Seòmar agus comataidhean

I am very sympathetic to the member’s points about anorexia nervosa, and I think that we need to put safeguards in place in that respect. That said, I wonder whether there are technical problems with the reference to

“voluntarily stopping eating and drinking”,

given that there are a number of conditions, including digestive ones, that might result in people not being able to eat or drink and being required to use enteral feeding, have percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tubes and so on. I wonder whether the way in which the member has captured that issue might have unintended consequences.

Will the member accept my point that, in principle, rather than necessarily establishing an accurate prognosis, setting a time limit is about trying to set a time boundary around the immediacy of the expectation of the end of life? Does he imagine that such time bands would at least have to feature in guidance so that we do not run the risk of expansion? In other words, how does one judge that immediacy if we do not put it in the bill or guidance?

Will the member give way?

At the outset, I state that I broadly agree with much of what Jeremy Balfour has set out. To my mind, the debate has been marked by two substantial features both for those who are advocating for the bill and for those who are speaking against it, in that we all want to provide dignity and empowerment for those who are in the final stages of their lives and who may well be suffering from conditions and diseases that leave them in an intolerable situation. On the other hand, we also want to ensure that we do not foster a culture in which people feel as though they are under pressure to end their life or that there is an expectation that they do so in certain circumstances, particularly when that involves things such as mental illness, disability and other such issues, as Jeremy Balfour has set out. That is why I think that the definition of terminal illness is so important.

I understand that definitions are always difficult and I understand the reasons why the definition in the bill was arrived at but, to my mind, the key point is that the bill’s provisions must be used only when a person’s death is imminent and expected. If I were to put it glibly, in a sense, we all have a terminal and progressive condition, but the immediateness of it is relative. That is why I think that it is important to include some sort of time boundary, not just for clarity but to prevent judicial expansion, which we have all been very concerned about, based on situations in other countries. I think that there is an inherent issue with the accuracy and effectiveness of time limits. The point is not necessarily about the accuracy of a prognosis; it is about clarity on the immediacy of the likelihood of a person’s death and whether that is a reasonable expectation. Including a time boundary could provide absolute clarity that the likelihood of a person’s death has some immediacy, so that the time period is counted not in years or decades but in weeks or months.

Jeremy Balfour’s amendment 143 sets out the time boundary as three months, which I think is probably too short. If we are leaving these decisions to be made only when death is very proximate, that could preclude people from making a decision as calmly and in as informed a way as possible, although I think that three months would be better than no time limit. If my amendment 4 is pre-empted, I will understand. Whether the committee decides on a timeframe of three months or six months, we need a time limitation in order to set out clearly that there should be the expectation of the likelihood of a person’s death being imminent.

I wonder whether Bob Doris would agree with me on this. There are two points here: one is the principle, and one concerns the technical drafting. On the principle, as he has pointed out, the policy memorandum seems to suggest that the bill is about providing a possibility for people for whom death is very near or imminent. That is different from the technicalities of how we capture that. However, it is important to establish whether we want to capture that immediacy in the bill itself or leave it to further regulation and guidance. Does the member agree with me that, even if the committee rejects the technicalities of what has been drafted, we need some understanding of whether members accept the principle?

I think that the member might be referring to my amendments in a later group, which would alter the age to 25. I hear what he is saying, but I wonder whether he thinks that there is a discussion to be had about the issue. He talks about rights but, earlier in his contribution, he talked about capacity, too. There is an increasing body of evidence on cognitive development and neurodevelopment that shows that people’s attitudes and ability to make decisions—that is, their cognitive ability—do not fully mature until the age of 25. If capacity is a central issue, there is at least a discussion to be had about the age limit to be set, because we absolutely want to ensure that people are exercising this right with the fullest of capacity. Does the member accept that those are the parameters of this debate?

My intervention is further to that point. I echo the questions that Bob Doris just raised and will add to them. As it stands, from the member’s understanding, what would prevent someone with a decade or more to live from exercising their rights under the bill? That question follows on from the very powerful point that Pam Duncan-Glancy made.

Bob was first.

In your annual report last year, you stated that one of your primary risks relates to stability of funding from the Scottish Government. Given that you will produce your annual report a matter of weeks before the Scottish Government will introduce its budget, how is the Scottish Government supposed to set its budget with confidence if it does not know how you have estimated your performance in the previous financial year?

Mr Wilson, you stated that your key focus is on outcomes for consumers in Scotland. Consumer Scotland’s statutory aims are to reduce harm to consumers, to increase consumer confidence, to increase the extent to which consumer matters are taken into account by public bodies, to promote sustainable practices in the use of goods by consumers and to otherwise advance wellbeing. There is a heavy emphasis on consumers, but how do you measure those outcomes? In your annual report last year, there is an awful lot of articulation of outputs but not necessarily any measures of outcomes for consumers.