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I hope that we would all agree that, if legislation of this kind is passed, we should try to avoid, as much as possible, individuals incurring any financial cost. Will there be a financial cost involved in notaries public providing such a service? If so, how do we expect that it will be met?

I am curious about the part of Bob Doris’s amendment that refers to regulations making provision about

“the type of settings or premises where functions under this Act”

can take place. That seems to be a very broad definition. There is a legitimate discussion that we might have about whether there ought to be regulations on the settings or premises in which the final action under the bill—the provision of an approved substance and its use by an individual—should take place and about whether that should be defined. However, it seems to me that it is quite broad to say that there should be regulations on the settings and premises for any functions performed under the act, including record keeping and the recording of statements, for example. Will Bob Doris explain why he has taken a very broad approach to that aspect?

So that I can be clear about what the member is saying—is he saying that he does not support the amendments from Jackie Baillie at this point but that he is willing to explore the issues further? Is he resisting the amendments or is he ambivalent about them?

First, I have a brief comment on Liam McArthur and Jackie Baillie’s amendments. I agree with Liam McArthur that the meaning that is captured in the amendments is already included in the bill, but there is clearly a desire for some additional clarity, which I do not have a problem with. Liam McArthur’s formulation is slightly preferable, so I will support amendment 24.

On the specific argument about a prognosis, part of my worry is that we will end up placing an unbearable pressure on clinicians, who must make finely balanced judgments. There is also a potential risk that individuals who make a request could, in certain circumstances, have their access to the rights set out in the bill subject to challenge.

If we lived in a world where prognosis was a simple calculation—it was correct or incorrect—such a time limit would be workable. We do not live in such a world, and the judgments that are required to give a prognosis are not precise. One thing that we should be keen to avoid, if the bill passes and becomes legislation, is individuals—professionals involved in the process or people who seek to access the right to assistance—ending up with their circumstances subject to challenge and query and their rights essentially blocked by those who seek to challenge such judgments, which, by definition, cannot be precise.

Will the member take an intervention at this point?

I did not want to interrupt in the middle, but I hope that Bob Doris could say a little more about what seem to me to be subjective issues in the definition, in particular about coercion including being

“unduly influenced ... by ... the person’s own beliefs about themselves”.

We are all very conscious that we are discussing a subject on which people in society have profoundly different values. There will be people around this table with very different values on how we make decisions in our own lives. Legislation of this kind needs to reflect and respect the fact that people have a right to make decisions in line with their own values, not in line with the values that are imposed on them by society. Can the member tell me what the difference is between legitimately making a decision in a way that is reasonably influenced by my beliefs about myself and what would be considered coercion by being unduly influenced by my beliefs about myself? It feels to me to be a subjective and difficult-to-define area.

The most important thing that we should bear in mind is that that is how people are overwhelmingly likely to use the right to seek assistance. The idea that somebody would seek assistance and say, “I want help to end my life,” two days after a diagnosis is a bit of a straw-man argument. It is highly unlikely for somebody to be in such a scenario after two days.

As Liam McArthur said, a range of other safeguards are in place. Discussions and conversations will have to happen with the patient and other professionals, some of which will likely be strengthened as we debate other groups of amendments at stage 2 that will ensure that the conversations happen in a sensitive and understanding manner. Principally, the decision and the judgment need to be driven by the individual. It is about giving people a degree of control.

I am not convinced by the time boundary amendments. As the member might be aware, I was not on the committee for the stage 1 inquiry and have joined the committee since then. However, I think that the committee got the judgment right in its stage 1 report in suggesting that a time-bound prognosis should not be required, so I will not support those amendments.

I am sorry, but could you speak up a little?

Secondly, I would like to ask how you can reassure us, and by doing so reassure the public, that, as an organisation, you will have a zero-tolerance attitude to racism and other forms of prejudice, bearing in mind not only the special responsibility that all public bodies have but the particular role of your organisation in expressing something of Scotland’s essential identity, character and story? How can you reassure us of that?

Okay. There are two aspects to what I want to ask you about. One is about accuracy and, in particular, the accuracy of the suggestion that the allegation has damaged or ended a relationship that you had with the University of Glasgow on a project around slavery and empire. Do you know whether that suggestion is accurate and whether there is the potential to repair the damage to the organisation’s reputation so that such work can recommence?