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Many of the areas that I am interested in have been covered. I want to explore the main theme of this evidence session. Thus far, the evidence has highlighted the considerable complexity that is illustrated by the fiscal framework. It also points to the fact that there is a bit of a johari window issue in that politicians are driven to look at very nearside issues in relation to the budget in hand at this moment in time, although our earlier conversation was about the lack of long-term infrastructure investment—capex and so on. Public sector net investment was 8 per cent of gross domestic product in the 1960s and had dropped to 0.5 per cent of GDP by the 1990s. That big thematic framing of the UK macroeconomy tends to be forgotten when we are looking at this exercise.

That is a long explanation for what is a simple question. Given that this evidence session is about a strategic approach to the Scottish budget, in summing up, what areas would you like to pull out that have not been considered thus far to genuinely attempt some consideration of a strategic approach to the Scottish budget?

You looked at me, Professor Bell, so I will go to you first.

Good morning. I have a few random questions. David Lonsdale, I want to ask you about your intriguing comment about competitiveness pertaining to the tax strategy or framework, as you described it. Can you give us a bit more flavour of that? For the record, you said that tax strategy should include an additional principle of competitiveness

“to stimulate greater levels of private sector investment and consumer demand, to ensure a strong economic recovery.”

That is an excellent response. In asking that question, I was not making a singular plea for hypothecated taxes—it was merely a question.

Have David Lott and Vikki Manson anything to add on that? I appreciate that it is a bit of a left-field question.

You have touched on the subtle point that I was making, which is less rigid than the one on hypothecated taxes. It is about following the funding of such measures.

You illustrate the complexity of the issue, which can probably go only one way. To counter that complexity—I think that my colleague Ross Greer was getting at this—assumptions should be stated, where that is possible and feasible. The more planning, the better, even though we all accept that the only certainty is that, ultimately, all plans will be wrong. However, from a behavioural perspective, we need to try to track things.

On that point, I note that we will not have a medium-term financial strategy, and we do not anticipate that we will have an updated infrastructure investment plan. That seems to me to be counter to the dawning realisation that everyone has had that we are in the position that we are in because of a failure to plan—or, rather, to scenario plan. Given that pay policy informs the MTFS, what are your thoughts on planning and what we need to do in that respect?

As things stand as regards our understanding of those ifs, we are light years away from being able to definitively state that there will be Barnett consequentials as a result of that UK Government policy. That is what I am trying to get at.

I have a couple of wee questions to finish off. First, on the question that Liz Smith raised earlier about VAT on private schools, I want to make sure that I have all my ifs in a row. If that policy is enacted, if the money is spent on education in England and Wales and if it goes on public sector education spend—in other words, if it is not used to enable private companies to set up education-type bodies—only at that point could it result in Barnett consequentials. I accept that we would not know the detail of that, because of what you said in your earlier commentary. I am trying to flesh out all the ifs. There would be Barnett consequentials only if the money that is raised is spent on publicly tractable public sector funding for education. There could be a scenario in which the money that is raised is nominally spent on education provision or services, but it cannot be Barnett consequentialised, if there is such a word.

The Scottish pubs code adjudicator, Sarah Havlin, has recently been appointed for a three-year term. Will the delay to the regulations have any impact on the operation of her office?

Good morning, convener. Similarly, my entry in the register of members’ interests is up to date, but I note that I am an ambassador for the Westminster all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking, and I own a couple of buy-to-let properties. I am not sure that either of those things are relevant, but it is better to be on the safe side.

I have listened to the session with great interest, and there is no denying the power of your advocacy for disabled people. In general terms, I am hearing a lot of arguments to which I would take a slightly counter view, similar to what I said about EqIAs. In all the various forms of government, there are issues with processes not being undertaken because they are time consuming, expensive and often difficult, particularly where there are competing rights. We have seen that before, and it has proven quite difficult.

To what extent have you considered that although you are operating with the best intent, in reality, you are desperately seeking to plug a gap that is there? If that is the case, why cannot we—all of us in the Parliament—plug that gap without a commissioner?