roz McCall not to move amendment 198.

I am grateful to Mr Balfour for lodging his amendment 77, which seeks to expand the prescribed list of circumstances where children’s legal aid is automatically available to a child in connection with certain children’s hearings and court proceedings. Although I agree with the principle of his intentions, I am concerned that the amendment would have significant adverse consequences for not just the children and young people who are eligible for legal aid but the legal profession and the courts that serve them in those circumstances. I will lay out my concerns.

The Scottish Legal Aid Board has established a scheme to ensure that a duty solicitor is available to a child who is entitled to automatic legal aid under section 28C of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986. Under regulation 35 of the Children’s Legal Assistance (Scotland) Regulations 2013, a child in those circumstances may not choose their own solicitor, as children’s legal aid may be provided only by a solicitor who is made available under the duty scheme.

Amendment 77 would impose a requirement for all children to be provided with a duty solicitor, creating a twofold problem, as that would be undeliverable and would impose a requirement for children to be represented by whoever the duty solicitor was at the time, and I think that the member would agree that that is not necessarily a child-centred approach.

I understand that, in most cases where there are court proceedings, children will already have a solicitor of choice who has been acting for them in earlier hearings proceedings, and our information is that there are few, if any recorded instances of children being unable to secure representation. Accordingly, although I agree in principle with the amendment, I have concerns that it could undermine some of the existing arrangements. In the light of those concerns, I ask Mr Balfour not to press amendment 77. However, I have been clear with him that I am happy to engage with him on the issue to explore other potential opportunities to strengthen children’s legal aid.

I am grateful to members for lodging amendments 111 and 112, which raise important questions about the quality, consistency and trauma-informed nature of representation in the children’s hearings system. The Government is fully committed to ensuring that children and families experience high-quality, trustworthy and trauma-informed legal support. However, both amendments raise significant issues relating to the independence of the legal profession, regulatory oversight and the sustainability of the solicitor workforce.

In Scotland, the regulation of solicitors is a matter for the Law Society of Scotland, overseen by the Lord President. Introducing a minister-driven accreditation scheme, as proposed in amendment 111, would risk a significant departure from that long-standing position and would challenge the independence of the legal profession.

The Scottish Legal Aid Board already requires solicitors who work in the area of children’s legal assistance to meet five defined standards, which show their knowledge and experience in child law and development. Solicitors can also choose to be specially accredited in child law through the Law Society of Scotland. However, we know that there are shortages of available solicitors in some areas and that securing duty representation can sometimes be challenging. Mandatory accreditation or additional compulsory training could exacerbate that situation.

Similarly, amendment 112 seeks to ensure trauma-informed practice by requiring completion of a course approved by the national convener, rather than by the Law Society or the Lord President. Although the intention is welcome, the amendment might reduce the number of solicitors who are prepared to undertake that work unless it is accompanied by appropriate remuneration and implementation planning, so I have some concerns about the framing of the amendment. We also recognise the strong vision and values statement that is endorsed by partners across the hearings system, which sets out clear expectations around collaborative, respectful child-centred practice. Any move towards formal accreditation should build on that shared framework.

For those reasons, although we support the aspiration to strengthen practice, we do not necessarily consider that introducing statutory accreditation at stage 2 is the right approach.

Accordingly, I invite members not to press amendments 111 and 112 today, but I am happy to commit to further engagement with the Law Society of Scotland, the Lord President, SLAB, the Family Law Association and wider stakeholders ahead of stage 3, and to consider whether a more proportionate, consensus-based approach could be developed. Our shared priority must be ensuring that children and young people receive the best possible support in the hearings system.

Amendment 114 would make children’s legal aid automatically available to every child who is subject to a children’s hearing fixed by the children’s reporter, including all deferred hearings, irrespective of the grounds of referral. The effect of the amendment operationally would be to require the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration to notify the Scottish Legal Aid Board of every hearing. The Scottish Legal Aid Board would then have to arrange for a duty solicitor to be made available to every subject child. That would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, logistically. In addition, given the rules on children’s legal aid schemes, it would mean that every child who had chosen their own solicitor would need to use a duty solicitor.

It could also lead to the presence of more solicitors in a children’s hearing, with a risk that the voice of the child would become quieter. The relevance of legal presentation should be a key issue in determining the need for a solicitor, and we should avoid it becoming the norm.

Amendment 114 is also unnecessary because, in any case from 1 June, children will have automatic access to free advice by way of representation for any children’s hearing without any means or merit tests. Another key issue relates to the concern that the supply of duty solicitors would fail to meet any new increased demand of that level, with the consequence that such a proposal would become inoperable.

Amendment 114 also seeks to extend the availability of automatic children’s legal aid but, in this case, only on any occasion when a referral ground includes an offence allegedly being committed. Although I accept that that is narrower in scope than amendment 113, I am again concerned about the need for such a blanket provision when there is adequate scope under the current rules for children to access to legal aid when it is required. As has already been mentioned, from 1 June, assistance by way of representation will be automatically available to the subject child for all hearings.

In addition, although amendment 114 is narrower in scope than amendment 113, it is disproportionate, as it would nonetheless result in automatic children’s legal aid for any hearing involving a referral, even referrals for minor offences. Operationally, amendment 114 would also result in a significant number of duty appointments being required to be put in place by SLAB, along with a knock-on effect for those solicitors. As with amendment 113, any child who has selected their own solicitor would be unable to be represented by them since the duty rules will require that automatic legal aid be provided by the duty solicitor.

Finally—you will be pleased to hear me say that—it should be borne in mind that children’s hearings adopt a welfarist approach that aims to be non-adversarial—

I am interested in working to further improve the support that is provided to our youngest children and babies. I am happy to discuss with Ms McCall whether the approach in her amendments in this group is the right one.

It would be relevant to pull together the host of work that partners are undertaking in relation to the provisions in the bill and the wider non-legislative work through, for example, the children’s hearings redesign board, to improve the support that is provided to our babies and youngest children. If I pull that together and provide it to Ms McCall, we could then have a further discussion on the amendments.

If Ms McCall is willing to make an intervention, I ask her to say whether, given that assurance, she will not press or move her amendments so that we can discuss the issue further.

I would need to reflect on that. There is a clear role for the safeguarders. I might want to consider that further, but I see that Mr Whitfield has another point.

There was no guarantee that the young people who engaged in the consultation would get the care leaver payment. No specific timescale was set for the payment being introduced. Obviously, there will be children who have not had the payment since the consultation, but lots of care-experienced young people prior to the consultation did not receive the payment.

The payment is a key aspect of delivering the Promise. I appreciate that we have had to wait until 2026 for the regulations, but I highlight that the introduction of the payment is an extremely positive move that will support young people when they leave care.