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I understand their concerns, and I understand the overall pressures on the teaching profession and on all practitioners working in classrooms, but I find myself struggling somewhat with some of those arguments, for two primary reasons.

First, it is contended that the guidance is already being followed. If so, I do not understand why putting that guidance on a statutory footing is problematic. If the guidance is being followed, and because I do not foresee a huge change in the substance of that guidance, which would be revised but would not be altogether different, I do not understand why putting it on a statutory footing would be problematic.

Secondly, there is the more fundamental point that I outlined in my previous answers. We are talking about the use of force and the deprivation of liberty. Those things are very serious when they occur, so we need the most robust levels of oversight and recording; if anyone thinks that that is not the case, I would really like them to explain why they think those things should just be a matter of routine and should not require what I think is a not terribly onerous level of oversight. We are just asking for those things to be recorded. I have not specified exactly how, but that might simply be a matter of recording in an electronic journal. I have not specified how the informing should occur but, in most instances, that would probably mean just a phone call.

Regarding the training requirements, if physical intervention is to be applied, especially if that is foreseeable and regular, it is clear that people will need training.

I have not heard an explanation of why any of those elements is problematic.

The member raises an interesting point, which goes to the heart of the matter. The most profound concern probably comes from people with those needs. I am not clear about any need for particular provision, primarily because the bulk of such incidents involve children with additional support needs, which means that it would be impossible to look at guidance in that area of practice without keeping additional support needs absolutely front and centre, as they very much are in the current guidance.

The question is interesting from another perspective, and I would be interested to follow up informally with committee members about their visit to Donaldson’s. When we talk to practitioners working in such settings, they have the fewest issues or concerns about the bill, because they understand the need for sensitivity. When I spoke to people at Donaldson’s, they almost questioned the need for the bill because they do not use restrictive practices.

I absolutely think that, when we look at the bill and develop guidance, we must have young people with additional support needs or disabilities at the forefront of our minds. I do not think that that means there is a need for more specific provision within the bill, but I am focusing precisely on that.

Let us again be clear about what the bill would and would not do, and what the definitions would and would not do. The definitions are simply about providing the scope of practice around which there needs to be guidance from the Government. The bill does not state that anything would be prohibited, nor does it provide for any penalties. The bill literally states that the Government must provide guidance for actions that fall within that scope of practice. It is then for the guidance to provide the sort of clarity that the member quite rightly seeks.

That is a normal way for the Parliament to proceed. Jackie Dunbar is here—we had a similar discussion yesterday about the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill. There is a balance between the boundaries that we create in legislation and the things that we leave as a matter for guidance. What I am saying is that there is a scope of activities that need to be regulated by guidance. It is then for the guidance to specify precisely what those activities look like.

Willie Rennie makes an important point, which I understand. The current situation makes it worse; having non-statutory guidance that does not have the precision or the clarity that we might want creates ambiguity in those situations. Having the provisions on a statutory footing, and requiring clarity and engagement on the definitions and, indeed, on recording, would better promote clearer definitions about what we mean by restraint and appropriate responses.

Critically, that is why there is also a training element. If we were just talking about the bill without the other elements, particularly training, I might agree with you. However, the key point is that I am not just seeking to provide a document. I am seeking to provide clarity on training and practice. That will always be an on-going effort. The moment that the Government produces guidance, concerns will be expressed along the lines that Mr Rennie has set out. By making the guidance clearer and more precise, we will minimise the risk.

Yes, but, again, there is the question whether introducing such assistance in care homes puts pressure in the other direction, on people who do not wish to consider an assisted death. At the very heart of this is the personal nature of hospices, many of which are very small, which means that assisted dying almost becomes the assumption that they are introduced to. I recognise the point, and the stress that might be caused.

I am sorry; is that an intervention?

I understand the point and I recognise that this is complicated and delicate, but the flipside of that coin is that there is a very real concern among those in the hospice sector that, if what is proposed in the bill is undertaken, especially in small, intimate settings, the practice with regard to palliative care for those who do not wish it will be affected. That would essentially be impossible to avoid, given the nature of many of those settings. It would not be the case in every setting, and it may well be that the regulations would make specific considerations. However, I ask the member to understand that, if his argument is correct, there is a very real flipside to the same coin, which is that one practice would be unavoidably affected by the other.

That is very much at the heart of why I lodged amendment 20. It is one thing to propose a notional opt-out, either for individuals or for organisations but, especially for hospices, it may be that the practice becomes such that opting out would not be a financial practicality, especially given the precarious financial circumstances in which hospices find themselves—they get only partial funding through the NHS. Again, we need to tread carefully. I recognise that it is a matter of balance but, given the very personal nature of the situation, it is important that we allow that flexibility, especially for hospices and care homes.

It is useful to follow Bob Doris. My amendments fall, like his, in multiple parts of the bill, so I ask for the committee’s forbearance.

This group of amendments is very important. It is entitled “Assessments of the terminally ill adult”, and those are at the heart of what the legislation is about. Indeed, they are critical to its operation. We have already heard that there will be a need for careful consideration by the co-ordinating medical practitioner, who will not always be able to deliver everything by themselves and will need to refer to other professionals or seek other information. It is important that we are clear about how that will work, and not just with regard to what is in the bill. Ultimately, we must recognise that it will need to be based on professional judgment, no matter how good the legislation, the guidance or the training might be. It will all boil down to medical practitioners and doctors making careful decisions in consultation with the person concerned and ensuring that that happens in a fully informed way.

The first set of amendments that I will speak to has been prepared in conjunction with CHAS. As we have already discussed with regard to previous sections, when it comes to situations involving young adults, there needs to be more careful consideration both of the nature of their illnesses, which can look very different, and of their vulnerability.

Amendment 50 provides for amendment 51, which sets out that, when someone is under the age of 25, there will be a referral to a registered social worker and a registered medical practitioner who is a specialist psychiatrist. That is to ensure not just that there is a vulnerability assessment, but that the young adult is making the decision in an informed way. It is important that, in such situations, there is referral to those specialists, because the decision involves a critical judgment, and such referrals will be critical in ensuring that the young person has capacity and understands fully what is inevitably going to be a very complex decision.

CHAS’s judgment is that the current assessment process does not make sufficient provision for assessing that capacity or providing the safeguards that it believes are needed for young people. I know that the numbers are likely to be very small, but it is important that we take the proposed approach, which I do not think would put undue pressure on social work or psychiatry systems.

Critically, the approach would not change the decision-making process, which will ultimately rest with the medical practitioner; there is simply a request that those referrals be made and those additional points of information be sought. As I set out at the beginning, these will be delicate judgments that are based on the relationship between the patient and the co-ordinating practitioner, but it is important that, in particular circumstances, additional points of information and professional judgments can be brought in.

Like some of the amendments that Bob Doris has lodged, amendment 93 has been prepared in conjunction with another organisation—in this case, Hospice UK. It is absolutely essential that anyone who requests an assisted death be fully informed of all the options, not just the one that they are requesting. In other words, when they make their request, they must be fully informed of the palliative options that are available to them. There can often be complex issues, and there might be other connotations that people might not have perceived in advance. In particular, not all doctors will have expertise in such care, which is why Hospice UK has asked that anyone who makes such a request be provided with that information and have the option of being referred to palliative care.

Amendment 75, which has been prepared in conjunction with the Royal College of Psychiatrists, is, in a sense, an extension of the amendments that were previously debated on the proposal for a register. In the royal college’s view, it is important that, where there are questions about capacity and in any borderline cases—especially complex cases such as those involving dementia or other complex mental health disorders—there is an avenue for further exploration of those issues and further consultation.

Finally, I turn to my own amendments, 5 and 6. We have heard a great deal from Bob Doris about the nature of the decision that is to be made by the co-ordinating practitioner and what that will look like. For me, that judgment is absolutely at the apex of the bill. As Bob Doris put it, we need to take great care that we do not turn this into simply a tick-box exercise.

My amendments are probing amendments. The fact is that we can put as much as we want in the bill, but we must ensure that the relationship in question is as effective as possible and that any judgment is made in as full a way as possible. To achieve that, I ask members to explore the nature of that relationship.

At the moment, co-ordinating practitioners are asked to sign the form in schedule 1, and they can literally just put their name and a date at the end of a block of text. The form does not ask any questions about the nature of the relationship or what has been explored, and it does not ask for an assessment. Bob Doris’s amendments are interesting, because they require a report, but I am simply asking the committee to think about whether we want to ask co-ordinating practitioners to declare any other information. The length of time for which a physician has known a patient is not a terribly good or accurate way of measuring the relationship, but—this is why amendments 5 and 6 are probing amendments—it is one way of getting a sense of how well the practitioner knows a patient.

Let me draw in some other examples from a health context. It is important that, although we are discussing a particular situation, the wider health system is not divorced from the discussion. I have been in a situation in which a physician whom I have known for only a very short time has provided me with an excellent level of in-depth information, which has allowed me to understand it. In particular, when my daughter was born, I was dealt a medical situation that I found quite overwhelming. However, I have also been in a situation in which I had surgery and, to this day, I am not clear about which physician performed the procedure on me.

I have also been in situations in which I have had to fight to get physicians to understand the full, broad range of circumstances, because they have been so busy. It might be that a physician ultimately signs off or authorises a procedure but, actually, a team of physicians is involved and the overstretched nature of the system means that no one person has a relationship with the individual.

We need to ensure that that is not the case under the bill—there must be a positive relationship that is well understood. The physician must not only take the time to understand the individual, their needs and why they are seeking to make this decision, but draw in other professional opinions and ensure that the person has the information that they need.

Amendments 5 and 6 do not ensure that. I am asking whether the declaration and the duties and obligations that we set out are sufficient. More needs to be done to ensure that they are, which cannot be a tick-box exercise, as we have seen happen time and time again. We can create a pro forma and a set of tick boxes, but that does not always mean that a relationship of the quality that we want, the information that we require people to have and the empowerment that we seek are provided. More needs to be done in the bill on that point.

Again, I would just say that the reverse could also be true. By not permitting that, you are, in effect, creating a mandate and therefore there is a concern that practice in palliative care will be inextricably altered by that practice. We need to listen to that concern.